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Introduction

“道，可道也，非恒道也.”1 “The [D]ao that can be spoken is not the eternal
[D]ao.”2 These words belong to Lao Tzu’s most famous text and Daoism’s staple cannon, the
Dao De Jing.3 Not only is the first sentence one of the most difficult sentences to translate
from ancient Chinese into English, but it also encompasses many cultural values that the
Chinese still hold dear today. Both Chinese and Western scholars have fought over the true
meaning of this first verse for centuries and still have not reached a consensus on the correct
meaning of the phrase. The ambiguity of the first sentence of the Dao De Jing can also be
used to describe the way Chinese leaders view themselves in the world and Chinese foreign
policy behavior. However, until there is global comprehension of the Dao De Jing and other
Chinese cultural texts, the world will not completely understand China and its role in the
international system.
One way to try to bridge Chinese culture and foreign policy behavior is through the
use of role theory and national role conceptions. National role conceptions can be defined as
the way in which foreign policy decision-makers perceive their actions in the international
system.4 Scholars are trying to determine the origins of Chinese foreign policy because it is
becoming a more dynamic factor in today’s world. By using national role conceptions, role
theorists attempt to juxtapose politics and cultures to gain a more comprehensive
understanding of the development of Chinese foreign policy.
In this Independent Study Thesis, I will attempt to answer the question: “How do
Chinese leaders’ national role conceptions affect the foreign policy behavior of China?” The
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national role conception that Chinese leaders have plays an essential part in the development
and implementation of Chinese foreign policy. These different national role conceptions
create an understanding of how China views itself in the international system. Chinese
foreign policy has undergone many transformations since the death of Mao Zedong. Instead
of being a relatively isolationist country, China is now at the center of world politics.
However, different Chinese leaders have had differing opinions vis-à-vis the path China
should follow in its global rise in power. Therefore, I hypothesize that the different national
role conceptions of Chinese leaders lead to the changes in Chinese foreign policy behavior.
In the next chapter, I will review the relevant literature on role theory and foreign
policy analysis. This literature review will start with the theoretical base for role theory and
national role conceptions. K.J. Holsti’s seminal study on national role conceptions and
foreign policy will lay the foundation on which I will conduct my study.5 Chih-yu Shih’s
scholarship using role theory and national role conceptions to understand the complexities of
Chinese foreign policy and his empirical work on Chinese foreign policy will be essential in
formulating my argument and will give me a helpful foundation from which I can build my
own empirical research.6
Following the literature and theory review, I will detail my research design and
methodology. For this project, I will be employing the comparative case study methodology.
Because of the scope of my independent variable, I believe content analysis is the best way to
determine the national role conceptions of Chinese leaders. Through this methodology, I will
be able to analyze the works, speeches, documents, etc., of Chinese leaders like Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. I will then develop a national role conception for
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each leader and see if their differing national role conceptions have led to different foreign
policy behaviors.
In the next chapters I will display and critically analyze my data to determine if it
shows support for my hypothesis. First, the case of Deng Xiaoping will be provided,
followed by the case of Jiang Zemin. The case of Hu Jintao will end the case study portion
of the study. Following the case studies will be my analysis and conclusion where I will
provide possible policy implications for my research as well as provide different avenues to
pursue for further research.
Throughout this project, the eternal words of the Dao De Jing will never be forgotten.
Chinese foreign policy and Chinese leaders’ national role conceptions have similar
characteristics to the Dao De Jing. They each have a simplistic element and are mildly
ambiguous when deeply analyzed while also being culturally based which shows the
complexities and different dynamics of Chinese politics. It is necessary to gather a more
complete understanding of all these subjects to better comprehend China and its role in the
international system.

1

Robert T. Ames, and David L. Hall, A Philosophical Translation: Dao De Jing, “Making This Life
Significant” (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), p. 77.
2

Derek Lin, Tao Te Ching: Annotated & Explained (Woodstock, VT: SkyLight Paths, 2006), p. 3.

3 Ames

and Hall, A Philosophical Translation.

K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14:3
(Sept. 1970), p. 246.
4

5
6

Holsti, “National Role Conceptions.”

Chih-yu Shih, “National Role Conceptions as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of
Chinese Diplomacy,” Political Psychology 9:4 (Dec. 1988), p. 599-631; Chih-yu Shih, “Assigning Role
Characteristics to China: The Role State Versus The Ego State,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8:1 (Jan. 2012), p.
71-91.
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介绍

中国有一个很有意思的文化。它们的文化跟世界上别的国家都不一
样。因为中国的历史很长，中国的政治和社会还经常改变。可是今天，中
国是一个非常强大的国家。在世界上，中国的经济水平排名第二。而且，
中国的军事比别的国家最大。这两个方面很有意思。现在，中国在世界上
有一个非常重要的地位。如果一个学者想了解中国目前的情况，他们必须
了解中国的历史和文化。
政治学家有很多很多方法了解文化和政治的关系。在美国和别的西
方国家，政治学家用 “national role conceptions (国家角色的概念)” 来了解
这个关系。国家角色的概念是一个国家领导自己的感觉。每个领导有一个
国家角色的概念。
这些看法有很多影响。比如说，每个领导的外交政策跟他们的国家
角色的概念有一个很有意思的关系。如果你能了解这个关系，就能了解中
国和这个国家的国际关系。
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在这个四年级的论文中，我想回答这个问题，“中国领导的国家角色
的概念跟中国的外交政策有什么关系？” 这个问题非常重要，因为中国是
一个非常重要的国家，很多人想尝试了解这个国家。
下个章节我会讨论很重要的国家角色的概念和外交政策的文学。我
会讨论一些很有名的学者。那些学者的观点会帮助我进一步完成我的论
文。文学讨论以后，我会写我的研究设计和方法。很多用国家角色的概念
的学者觉得内容分析是最好的方法。我会用内容分析的方法分析一些很重
要和有影响力的中国领导的论文，演讲，文件，等等，并且发现一个国家
角色的概念。那些领导是邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛。完成这一章节以
后，我会展示和分析我的结果。之后，我会给出我的结论，并且为进一步
的研究作准备。
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Chapter One: Literature Review and Theory

This chapter presents a general survey of the literature on foreign policy analysis and
a specific examination of role theory and the importance it has in explaining different types
of foreign policy behavior. The chapter then develops the different aspects of role theory that
are necessary to understand foreign policy behavior, with a large emphasis on national role
conceptions. Next, it provides an account of the literature on the different elements of
national role conceptions and concludes with different types of national role conceptions an
individual or state may hold.

The Study of Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Defined
Foreign policy is often a difficult subject to succinctly define. As Hermann points
out, there are many different aspects to foreign policy and one agreed upon definition may
not be the best for the scholarship.1 Some definitions of foreign policy are very general,
stating that they are the activities a state pursues in order to try to change the behavior of
other states.2 Other definitions are state-specific where one country, like the United States, is
analyzed to look at the different actors, factors, and conditions that create that one nation’s
foreign policy.3 Definitions like this are at times too specific and are not always
generalizable.
Most foreign policy scholars, however, believe that foreign policy consists of multiple
dimensions that affect the foreign policy decision-making process.4 These dimensions
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include different domestic influences as well as external factors that allow a country to
produce a certain foreign policy.5 Therefore, in order to have the most cohesive definition of
foreign policy, one must include both internal and external factors. Hermann’s definition of
foreign policy seems to satisfy this element of defining foreign policy. He states, foreign
policy, “...consists of those discrete official actions of the authoritative decision-makers of a
nation’s government, or their agents, which are intended by the decision-makers to influence
the behavior of international actors external to their own polity.”6 Hermann bridges nicely
both the domestic and international factors that may determine foreign policy. Many
academics, while studying foreign policy, have used his definition in order to conceptualize
foreign policy.7

Foreign Policy Analysis
According to many scholars of international relations, one of the most concrete ways
to develop a clearer understanding of global politics is through foreign policy analysis
(FPA).8 Foreign policy analysis acts as a bridge between international relations and many
other disciplines. Not only can FPA give students and scholars a more comprehensive
overview of the world around them, but it also provides different methodologies for
academics to use when trying to understand the relations between states. 9
Perhaps the most important addition foreign policy analysis gives to the study of
international relations is the idea that FPA is an actor-specific theory.10 Many other
disciplines and theories of international relations look solely at the system or state levels
when describing the world. However, FPA scholars take a different approach and look at a
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more micro-level of analysis, the individual.11 According to Valerie M. Hudson, historically,
foreign policy analysts would study the different methods of decision-making to interpret
foreign policy behavior.12 This reflects directly to the individual level of analysis and allows
for different explanations of foreign policy behavior.
However, Hudson also points out that a more direct way of gaining more knowledge
in international relations is to study foreign policy decision-makers. One could also look at
the specific characteristics of the individual to try to understand the foreign policy behavior
of a country such as Wish does in her 1980 study on national role conceptions and foreign
policy behavior. Essential to this individual level of analysis, as Hudson, Katzenstein, and
Dellios point out, is the influence of culture on the decision-making process.13 Both Hudson
and Katzenstein cite the importance of having actor-specific theory regarding international
relations and especially in the realm of foreign policy analysis.14
Breaking down the study of foreign policy to smaller, more specific pieces of
analysis, provides more nuanced and specific ways of describing international relations.
Foreign policy analysis is essentially the most comprehensive study of international relations.
One cannot understand the complexities of international relations without first understanding
the distinctions of foreign policies between different countries. Foreign policy analysis is
quickly becoming a more important and useful tool in international relations. Foreign policy
analysis has an explanatory power which other analyses of international relations lack, which
has led to the development of many different theories that are helpful in explaining relations
among states.
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Role Theory: A Foundation in the Social Sciences
Role theory has long been a staple theory in different social sciences including
sociology, social psychology, and anthropology. Role theory takes its name directly from the
theater where actors play certain parts which then encompass the entire show.15 According to
Eric S. Knowles, role theory is a perspective that scholars can use to develop different ways
of understanding human relations.16 Bruce Biddle, on the other hand, believes that role
theory is, “...a science concerned with the study of behaviors...” which are given to each
person depending on the context within which they live.17 The different characteristics that
are given to individuals are able to explain the distinct behaviors of said person or are
affected by the certain type of behavior.18
Although there are differing standpoints regarding role theory, the varying
interpretations come together to show that people are acting in specific ways based on the
need for certain roles in the world. The different ideas and premises that role theorists use
are very important to the development of the theory; Since there is not a single definition of
the theory, the many different perspectives of role theory work together to allow it to be used
in foreign policy analysis.

Elements of Role Theory
Roles consist of many different elements. There are many aspects that one can use to
determine their role in society. In some instances, roles are comprised of, “...a set of
standards, descriptions, norms, or concepts held for the behaviors of a person or social
position....”19 At other times, roles are different behaviors that are expected of people.
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Sarbin and Allen dictate that in order for people to be able to combine the differences
between the structure of society and the behavior of certain roles, one must look at role
expectations.20 Role expectations, in the social sciences, are, “...comprised of the rights and
privileges, the duties and obligations, of any occupant of a social position in relation to
persons occupying other positions in the social structure.”21
According to different social science literature, role theory, and the concept of role
more generally, looks at the social conduct between many different actors in society at
large.22 All people in the world have a specific part that they must undertake in order for the
world to function in a relatively peaceful manner. Roles have very important functions in the
world and societal system. People are able to gain different perspectives on issues regarding
the position they believe themselves to currently hold.
Members of a society must be able to understand and acknowledge the role they hold.
Role location is the idea that people need to locate their specific role for themselves.23
Citizens of the world need to know where they stand in society in order to better enact their
part in the world. Role location is a very important point because if people were not able to
gain a full understanding of where they stand in the societal structure, and why, then they
would not be able to enact their role in a comprehensive manner.

Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis
Role Theory’s Foundation in Political Science: What is a ‘role’?
Role theory has recently become a leading theory to use when studying foreign policy
behavior. However, the use of role theory regarding political science more generally has not
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been as widely researched; Since it is a newer approach when applied to political science,
not as much has been written in the area of study. Role theory has much potential for
explaining different phenomena in the world because of the many different avenues that
scholars can pursue when using role theory vis-à-vis political science. 24
According to Thies and Breuning, “[r]ole theory is premised on explaining and
understanding the interaction between agents and structures.”25 Thies and Breuning’s
statement directly corresponds to Hudson’s view that foreign policy analysis is based directly
on actor-specific theory.26 When thinking about foreign policy decision-making, it is still
essential to remember, as role theorists do, that individual people are making the decisions.
The fact that role theory focuses directly on the decision-makers gives it a certain level of
power that other theories of international relations may lack.
However, it is important to note that role theory does not only work on the individual
level of analysis. Role theory is able to be used in all three levels of analysis including the
system and state levels. At the system and state levels, the roles of the states would have
much more value than the role of individual decision-makers. Using role theory at the
system and state level would provide for broader analyses of political science. The
individual level of analysis, on the other hand, gives a very nuanced description of role
theory and its use in foreign policy analysis. Through the individual level of analysis, a more
specified view of the world can be given which allows scholars to gain a more
comprehensive understanding of how international relations and foreign policy work in the
international system. Therefore, a hybrid of the individual and state levels of analysis
provides the best framework for using role theory and foreign policy analysis.
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The Foundation of Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis
Role theory was first used in political science in the groundbreaking work of K.J.
Holsti and his use of role theory to explain the foreign policy behaviors of different nations.27
Holsti’s work was one of the first and most influential pieces of scholarly literature that first
combined role theory and foreign policy. While many have added different dimensions to
Holsti’s unprecedented study, the initial impact that Holsti had on foreign policy analysis as a
discipline was extremely important.
Holsti first described role in a more normative sense by basing role on a single
policy-maker’s perception of what to do, how to do it, and when to pursue a certain action.28
Holsti gave a more stylized and basic view of role that can be made applicable and useful to
other aspects of political science. By only looking at the what, how, and when questions,
Holsti allows other political scientists more room to develop their own concept of role, while
still basing their scholarship on his work.
Holsti’s most interesting contribution to role theory and foreign policy analysis,
besides being one of the first works on the subject, was the fact that he focused his study on
the individual rather than other levels of analysis.29 Until his study was published, foreign
policy scholars mainly looked at the state and systems level of analysis.30 Finally, with
Holsti’s groundbreaking work, the door was opened for many scholars to attempt to
understand international relations and foreign policy decisions at the individual level, which
helped to broaden the scope of studies produced in the realm of foreign policy analysis.
Philippe G. Le Prestre expands on Holsti and the meaning of ‘role.’ According to Le
Prestre, the word ‘role’ can have 6 different meanings with regards to foreign policy.31 Roles
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can be considered to be a contribution or function, an influence or impact, expected behavior,
part of a larger course of action, policy decisions, or rank in the international system.32 Le
Prestre’s vision of what a role is is more abstract. He is not looking directly at a decisionmaker and the part that a decision-maker plays. Rather, Le Prestre is showing how complex
and diverse role can be and how difficult it is to understand in a political science sense.
Other social scientists tend to more easily define role vis-à-vis the situation they are trying to
understand. Political scientists, on the other hand, are not easily able to give role a definitive
meaning because there are so many factors that can potentially be considered the role of a
state or an individual.33

Historical and Cultural Elements of Role
History and culture play a large part in the development of roles, especially when
political scientists use the concept.34 This is seen in much of the empirical work conducted
by scholars using role theory to describe and analyze foreign policy. For example, Shih and
his 1988 work on the cultural and psychocultural elements of Chinese diplomacy delves into
this area of study quite substantially.35 In his work, Shih develops the different cultural
aspects of Chinese leaders that can potentially impact the policies implemented by the
decision-makers. Elements that he includes in his study are Confucianism, Daoism, and
Marxism, all of which have deep historical backgrounds in Chinese history and culture.
Using Shih’s work, Katzenstein and Dellios conduct further analysis on the
importance of culture and historical factors on the foreign policies implemented by the
Chinese government.36 These scholars again highlight different historical factors that have
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induced Chinese foreign policy since the death of Mao Zedong. Katzenstein develops his
analysis of Chinese foreign policy from a strictly cultural and historical base. He cites many
different myths and legends that the Chinese people hold deeply within their culture that have
had profound impacts on the policies produced by different government officials.37 Dellios’
work falls in line more with Shih and the fact that she uses different Confucian principles to
develop a framework for studying Chinese foreign policy.38
It is clear that the definition of role in political science has many different meanings
despite the seeming ease with which other social sciences use the word. There are so many
elements to the concept of role that it is impossible to have a definition general enough for all
political scientists to use. Political scientists are at the mercy of their own conceptions of the
word ‘role’ to conduct research using role theory as their main theoretical approach. Role
theory has great potential to be a useful theory in political science, but it will still need to
develop in more generalizable terms in order for it to be used to its utmost potential.

Why Use Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis?
Stephen G. Walker was one of the first political scientists to try to explain the utility
of role theory in the study of foreign policy.39 Walker asserts that role theory is,
“...conceptually rich, but methodologically poor...” showing that role theory has some flaws
that need to be addressed before it can be a strong theory in foreign policy analysis and
international relations in general.40 Walker’s sentiment has been echoed by many different
foreign policy scholars including, Thies, Le Prestre, Shih, Cantir and Kaarbo, and Thies and
Breuning.41 However, the flaws are not substantial enough to dismiss the theory as a whole.
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Rather, the blemishes in the theory allow for different approaches to be used when studying
foreign policy.
Walker states that role theory is a very good descriptive, organizational, and
explanatory force for foreign policy analysts. Descriptively, Walker writes that, “...the
concepts associated with role analysis provide a vocabulary of images which can focus upon
foreign policy behavior at the national level of analysis, and also move up to the system level
of analysis.”42 Role theory, therefore, has a great descriptive ability and has multiple ways
that scholars can describe the foreign policies that are implemented throughout the world.
Again, a hybrid of the individual and state levels of analysis can be used to further develop
role theory. Organizationally, Walker asserts, “...the concepts associated with role analysis
permit the analyst to adopt either a structure-oriented or a process-oriented perspective.”43 A
structure-oriented perspective would allow the scholar to analyze the way in which the
structure of the international system would allow for certain roles to arise which would then
lead to the different foreign policy behavior of a country. The process-oriented perspective
looks at decision-making processes to determine how a state’s foreign policy was made.
Finally, as an explanatory force, Walker states, “...role analysis appears to depend on whether
its concepts are theoretically informed (a) by an appropriate set of self-contained propositions
and methods, or (b) by the specification of an appropriate set of auxiliary limiting conditions
and rules linking these conditions with role concepts.”44 The first of Walker’s points asserts
the need to have a clearly defined definition of role when conducting role theory research.
Then, Walker acknowledges the need to have strict codes of operationalizing role and the
concepts that make up a role.
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Components of Role Theory: How it is Used in Foreign Policy Analysis
As various social science scholars have stated, there are many different components
that produce role theory. Included in this are role enactments, role location, role
expectations, role demands, and the most useful for foreign policy analysis, role
conceptions.45 Role enactments, according to Sarbin and Allen can be classified in three
different ways, the number of roles an individual holds, how much effort is used to display a
certain role, and the amount of time an individual compares their role to other roles they
could possibly hold.46 These are the different ways that individuals can enact their specific
roles. Role location, as stated before, is the ability for an individual to find their role in
society.47 Once a person is able to find their respective role, based on the socialization of the
society, then they are more likely to perform their role in a more meaningful manner.

Role Expectations and Role Demands
Role expectations play a large part in the development of role theory and its
application to foreign policy analysis. According to Thies, role expectations, “...consist of
norms, beliefs, and preferences concerning the performance of any individual in a social
position relative to individuals occupying other positions.”48 All of these ideas factoring into
role expectations create what individuals are expected to do when holding a certain role in
the international system. Thies also writes that role expectations, “...provide the conceptual
bridge between the individual and societal structure.”49 Wish asserts that role expectations
are one of the driving factors that can, “...influence role performance or behavior.”50 These

18

driving factors are necessary in order to gain a full understanding of why decision-makers
develop certain policies.
Walker believes that role expectations are one way in which a decision-maker is able
to select a role and then enact that certain role.51 He defines role expectations as what a
person is supposed to do in the international system based on other peoples’ perceptions.52
These role expectations manifest themselves in not only what decision-makers are presumed
to do, but also in what they complete in reality. Role expectations give multiple dimensions
to decision-makers and allow foreign policy leaders to be more prone to and able to develop
different polices once they take into account the goals they are expected to pursue.
According to Sarbin and Allen, role demands are implicit demands for a specific role
to be enacted.53 Role demands, as stated by Thies, show the necessity of enacting a specific
role when in certain situations.54 Walker writes that role demands are also an important
player in the determination of a person’s role in the international system. 55 This plays into
the number of roles that an individual would hold; The more diverse roles that an individual
holds, the more able that individual would be to enact those roles when a situation demands
that he/she did so. Having multiple roles allows for people to not be tied down to holding
one certain position. With role demands, people can pick and choose the roles they wish to
enact giving decision-makers more choice in what they decide to perform.
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National Role Conceptions
National Role Conceptions Defined
All of the different aspects of role come together to form a role conception. Role
conceptions, specifically national role conceptions, are the most used aspect of role theory
when studying foreign policy behavior. Holsti is regarded as the first person to use national
role conceptions in political science, and specifically in foreign policy analysis. His article,
“National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” laid the foundation on which
other foreign policy scholars would build their work.56
When using role theory to analyze foreign policy, many academics develop national
role conceptions for leaders to gain a better sense of what type of foreign policy behavior will
occur.57 Holsti’s work is the most actively cited work regarding role conceptions and foreign
policy analysis. The definitions of national role conceptions, however, differ slightly among
academics using this to explain foreign policy behavior.
Holsti states that a national role conception, “...includes the policy-makers’ own
definitions of the general kinds of decision, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their,
state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the
international system....”58 This definition is specific to the actual leaders that are producing
foreign policy. Other scholars have used this definition as a starting point to build their own
definitions of national role conceptions. For example, Wish states that national role
conceptions, “...are defined as policy-makers’ perceptions of their nations’ positions in the
international system.”59 Wish takes a larger approach to defining national role conceptions.
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She is not as specific as Holsti in her definition which makes it more generalizable and useful
for other scholars.
Marijke Breuning makes other important insights concerning national role
conceptions. She defines national role conceptions as a decision-maker’s, “...perspective
from which they view the world and how they frame the issues that confront them....”60
Breuning, in her 1992 doctoral dissertation, argues that national role conceptions are very
structural in their development.61 Role conceptions, as defined by Wish’s 1980 article, are
quite similar to the ideas pushed in structural realism.62 The definition Wish provides for
national role conceptions is directly related to the structure of the international system. If
national role conceptions are seen to be perceptions of one’s place in the international
system, then without a doubt, the structure of the international system matters. Since
structural realism states that the structure of the international system dictates certain aspects
of international relations, Wish’s definition of national role conceptions fits into the
assumptions of that theoretical framework.
Another important insight that Breuning provides is that the roles decision-makers
hold are predetermined because of the position those leaders hold in the international
system.63 Within the international system, people are members of different societal
structures. The position each person holds in the society allows for the development of a
certain role in that society for that person to uphold. The creation of a role, however, does
not happen by itself. As Barnett points out, roles that decision-makers hold are made because
of the different relationships that occur in a society.64 In short, roles are developed in relation
to other roles that have been created.65
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Shih’s definition of national role conceptions takes the concept to a deeper level. For
him, national role conceptions consist of self-role conceptions. Included in these self-role
conceptions are, “...a description of national mission in the world, specific notions of
interstate relationships, and stability over time.”66 In addition, Shih believes that national
role conceptions are one of the only ways that decision-makers are able to understand the
world.67 For Shih, a role conception is a lens through which decision-makers look to develop
the policies they wish to use. However this lens, as Breuning states, can again be explained
as a decision-maker’s perception of the international environment in which they live.68
Shih’s definition of national role conceptions, focusing specifically on the self, acts as a
bridge between multiple scholars’ definitions. He allows for a more specified view of
national role conceptions and helps develop more ways in which to conceptualize this idea.
Rosenau writes that national role conceptions are most useful to those who believe
that the state is the primary actor in international relations. 69 He writes that in order to gain
the best understanding of international relations and foreign policy behavior between states,
one must look directly at the state level. Rosenau questions the assumptions that are later
developed by Shih because he critically analyzes the usefulness of the individual level of
analysis. However, he also maintains that national role conceptions are sometimes,
“...confined to the attitudes, behaviors, and expectation that attach to top positions in the
foreign policy-making process.”70 This seems to contradict what he writes later in the piece
when he asserts that national role conceptions are best used when looking at international
relations from the state level of analysis. However, this point also helps strengthen the
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argument that a hybrid of the individual and state levels of analysis has the most utility when
using role theory to describe foreign policy behavior.
Thies points out that Rosenau’s idea that national role conceptions are best used at the
state level may not necessarily be a contradiction. Rather, Thies argues that the state level of
analysis is developed because of the different decisions that are made by policy-makers.71
Therefore, the individual level of analysis leads to the development of the state level of
analysis. Using his logic, then, the individual level of analysis and the national role
conceptions developed by individual leaders, would then create the state level of analysis
which then naturally leads itself to the systems level approach. National role conceptions,
thus, can be interpreted as the building blocks of international relations and foreign policy
behavior.
National role conceptions, therefore, are extremely important factors in the
development of foreign policy behaviors of different states. There are many different ways
that national role conceptions can affect the foreign policy outcomes of states and the
conceptions that decision-makers hold of themselves is essential when analyzing the
contrasting behaviors of states in the international system. However, there are many other
factors that create national role conceptions that are larger than just the perceptions leaders
hold of themselves and others.

Components of National Role Conceptions
National role conceptions, as stated earlier, are not created out of thin air. There are
many different factors that all come together in order to create different national role
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conceptions for leaders. Wish, in her 1987 study on the sources of national role conceptions
states that national attributes are an important factor in the development of national role
conceptions.72 In her previous work, Wish developed the idea that there were different
factors that possibly drive national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. National
attributes, Wish argues, are different socioeconomic conditions that lead to the development
of different national role conceptions.73
The different socioeconomic factors that can result in contrasting national role
conceptions are the size and capability of a country, the amount of economic development,
and the country’s political orientation.74 If a country is deemed larger, then the leaders and
decision-makers would have more resources at their disposal to use in developing their
national role conception and ultimately their foreign policy behavior. A country that is larger
and has more resources will then have more domestic factors influencing the national role
conception of leaders.
Countries that have high levels of economic development would again have more
opportunities for different national role conceptions. More economic development allows for
more institutions to arise which gives more opportunity for national role conceptions to
manifest in the policies of foreign policy decision-makers. A country that is more
economically developed than other countries also allows for it to have more resources at
decision-makers’ disposal. Again, these resources may make it seem as though the state will
have a higher level of responsibility in international politics.75
Finally, the political orientation of a country opens the doors for different national
role conceptions to develop.76 A nation that is more politically open will be more apt to
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develop diverse role conceptions due to the fact that the government is more interconnected
with other countries. The interconnectedness of states then may lead to more role
conceptions that can be held by that state. Decision-makers in politically open countries will
be able to develop perceptions based on what they see others in the world pursuing,
ultimately having those different perceptions form their own national role conception.
At the other end of the spectrum, a state that is politically closed would be more apt to
not change their role conceptions. In other words, a country that is politically closed does not
have the necessary institutions put in place to develop different role conceptions. Closed
countries are not looking at other countries in the international system for ideas on what the
norms of international society are. Rather, decision-makers in this type of country are only
thinking about their own country and the best way to pursue those policies.
Interconnectedness and the conceptions that come with interdependence are not a factor for
politically closed countries.
Wish postulates a new model for understanding foreign policy behavior which
includes the national attribute model. National attributes give way to different national role
conceptions which then affect the foreign policy behavior of a certain country. According to
this model, “...a nation’s foreign policy behavior is in large measure a product of its national
capabilities...” which then affect the decisions that are made by foreign policy leaders.77
However, national attributes are not the only thing that can possibly affect the
national role conceptions that foreign policy decision-makers hold. Shih posits that there are
many other aspects that can have an effect on the national role conceptions of decisionmakers. According to Shih, there is nothing more important than the history and culture of a
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country when trying to see what types of policies a nation will gravitate towards pursuing.
Psychocultural bases are extremely important in the development of national role
conceptions. Not only do psychocultural bases have an effect on the perceptions decisionmakers have of themselves, but they also have an enormous effect on the perceptions of
others. Different principles of morality and judgement that are embedded within a certain
culture allow for varying national role conceptions. However, it is important to note that
since culture and history act as an umbrella under which society functions, foreign policy
decision-makers would be more prone to having similar national role conceptions. Having a
shared culture and historical background allows a decision-maker to hold national role
conceptions that fall within those bounds.78
Finally, Margaret Hermann posits that there are six traits that can affect national role
conceptions and, therefore, foreign policy behavior.79 These six traits are: nationalism, the
belief in a state’s ability to control events in the international system, a need for power, a
need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, and distrust of others.80 Nationalism, as
Hermann writes, refers to viewing the world like one’s own country was at the center.81 This
notion leads countries to have very self-centered national role conceptions. Stemming from
nationalism, the belief that one’s country is able to control events in the international system
also has the ability to influence the foreign policies created by leaders.
The need for power is the concept that all countries in the world wish to have power
in order to impact others. Decision-makers that wish to have more power in the international
system would be more likely to carry more powerful national role conceptions. The need for
affiliation that Hermann states as a necessary component in the development of national role
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conceptions refers to countries wanting good relations with other nations. Having good
relations with other nations would allow countries to be more prone to develop conceptions
that are based on the positive perceptions of relationships between countries.82
Conceptual complexity, “refers to the degree of differentiation which a person shows
when observing or contemplating his environment.”83 This shows that a decision-maker is
actively trying to understand the world around him/her. Therefore, the perceptions the leader
is gaining from that would impact greatly the national role conception the leader would hold.
Finally, having a distrustful relationship with other countries would make the perceptions
decision-makers have of other countries less likely to be friendly in nature. Doubting the
doings or policies of other countries allows for national role conceptions to be more prone to
change, depending on the amount of doubt countries hold for one another.

Types of National Role Conceptions
In his seminal study of national role conceptions and the study of foreign policy,
Holsti developed seventeen distinct types of national role conceptions. These conceptions
range from very revolutionary, such as bastion of revolution-liberator and liberator
supporter, to hegemonic in nature (regional leader), and everything in between (mediatorintegrator and defender of the faith).84
Holsti’s national role conceptions try to fit every nation in the world at the time of his
writing. Some of his conceptions are extremely specific, such as anti-imperialist agent,
where only certain countries or leaders would fit the description. Other conceptions, such as
regional leader, are so general that almost every country or decision-maker would hold that
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conception.85 Margaret Hermann builds on the conceptions that Holsti determined, but then
also develops some of her own generalized national role conceptions.86 Similar conceptions
between the two scholars, such as active-independent and mediator-integrator allow scholars
to see the continuities of national role conceptions.87 Decision-makers throughout the world
are able to potentially hold one of these national role conceptions since they are generalizable
enough to cross multiple cultures and nations.
Hermann also developed some national role conceptions that were out of the scope of
Holsti’s study. Role conceptions such as opportunist and developer are not mentioned in
great deal by Holsti. Role conceptions that are opportunist in nature, Hermann writes,
“...take their cues from others, being interested in ascertaining what will receive widespread
public support.”88 Leaders with this kind of national role conception place great emphasis on
public opinion and often need a great deal of support in order to make decisions. The
developer role conception emphasizes the desire of public officials to remain in office.
Therefore, decision-makers with this role conception are likely to want advisors that have
similar beliefs as themselves.89 These different national role conceptions show how decisionmakers have collectively changed their behavior since Holsti first wrote.
The following attempts to categorize Holsti’s and Hermann’s national role
conceptions. It shows how Hermann has tried to fill a void in some of Holsti’s work by
developing and branching of the different national role conceptions he first advanced:
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Figure 1: Holsti and Hermann’s National Role Conceptions
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Wish, in her 1980 article, sheds different light on the subject of types of national role
conceptions. Instead of making broad generalizations like Holsti and Hermann, Wish gets
more systematic in the classification of national role conceptions. One of the first ways of
categorizing national role conceptions is through status. Wish believes that status is of
extreme importance and can be the foundation for certain national role conceptions. Status is
related to power and influence and can therefore be measured by, “...its domain of influence
and its degree,” to which the power of one state is felt on another.”90 Having great power
status, she writes, requires a state to be, “...influential in large rather than small domains.”91
However, one must remember that status is not determined by other states, but rather from
the perceptions of leaders within a state. This means that state leaders are looking at multiple
aspects regarding power and influence in the international system. Because of this, Wish
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develops six different ways for a state to perceive its status: domestic, bilateral, dominant
bilateral, subordinate, subordinate other, and global.92
The second area Wish discusses regarding national role conceptions is motivational
orientation. Wish states that foreign policy decision-makers have either individualistic,
cooperative, competitive, or both a cooperative and competitive motivational orientation.93
Roles that are motivated individualistically are manifested in isolationist states. Wish states
that decision-makers in these states see domestic problems as having a higher priority than
international issues. Cooperative and competitive roles are given similar criteria and are
measured, in her study, by the percentage of external motivations that are cooperative,
competitive, or both.94 Also, in this category of national role conceptions, Wish cites that the
motivation for change plays a large part in the overall motivational orientation of a foreign
policy decision-maker.
The final category for the operationalization of national role conception is substantive
problem areas.95 In this group, Wish tries to surmise the different areas that may pose
problems to a country regarding their foreign policies. These different areas include
territorial/defense, ideological, political/diplomatic, universal values, and economic.96 The
different typologies of national role conceptions that Wish produces provides a very
generalizable way to describe national role conceptions that all leaders in the world have the
potential to hold.
Through Holsti, Hermann, and Wish, a good understanding of different national role
conceptions arises. There are many different types of conceptions states can have and there
are multiple ways of developing those same conceptions. These conceptions are able to help
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further scholars’ understandings of foreign policy behavior and the world surrounding them.
The different types of national role conceptions allow for all types of leaders to be analyzed
for a specific type of foreign policy. Each type of national role conception is posited to
correspond to a certain type of foreign policy behavior. Whether that is the case or not leads
scholars to conduct empirical tests to see if the relationships that Holsti, Hermann, and Wish
hypothesize actually occur in the real world. More empirical testing on the subject should
occur if academics and decision-makers want to gain a better appreciation for the
international system.
Role theory, national role conceptions, and foreign policy analysis are all very
important factors when trying to understand the world and the relations between states.
Foreign policy analysis can be considered the backbone of international relations and is
necessary to fully comprehend the behavior of states. Role theory and national role
conceptions also help frame the arguments that attempt to explain foreign policy behavior.
Using national role conceptions at the individual-state level to explain foreign policy
behavior is something that is essential to furthering the understanding of how different actors,
factors, and conditions allow for various types of foreign policy behavior between states.

1

Charles F. Hermann, “Policy Classification: A Key to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy,” in The
Analysis of International Behavior, eds. James N. Rosenau et al. (New York: Free Press, 1972), p 70.
2

Ibid

3

Ibid.

4

Naomi Bailin. Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions,” International Studies
Quarterly 24:4 (December 1980), p. 532-54.; Hermann, “Policy Classification.”
5

Hermann, “Policy Classification,” 70.

6

Hermann, “Policy Classification,” 72.

7

Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers,” 540.

31
8

Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International
Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 5:1 (January 2005), p. 1-30.; Juliet Kaarbo, “Foreign Policy Analysis in the
Twenty-First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas,” in Foreign Policy Analysis in
20/20: A Symposium, ed. Jean A. Garrison, 156-163. (International Studies Review 5:1 (January 2003)).;
Cameron G. Thies, and Marijke Breuning, “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations
through Role Theory.,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8:1 (January 2012), p. 1-4.; Stephen G. Walker, “The Relevance
of Role Theory to Foreign Policy Analysis,” in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 1-4.
9

Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory,” 2.

10

Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory.”

11

Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory.”; Kaarbo, “Foreign Policy Analysis in the TwentyFirst Century.”
12

Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory,” 7.

13

Valerie M. Hudson, “Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda,” in Culture and Foreign
Policy, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p.1-24.; Lawrence C. Katzenstein,
“Change, Myth, and the Reunification of China,” in Culture and Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie M. Hudson
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 45-72.; Rosita Dellios, “‘How May the World be at Peace?’: Idealism
as Realism in Chinese Strategic Culture,” in Culture and Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 201-30.
14

Hudson, “Culture and Foreign Policy,” 1.; Katzenstein, “Change, Myth.”; Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis:
Actor Specific Theory.”
15

Theodore R. Sarbin and Vernon L. Allen. “Role Theory,” in The Handbook of Social Psychology, eds.
Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968), p. 489.; Bruce J. Biddle, Role
Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (New York: Academic Press, 1979), p. 9.
16

Eric S. Knowles, “From Individuals to Group Members: A Dialectic for the Social Sciences,” in Personalities,
Roles, and Behaviors, eds. William Ickes and Eric S. Knowles (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), p. 6.
17

Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, 4.

18

Ibid.

19

Biddle, Role Theory: Expectations, 9.

20

Sarbin and Allen, “Role Theory,” 497.

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid., 490.

23

Ibid., 506.

24

Cameron G. Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” International Studies Association Compendium Project
(2009), p.2.
25

Thies and Breuning, “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis,” 1.

26

Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory,” 2.

27

K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14:3
(September 1970), p. 233-309.

32
28

Philippe G. Le Prestre, “Author! Author! Defining Foreign Policy Roles After the Cold War,” in Role Quests
in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition, ed. Philippe G. Le Prestre (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1997); Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” 246.
29

Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” 2.

30

See Section on Foreign Policy Analysis above.

31

Le Prestre, “Author! Author!” 3-4.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.,1.

34

Cameron G. Thies, “International Socialization Processes vs. Israeli National Role Conceptions: Can Role
Theory Integrate IR Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis?” Foreign Policy Analysis 8:1 (January 2012), p. 29.
35

Chih-yu Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy Motivation: The Psychocultural Bases of
Chinese Diplomacy,” Political Psychology 9:4 (December 1988), p. 599-631
36

Katzenstein, “Change, Myth.”; Dellios, “How May the World.”

37

Katzenstein, “Change, Myth,” 53.

38

Dellios, “How May the World,” 209-11.

39

Stephen G. Walker, Role Theory and Foreign Policy Anlaysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987)

40

Walker, “The Relevance of Role Theory,” 2.

41

Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy.”; Thies and Breuning, “Integrating Foreign Policy
Analysis.”; Cristian Cantir, and Juliet Kaarbo. “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role
Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory.” Foreign Policy Analysis 5:1 (January 2012); Thies,
“Role Theory and Foreign Policy.”; Le Prestre, “Author! Author!”
42

Walker, “The Relevance of Role Theory,” 2..

43

Ibid.

44

Ibid.

45

Sarbin and Allen, “Role Theory,”; Holsti, “National Role Conceptions.”

46

Sarbin and Allen, “Role Theory,” 491-497.

47

Ibid., 506.

48

Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” 9.

49

ibid.

50

Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers,” 534.

51

Stephen G. Walker, “National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes,” in Psychological Models in
International Politics, ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 177.
52

Ibid.

53

Sarbin and Allen, “Role Theory,” 510.

54

Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” 10.

33
55

Walker, “National Role Conceptions,” 177.

56

Holsti, “National Role Conceptions.”

57

Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers.”

58

Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” 245-46.

59

Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers,” 533.

60

Marijke Breuning, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Assistance Policy Behavior Toward A Cognitive
Model,” (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1992), p. 30-31.
61

Breuning, “National Role Conceptions,” 23.

62

Ibid., 28.

63

Ibid., 32.

64

Michael Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System,” International
Studies Quarterly 37:3 (September 1993), p. 275.
65

Ibid.

66

Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy,” 600.

67

Ibid.

68

Breuning, “National Role Conceptions,” 20.

69

James N. Rosenau, “Roles and Role Scenarios in Foreign Policy,” in Role Theory and Foreign Policy
Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 50.
70

Ibid., 45.

71

Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.” 14.

72

Naomi Bailin Wish, “National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-Motivation
Model,” in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1987).
73

Ibid.

74

Ibid., 96.

75

Ibid., 98.

76

Ibid., 99.

77

Ibid., 96.

78

Shih, “National Role Conception as Foreign Policy.”

79

Margaret G. Hermann, “Foreign Policy Role Orientations and the Quality of Foreign Policy Decision,” in
Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987),
p. 123.
80

Ibid.

81

Ibid.,124

34
82

Ibid.

83

Ibid.

84

Holsti, “National Role Conceptions.”

85

Ibid.

86

Hermann, “Foreign Policy Role Orientations,”136-139.

87

Hermann, “Foreign Policy Role Orientations.”; Holsti, “National Role Conceptions.”

88

Ibid.,138.

89

Ibid.

90

Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers,” 536.

91

Ibid.

92

Ibid., 537.

93

Ibid.

94

Ibid.

95

Ibid., 539.

96

Ibid., 540

35

第一章：有关的文献和理论

介绍
这篇文章介绍的是重要的外交政策和角色理论的概念。本段落只是
一个简短的提要。文中会列举最重要的概念和及其提出者们并进行分析。
首先，我会介绍外交政策。其次，我会介绍和解释角色理论和角色理论的
重要性。最后，我会解释国家角色的概念。

外交政策的定义
外交政策有一个非常复杂的定义。很多外交家有多样的解释。有的
定义是非常简单的，比如：外交政策是如果一个国家尝试改变别的国家的
政策。有的定义是非常具体的。比如说，学者们学习一个国家和学习最重
要的决策者，因素和环境的他们的外交政策行为。
不过，很多外交家认为外交政策 跟外交政策的决策有多方面的关
系。这些学者认为外部的因素跟外交政策的决策有关。另外，国内的因素
也非常重要。很多美国的外交家觉得这个是最好的定义。如果你知道外交
政策是跟外部和国内的因素都有关，就能很好地理解外交政策。
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外交政策的分析
很多美国的国际关系者觉得如果你想了解全球政治，你必须了解如
何分析外交政策。外交政策的分析跟国际关系有非常重要的关系。外交政
策的分析和国际关系两者都有助于了解全球政治。
外交政策的分析体现了一个角色理论。我的意思是分析外交政策的
的时候你可以学习一个领导的决策过程。这有别于其他的国际关系理论。
分析外交政策需要对国际关系进行非常全面地分析。这个国际关系的部分
有些特殊。所以外交政策的分析是对国际关系一个非常全面的了解。

角色理论：社会学中的一个基本依据
角色理论不属于政治范畴。角色理论跟社会学，社会心理学，和人
类学都相关。角色理论是一个非常重要和有用的理论。在世界上，每个人
都有他们的角色。有的人是老师，有的人是律师。每个人在他们的工作中
被分配了一个角色。一个历史老师教历史，一个经济教授教经济。所以角
色理论跟其他人的看法有关系。

37

角色理论的基本因素
角色理论有很多的基本因素。在世界上人民有很多角色的决定因
素。有的角色理论家说一个人的角色是可以预计的。那些理论家认为社会
结构的不同和角色的行为一起是一个人的角色的预计。角色预计是由权
利、和责任组成的。每个人有他们的权利责任。所以他们也有相应的角色
预计。
在世界上，角色有非常重要的功能。人可以有多重的视角。这个是
因为他们有多重角色和相应的角色预计。在社会中，每个人也应该有他们
的角色。角色位置是一个概念，社会上的人必须找他们的角色，这个是非
常重要的。如果他们不能找到他们的角色，他们就不能融入社会。

角色理论在社会学中的根据：角色是什么
角色理论最近已成为一个领先的研究外交政策行为时使用的理论。
角色理论有很多方法解释外交政策行为。而且角色理论可以用于解释世界
上不同的现象。对外交政策来说，角色理论于决策人有很多相互作用。那
些相互作用是跟一个表演一样的。每个人认为他们的表演非常重要所以他
们能发展他们的角色。所以决策人有很多影响。
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很多美国政治学家说角色理论用于外交政策的分析有一个很有意思
的典故。1970 的时候，一个非常有名的美国政治学者写角色理论可以有
助于了解别国的外交政策行为。这个政治学者说角色是一个决策人的看
法。他们应该知道他们必须做什么，什么时候做一个决定，和怎么解决他
们应该做什么。这个观点在政治学界有很大的影响。

国家角色的概念
为了用角色理论了解外交政策行为，很多政治学家用国家角色的概
念。国家角色的概念 “包括决策者自己定义的一般类型的决定、 承诺、
规则和操作适用于他们，国家和功能的如果有的话。国家角色的概念也必
须继续，在国际体系中。”1这个是一个有广泛影响的定义。很多美国政治
学家觉得这个定义是最好的。
有的美国政治学家有一点不认同以上定义。他们认为国家角色的概
念是一个决策人的国际社会地位的看法。如果一个国家非常强，那个国家
的领导会有一个非常强有力的国家角色的概念。再说，如果一个国家是世
界上最重要，最强的国家之一，他们的国家角色的概念会反应他们的地
位。别的政治学家觉得文化和历史给国家角色的概念非常有意思的影响。
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每个领导在一个具体的文化中长大。文化和社会会影响一个领导的看法的
形成。

国家角色的种类
国家角色的概念有很多种类。这些概念包括革命型，比如革命解放
阵营或者解放志愿者，霸权型，比如说宗教领袖；还有两者之间的其他类
型，比方说同盟会、维持会、保皇党等等。下面的图表用于表现这个不同
的国家角色的概念：
第一个图表：不同的国家角色的概念
革命的

跟强有观的 孤立主义的

多边的

别的

反帝代理

榜样

积极独立

桥

信仰的捍卫者

革命解放者

扩张主义的

独立

发展的

国内发展

隔离

忠实盟友

机会主义者

调解−合作

保护

解放的支持者 有权势的

区域领袖
区域保护器
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每个国家 角色的概念跟一个明显的外交行为有关系。比如说，一个
区域的领袖国家角色会尝试在别的国际和区域的组织成为领导。而且他们
会更倾向于对其他国家施加他们的影响。
角色理论和国家角色的概念都是非常关键的。如果你想了解别的国
家的外交政策，就必须了解该国领导的看法。国家角色的概念帮助学者了
解国际关系。

1

K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 14:3
(Sept. 1970): p. 233-309.
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Chapter Two: Research Design and Methodology

In the previous chapter I reviewed the relevant literature on national role conceptions
and their usefulness in foreign policy analysis. This chapter details my research design and
methodology. First, I will provide my hypothesis and a causal diagram of my argument.
Following that, I detail the operationalization of my independent and dependent variables and
then describe the case studies I will use and the content analysis methodology that will be
employed for the project.

Research Design
I hypothesize that different national leaders’ “national role conceptions” lead to
different foreign policy behavior. This hypothesis is based on many scholars’ work on the
importance of national role conceptions in describing foreign policy behavior. In his
groundbreaking study, Holsti provides a general framework which other academics have
been able to use to further the understanding of national role conceptions and their usefulness
in studying foreign policy behavior. Holsti writes that a leader’s national role conception
pertains directly to the leader of a country and can be seen through different policies that are
implemented. National role conceptions, according to Holsti, also have a large effect on the
type of foreign policy that is produced by a leader.
Wish, Breuning, and others have built upon this framework regarding national role
conceptions and foreign policy analysis. Wish, in her influential article on decision-makers
and their national role conceptions, provides a more generalizable framework from which
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one can gain better comprehension of the importance of national role conceptions when
studying foreign policy analysis. Breuning demonstrates how national role conceptions are
predetermined factors that are based on the position a leader holds in the international
system. This insight from structural realism allows for a greater emphasis on the ways in
which a leader is able to utilize their specific role.
Not only are national role conceptions seen through the position one holds in the
global community but they are also evident in the historical and cultural contexts of which
each country and leader are a part. Shih asserts that culture and history have powerful effects
on the development of national role conceptions. Without a cultural context to which one can
relate, national role conceptions do not hold as much merit as one would seem to believe.
Each national role conception that is developed also corresponds to certain foreign
policy behavior. In essence, each national role conception is predictive of certain foreign
policy behavior. As both Hermann and Holsti suggest, there are many different national role
conceptions that one can hold that will determine the type of foreign policy behavior that one
should expect from that conception.1 These different conceptions and behaviors are essential
in understanding the development of foreign policies and gaining more knowledge on the
decisions that are made each day by leaders around the world.
Therefore, based on the available literature and theoretical arguments provided, I
hypothesize that different national leaders’ national role conceptions lead to different foreign
policy behavior. The research hypothesis for this study is illustrated in the following casual
diagram:
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Independent Variable

Dependent Variable

Leaders’ National Role Conception

Foreign Policy Behavior

Indicators:
• Socioeconomic Status (HDI)
• Internationalist vs Isolationist
• Interest in Development (Internal and
External)

Indicators:
• Relations with Great Powers
• Military Power
• Economic Power

Independent Variable: Leaders’ National Role Conception
In order to develop national role conceptions for different leaders, it is essential to
look at certain themes that correspond to certain national role conceptions. These themes
will be determined by the time periods in which the leaders studied had power, crossing
multiple decades from 1978 to 2012. Having multiple years accounted for in the study
allows for a deeper analysis of the chosen leaders. In this study, three different indicators of
national role conceptions will be used: socioeconomic status, perceptions on
internationalism and isolationism, and interest in development. Each of these will be
discussed separately to understand how they affect the development of national role
conceptions.
When conceptualizing the independent variable, it is vital to understand that these
themes do not necessarily need to manifest themselves through policy behavior. On the
contrary, the themes that will be outlined below need to be viewed as important to the leader
and important enough to merit potential policy implications. For this study, it is not the
claim that national role conceptions will result in specific policy behavior. Rather, the
literature points out that there is potential predictive ability of foreign policy behavior

44

through the use of national role conceptions. Therefore, it is the perceptions that leaders hold
of themselves and of their country vis-à-vis these indicators of national role conceptions that
will be determining the certain national role conceptions that the leaders hold and the
potential foreign policy behavior.

Socioeconomic Status
Many scholars, including Holsti and Hermann, assert that the socioeconomic status of
a country has a large effect on the national role conception that the leader of said country will
hold. As stated in Chapter One, countries that have a larger economy and a better overall
socioeconomic status will have the ability to hold different national role conceptions.
Countries with better socioeconomic status may be more apt to be influenced by more
domestic and foreign factors when developing different foreign policies. The importance of
socioeconomic status of a country on the development of national role conceptions with other
states is, therefore, extremely important to leaders.
Socioeconomic status takes into account the different ways in which citizens within a
state have developed. Included in this form of development are the state of living, the quality
of education, life expectancy, etc. If the people within a state are better off socially, then the
leader of the state may carry a certain role conception that is based on the social development
of its citizens. One way to measure the social development of a state is through different
elements of the Human Development Index (HDI). The Human Development Index is a
composite score of different development indicators such as, life expectancy, average years
of schooling, and gross national income (GNI) per capita.
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If a country has higher HDI rankings, it can be assumed that the citizens of that
country have better livelihoods and are less likely to be critical of decision-makers. Leaders
in this situation would be more likely to develop national role conceptions that emphasize the
need to become a more influential player on the international stage due to their domestic
success. On the other hand, if a country has low HDI rankings, leaders will be more likely to
hold national role conceptions that emphasize the internal development of the state. In order
to keep citizens happy, decision-makers will be more likely to harbor national role
conceptions that aim to better the livelihoods of their citizens.
Since national role conceptions are based, in large part, on the perceptions of different
leaders, the HDI ratings, themselves, do not play a large role. However, the different
components of HDI and the perceptions leaders have on these aspects do play a large role in
the development of national role conceptions. Therefore, in order to see the perceptions
national leaders hold in this area, the different indicators of the Human Development Index
will be used. The best way to gauge the perceptions that leaders have on these issues is to
see whether or not a leader deems these different aspects important. The importance of
socioeconomic status to a leader can manifest itself through different areas. Using the
components of HDI as useful indicators of the importance of socioeconomic status to a
leader, one would be able to better their understanding of the national leaders’ perceptions on
the issue. The components of life expectancy, years of schooling, and GNI per capita will be
some of the indicators of a leader’s perception of socioeconomic status. If these different
indicators are mentioned in a positive manner, then the leader will be said to hold
socioeconomic status as an important part in the development of the state. If the leader
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provides certain data on the different indicators, and that data is relatively good, then the
leader will also be characterized as believing that socioeconomic status is important. The
converse of both examples is also true. These indicators of a leader’s perception on
socioeconomic status will be tested in select time periods within the leader’s rule in order to
obtain a relative amount of importance linked to the issue. The different indicators of HDI
and a leader’s perception of these indicators allows for the best possible avenue to see the
importance of socioeconomic status to a leader.

Internationalism versus Isolationism
The world today is an ever interdependent system. One cannot travel anywhere
without seeing the effects of interdependence on all countries and citizens in the world.
Some countries have fully embraced the idea of globalization stating that it is necessary for
all countries of the world to work together to develop strong relations amongst each other.
Many countries in the world embrace this feeling of internationalism and feel as though it is
their duty to be a fully cooperative member of the international system. Contrasting this
belief are leaders that are not as open to the notion of interdependence. Some leaders do not
believe that it is completely necessary to develop strong interdependent connections between
nations. These countries are seen as more isolationist and do not attach a lot of importance to
their relations with other states. In addition, some leaders fear that the world may be taken
over by the strongest powers due to the influence these powers have on perpetuation
globalization to other nations in the world.
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While there are many different aspects to internationalist and isolationist countries, it
is not possible to account for all of the different ways in which a country can view these
concepts. Therefore, in order to gauge a leader’s perception on whether their country is
internationalist or not, and the importance of the subject, two distinct categories, views on
intervention and interest in multilateral organizations, amongst others, will be analyzed
These categories will be conceptualized and operationalized in the following sections.

Views on Intervention-Conceptualized
When thinking in terms of internationalism and isolationism, one may be able to look
at the different ways in which a state will pursue interventionist policies. Intervention, in this
sense, does not necessarily mean military, but can also be in the form of humanitarian
intervention and peacekeeping. Not all countries in the world are willing to intervene in
conflicts in other nations. Whether it be in the form of peacekeeping or military intervention
to overthrow a regime, states make the conscious decision to pursue policies of intervention.
The views leaders hold on the importance, necessity, and legality of intervention plays a large
role in the type of national role conception that a leader may hold. Leaders can see their
country as playing an essential role in the upholding of the international system. Those who
feel this way will be more likely to hold national role conceptions that are more
interventionist in nature.
Not all leaders feel this way. Some leaders believe that sovereignty is the most
important norm that has been established in the international system. To defy this norm is to
defy all that the international system stands for and believes to be true. Also, some leaders
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do not believe it is their responsibility to intervene on the policies of other countries. This
may be based on material capabilities as well as on the norm of sovereignty. Leaders that
hold such beliefs would be more likely to hold national role conceptions that emphasize the
need to respect sovereignty and focus on the internal politics of the country, thus resulting in
more isolationist views. Countries like this will not necessarily be seen as leaders, both
regionally and internationally, though intervention is not the only way in which a country
becomes a leader.

Views on Intervention-Operationalized
As with the importance of socioeconomic status, just seeing where a country has or
has not intervened does not give a good representation of the perceptions of different leaders
regarding the phenomena. As a result, one must be able to gauge the perceptions of these
different aspects in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the importance
of intervention in the eyes of a leader. The views leaders hold on intervention policies will
be determined through the different mentions of intervention. For example, if a leader states
that their country will never intervene within the sovereign borders of another country, then
that leader will be characterized as having negative views on intervention. However, if a
leader states that it is necessary for their country to be an active leader on the world stage in
terms of intervention, then the leader will be presented as holding positive views on
intervention.
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Interest in Multilateral Organizations-Conceptualized
According to liberal and neoliberal theories of international relations, multilateral
organizations are essential to the development of the international system. It is through these
organizations that different forms of internationalism manifest themselves. Not all countries
are required to be a member of these organizations, but international organizations, such as
the United Nations, seemingly have so much power that it is almost necessary to be a
member of this organization. However, the prospects for more becoming more
interdependent and globalized, through these organizations, allows joining these
organizations to be within the interests of some states.
The importance of the multilateral organization that a country joins also plays a large
role in the development of a more globalized and interdependent international society.
Leaders need to be able to gauge the importance and usefulness of a multilateral organization
before being able to join the group and be an active participant. If the group seems
superfluous, then leaders may not find it worth their while to use resources to join the
organization. Leaders that are more actively involved in multilateral organizations would be
more likely to develop national role conceptions that emphasize multilateralism. If a country
is a leader within a certain organization, then the leader may hold national role conceptions
that are consistent with leadership and expanding influence. Contrasting this, leaders who do
not believe that multilateral organizations are important or do not hold active roles in the
organizations will be more likely to hold national role conceptions that are more reserved and
isolationist in nature.
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Interest in Multilateral Organizations-Operationalized
As with the operationalizations of the other indicators of national role conceptions,
this indicator also cannot be determined by whether or not a country has or has not joined an
international organization. Simply joining a multilateral organization does not constitute a
comprehensive way to asses the importance of these organizations vis-à-vis a leader’s
national role conception. Again, it is the perception that needs to be studied, not the activity
within the organization or if a country has joined at all. These perceptions, then, will be
determined through a leader’s perceived idea of importance of international organizations. If
a leader seems to have positive views of international organizations, then the leader will be
perceived to hold a high level of interest in the ability for multilateral organizations to shed
positive light on internationalism. However, if a leader holds negative perceptions on
international organizations, then the leader will be characterized as viewing multilateral
organizations as a hindrance to internationalism and, thus, more isolationist.

Interest in Development-Conceptualized
The level of development of one’s country is essential to the understanding of how
national role conceptions form and how different foreign policy behaviors are determined
from these conceptions. Many times leaders are faced with the task of trying to improve the
development of their country. The important factor within this is not if a country is
developed but rather if it is interested in furthering its domestic development. If a country is
willing to pursue more internal development, then that will be reflected in the national role
conceptions that leaders hold. Those leaders that are more interested in development are
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more likely to be very domestically oriented and try to make their country seem like a good
place for investment.
Development does not only occur on the domestic level. The extent to which a leader
will want to pursue external development will also play a role in that leader’s national role
conception. Many countries throughout the world try to help other countries, less fortunate
economically than themselves, by assisting in development projects. Leaders that are more
willing to hold an interest in helping develop other countries can result in different national
role conceptions. These national role conceptions tend to be those that emphasize leadership,
influence, and expansionary prowess.

Interest in Development-Operationalized
One of the most cohesive ways of seeing if a country is interested in assisting in the
development of other nations is to look at the amount of foreign aid that a country gives to
other countries. In addition, a country can be characterized as attaching importance to
development through the amount of foreign direct investment that one country provides to
another. These are both good indicators of whether or not a country is actively pursuing
these goals. However, foreign aid and foreign direct investment do not help understand the
perceptions that a leader holds on development. Therefore, I will gauge leaders’ perceptions
on development by determining their views of how their country should act in the realm of
development. If a leader responds positively to development, then a high perception of
development of will be given. In contrast, if a leader does not believe that development is
necessary, then a low perception of development will be given to the leader.
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General Measurement of Indicators for Independent Variable
All of these indicators will be measured separately to gauge the influence of each
indicator on that leaders’ national role conception. After each indicator has been given a
ranking, the rankings will come together to determine a national role conception. For the
complete list of words and phrases used while coding the speeches see the Appendix. Each
national role conception will correspond to distinct perceptions within the indicators of the
independent variable. In addition, these different indicators will be determined from a
specific time period of when the leader was in power. Since I will be analyzing three
different leaders, there will be multiple time periods that are analyzed, but each leader will
have a distinct time period so that there will be consistency in the analysis.

Types of National Role Conceptions to be Analyzed
As stated in Chapter One, there are many different national role conceptions that a
leader can possibly hold. However, it is not possible to determine all of the different types of
national role conceptions a leader can hold. In addition, leaders can hold multiple national
role conceptions. There are many different national role conceptions that have the potential
to fit the leaders I will analyze. However, I am confident that the leaders I analyze will fit
into one or more of the following national role conceptions: Anti-Imperialist Agent,
Regional Leader, Active Independent, and Internal Development.
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Anti-Imperialist Agent
Holsti, though writing during the Cold War, states that, “[w]here imperialism is
perceived as a serious threat, many governments...see themselves as agents of “struggle”
against this evil.”2 This is the basic idea behind the national role conceptions of antiimperialist agent. While the international community is currently not in the midst of the Cold
War, the concept of the anti-imperialist agent can still manifest itself. Many leaders
throughout the world view globalization as a new form of imperialism in the twenty-first
century. Countries, especially those not in the West, fear that there is a rising influx of
Western influence and power being expelled upon their nations. In nations such as this, one
would see anti-Western sentiment and countries being completely against globalization and
thus more isolationist.
Based on the indicators of national role conceptions introduced earlier, the antiimperialist agent would exhibit a multitude of factors. First, a leader that holds the antiimperialist agent would be more likely to perceive socioeconomic issues as important. Since
socioeconomic status is not heavily based on the interests of other countries, an antiimperialist agent would like to see an increase in the development of socioeconomic status.
The internationalism versus isolationism holds a lot of power for an anti-imperialist agent.
As seen by the name for this national role conception, leaders holding this conception would
be more likely to be isolationist. Therefore, these leaders would exhibit strong views against
any sort of intervention. However, in order to be seen as an anti-imperialist agent, leaders
may be members of many multilateral organizations, but may go against the wishes of the
‘imperialist’ power. Finally, in terms of internal development, leaders with the anti-
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imperialist agent role conception would perceive internal development as vital to their
country’s overall status in the international community.

Regional Leader
According to Holsti, “[t]he themes for this national role conception refer to duties or
special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself...” regarding states that are
located in similar regions.3 A regional leader exhibits characteristics that manifest
themselves through different leadership qualities. In a sense, a leader that holds the regional
leader national role conception is looking to expand their influence in countries in the
surrounding area. In addition, a regional leader would be trying to show different leadership
qualities through multilateral organizations.
Leaders who hold the regional leader national role conceptions experience distinct
factors that contribute to the development of the conception. Regional leaders would attach
high importance to socioeconomic status. These leaders would try to set their country as an
example for other nations to look at when developing certain socioeconomic policies. In
terms of internationalism versus isolationism, regional leaders would be very internationalist.
They would believe that intervention is a necessary thing and would voice interest in leading
interventions whether unilaterally or multilaterally. Regional leaders would also believe that
multilateral institutions are of extreme importance. Leaders with this national role
conceptions would want to take leading roles in multilateral institutions. This would be
especially applicable to regional organizations. In terms of interest in development, regional
leaders would be seen as very interested in the development of their own country. As with
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socioeconomic status, regional leaders would want to set an example for development that
other countries could follow.

Active Independent
The active independent national role conception refers to the idea that, “...decisions
will be made to serve national interests rather than the interests of others.”4 Leaders with the
active independent conception feel as though their policies should not be seen as conforming
to the different policies that large, influential powers may want to see. These leaders believe
that their country is the only country that matters and that it does not need to have strong
relations with other countries. Especially with regards to hegemonic powers, active
independents would want to stray from the influence of leading countries. Additionally,
active independents try not to align themselves with other countries and allow for a range of
different policy outcomes to occur.
Regarding the indicators of national role conceptions, a leader that holds the active
independent conception would again wish to better the socioeconomic status of their country.
However, in terms of internationalism and isolationism, these countries would be more likely
to be isolationist. Intervention would not be a high priority for active independent leaders.
However, multilateral organizations may be more important. Active independents would go
against the grain of what might be considered normal in international organizations. This
could be seen as voting against certain policies or developing their own policies that go
against the norms of society.
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Internal Development
The internal development national role conception is the idea that, “...most efforts of
the government should be directed toward problems of internal development.”5 This is not to
say that a country will not have relations with other states, but rather that many of the
country’s resources will be directed towards improving the livelihood of its citizens and
overall improvement of the state. For this national role conception, all forms of development
are seen as important. From the typical development standards of growth and GDP to the
most nuanced themes of educational development and other human development issues,
internal developers wish to see their country in the best possible position it could be.
Leaders that hold this national role conception would place heavy importance on
socioeconomic status. All of the different indicators of human development would play a
large role in the development of this national role conception. When thinking about an
internal developer, one would believe that they would be more likely to be isolationist.
However, in many cases countries that focus on internal development would be more
dependent on the international system. Therefore, a leader with the internal development
national role conception would be more likely to be internationalist. Finally, the internal
developer would believe that internal development is essential for their state. Many of a
country’s resources would be used to try to further that development. In order to more easily
understand how the different national role conceptions manifest themselves, the following
chart has been created. This chart shows the different national role conceptions that will be
studied and the different indicators of these national role conceptions. The chart then shows
whether a low, medium, or high level of each indicator is necessary in order to hold that
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certain national role conception or if the national role conception is contingent upon
isolationist or internationalist behavior.
Figure 2: Relationship Between National Role Conceptions and Indicators
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Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior
Foreign policy behavior encompasses many different details that are all extremely
important when trying to understand the relations between states. Through foreign policy,
countries are constantly interacting with each other trying to have solid relations but also
balance the importance of domestic interests. Because it would not be possible to include all
the indicators of foreign policy behavior within this study, I have chosen three distinct
indicators that will act as indicators of different types of foreign policy behavior. These
indicators are, diplomatic relations with great powers, military power, and economic power.
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Diplomatic Relations with Great Powers
For countries that are rising in status through the international system, it is essential
that they have good diplomatic relations with those powers that have greater international
status. In the case of China, it is quite apparent that it is rising in the international system.
Therefore, its relations with other great powers, for example the United States of America,
are of great importance. Without having good relations with great powers, China would not
be able to have as much of a say on international events. Great powers would dismiss them
and then China would not be in the position it wishes to hold.
While it is true that a country should attempt to have good relations with all countries
in the world, it is equally important to say that sometimes a country’s greatest goal should be
to have good relations with great powers. In the case of China, it is apparent that its
partnership with the United States is extremely important. Not only is the relationship
between China and the US important, but the relations between China and other great
powers, like the former Soviet Union and Russia, also play a large part in the foreign policy
behavior of China.
If China and the US did not establish official diplomatic relations in the late 1970s,
then China would most certainly be in a different position than it holds today. Having a well
established foreign policy between the two countries is something that is essential to the
overall development of the international community. The People’s Republic of China and the
United States are two of the most important countries in world politics today. It would be
essential to analyze China’s relations with the United States in order to receive a better
understanding of how Chinese foreign policy operates.
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In addition to the United States, the former Soviet Union/Russia act as an interesting
case regarding China’s relationship with great powers. China and Russia have had many ups
and downs in their relationship. From the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet Pact, to the
complete distrust the powers shared for each other, the relationship between the two
countries has become a staple of how cooperation and cynicism among great powers
manifests itself. While the relationship between China and the Soviet Union had many
negative aspects, the fall of the Soviet Union created a new chapter in the Sino-Russian
relationship. Since both countries boast great influence in the region, a stark dichotomy
exists between whether China or Russia holds the most authority.
There are many different ways one can analyze relations between different states.
Regarding the relationship between China and the United States and China and the Soviet
Union/Russia, one interesting facet of the relationships is their diplomatic relationship and
cooperation. The three nations have developed relations in different ways while also
maintaining that their individual priorities play an essential role in the development of
bilateral relations. For this study, the diplomatic relations between great powers will be
measured by looking at the scope of agreements that were negotiated between each country.
These agreements can come in the form of summit meetings or different dialogues between
top decision-makers and can include any range of topics that indicate cooperation.
Understanding the relationships between China and the United States and the Soviet
Union/Russia, creates an avenue for greater better comprehension of Chinese foreign policy.
These relationships also allow a good manner to understand the complexities of world
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politics and gives excellent cases from which one can study many different elements of a
country’s relationship with great powers.

Military Power
One of the most important and easily visible ways to see a foreign policy in action is
through a country’s military. For some countries, the military is the only means through
which foreign policy is implemented. There are many different ways that one can measure
military power. In this study, level of military spending, the number of armed service people,
and military modernization will be the indicators of military power.
The amount of money a country spends on its military is a direct indicator of the
strength and influence of a military. Those countries that spend large amounts on their
militaries will be perceived to have stronger militaries and will be able to easily carry out
certain foreign policies. Since the military is one of the easiest ways to pursue different
foreign policies, then it is necessary to understand exactly how much money is spent on these
forces.
Additionally, the amount of modernization that a military has experienced over the
years can be an indicator of a country’s military power. Military modernization can include
many different aspects including an increase in the number of military members and an
advancement in military technology. It is without a doubt that China’s military has seen
many changes over the past years. The People’s Liberation Army is a very ample body that
has vast military capabilities. Therefore, being able to compare the different militaristic
aspects of a country can determine the amount of military power a country boasts. In terms
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of foreign policy behavior, countries that spend more money on their military and have a
more modernized military will be more active in their foreign policies and will have the
ability to further the development of different facets of their country’s foreign policy.

Economic Power
Economic power is another good indicator of foreign policy behavior. Today, more
and more foreign policies are based on economic relations between states. While military
and other forms of diplomatic relations are still prevalent throughout the world, economic
power is becoming an important indicator of foreign policy behavior as well as a good way to
classify the nature of a states’ foreign policy behavior.
Economics can hold a wide variety of roles in foreign policy. However, trade may be
one of the most important aspects of foreign policy that is affected by economics. While the
world is becoming more interdependent, it is necessary to understand the importance of trade
between states. Most states are not able to support themselves without international trade.
Therefore, if a country is able to trade with others, then they will be able to have stable
relations with their trading partner and be able to further their country’s economy through
trade.
Another direct indicator of economic power in terms of foreign policy behavior is a
country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Income (GNI). Both of these
indicators show the direct strength of a country’s economy. If a country’s GDP and GNI are
high, then they will be more likely to assume more power and be able to influence the
international system. In contrast, countries whose GDP and GNI are decreasing would not

62

have the clout of other, more economically powerful, countries. This economic power, in
turn, corresponds directly to certain foreign policy behavior that can be seen through
different leaders and the decisions that are made by each leader during their time in power.
For both military and economic power, the foreign policies will manifest themselves
through the certain policies that have been created by different leaders. The polices of
Chinese leaders to invest in the military or to heavily invest in the economy will be what
indicates whether China is exhibiting military or economic power. In order to see the
proposed relationship between the independent and dependent variables, the following chart
marks what type of foreign policy behavior would be exhibited by certain national role
conceptions.
Figure 3: Proposed Relationship Between Independent and Dependent Variables
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Methodological Approach: Comparative Case Studies
To test my hypothesis, I am going to perform a comparative case study that will look
at three different Chinese leaders, their national role conceptions, and their foreign policies.
For this study, it is imperative that I look at the variation across time of the different leaders I
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will study. A comparative case study allows me the best avenue to gather information on my
independent and dependent variables and will enable the study to be as comprehensive as
possible.
Within these case studies, I will be using the methodological approach of content
analysis. This method will be used in order to test my independent variable. Because my
hypothesis deals with a very personal element, in this case national role conceptions of
leaders, it is necessary that I use a methodological approach that allows me to gather
individuals’ specific conceptions. To test my dependent variable, I will be employing
traditional case study techniques. Since my dependent variable is not as contingent on
personal characteristics, a more general research technique will be used. In the following
sections, I will explain these separate approaches in more detail and will explain my criteria
for selecting my cases.

Independent Variable
In order to give my research question and hypothesis the best test possible, I will test
my hypothesis using content analysis. According to Insch, Moore, and Murphy, content
analysis is, “...a family of procedures for studying the contents and themes of written or
transcribed text,”6 . An important part of Insch, Moore, and Murphy’s definition is that
content analysis is a procedure that helps evaluate documents for their substance. Content
analysis is being used because it allows for the easiest way to gain the perceptions of
different leaders. Not being able to interview the leaders in question makes it difficult to gain
the answers regarding which national role conception the leader would hold. Therefore,
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through content analysis, I will be able to determine what national role conception these
leaders hold.7
For my study, I will be looking at speeches given by my three cases. Speeches allow
for the most direct way to test for the leaders’ specific national role conceptions. Since
speeches are the most direct account of a leader’s feelings, they are the easiest way for me to
develop national role conceptions. In order to control for different factors that may affect the
rhetoric of speeches, I will only look at speeches given during certain time periods. The
easiest and most effective way to control for these speeches is to determine when Chinese
leaders consistently give speeches. The most consistent speech that all Chinese leaders give
is the speech which opens the Chinese Communist Party National Congress. The National
Party Congress meets every five years, and on the first day of every Congress, the paramount
leader of China addresses the Congress. Since many Chinese leaders have made speeches in
this regard, it is the most effective way to control for different factors that might affect why a
speech was given or the content of the address. This study is designed so that the variance of
my different cases across time can be analyzed. Therefore, with the speeches occurring
every five years, I will be working in compliance with the importance of variance in time.

Dependent Variable
To determine my dependent variable, I will be looking at articles published in
prestigious journals of international affairs. Included in this is the Asian Survey journal.
Every year, Asian Survey publishes reports on all countries in Asia. Within these reports are
data that correspond to each of my three indicators of foreign policy behavior. Gaining
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information from this source will allow the project to be as consistent as possible and remove
certain bias from other sources. In addition to Asian Survey, other influential academic
journals will be used. This will allow my project to receive data from reliable sources.
I will also look at official documents released by the Chinese military and finance
ministry. To gain the official perspective on Chinese foreign policy behavior, it will be
essential that I look at the bureaucracies that hold the information necessary to complete my
study. Official reports and documents that are essential to the understanding of China’s
military and economic power, based on the criteria in the preceding pages, will be analyzed
to develop the certain criteria for my dependent variable.
In order to be consistent with time periods, for each leader I will look at the policies
implemented in the years following the speeches that are analyzed. By looking at the
policies post-speech, I will be able to see if there is in fact a relationship between national
role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. This allows for a more comprehensive study
where the variance in time will be easily controlled.

Case Selection
It is without a doubt that the People’s Republic of China is quickly becoming one of
the most influential countries in world politics. China’s rise in status in the international
system can be attributed to many different factors such as its vast economic growth, its
military power, and its population. However, it is obvious that there have been different
routes China has taken to develop the policies that are seen today. Ever since the death of
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Mao Zedong, China has had different leaders take China in different directions in their
development.
Therefore, in order to see if national role conceptions truly have an effect on foreign
policy behavior, it is necessary to analyze different Chinese leaders. Since China has had
three main political leaders since the death of Mao in 1976, each of these leaders will be
analyzed to gain a greater perspective on their national role conceptions and the foreign
policies established during their time in office. No other leaders have had absolute power in
China since the death of Mao. They are considered the paramount leaders of China and are
representative of all foreign policies the People’s Republic of China has pursued since
opening up in 1978. While China’s decision-making process is quite extensive and has many
different actors working together in order to create foreign policies, it is the supreme leaders
of the country that allow these policies to occur. The leaders that I will analyze in this study
are Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.

Deng Xiaoping: 1978-1992
Many sinologists and academics attribute China’s great growth in the last forty years
to Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping is credited with the great 改革开放 “Open and Reform”
polices that began in the late 1970s and are still evident in some areas of China today. While
Deng had never assumed the role of president or premier of China, he is often cited as the
most influential leader China has seen. After the death of Mao Zedong, China was in
shambles due to the failures of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The country was
closed to the outside world and China’s economic development was small, if not non-
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existent. Deng Xiaoping capitalized on these feelings of isolationism that came with the cult
that surrounded Mao Zedong and tried to turn China into the great power that it once was.
Through his policies and ideas, Deng led China to grow in unprecedented economic
proportions. His novel ideas of leading China in a different direction than Mao Zedong
allowed him the ability to pursue greatness for China. Not only did Deng allow China to
grow economically, but he also was a catalyst for China opening to having relations with
other countries. Deng Xiaoping provides a good case of how different leaders from the same
culture have different national role conceptions and differing foreign policies. He also
provides a stark contrast to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao because Deng’s policies were so
focused on reform and opening China to the outside world.

Jiang Zemin: 1993-2003
Jiang Zemin led China throughout the early 1990s until the early 2000s. China, under
his leadership, developed in many different ways. The economic policies continued to occur
in the style of Deng Xiaoping but foreign relations saw a stark development. Jiang led China
through many different political and diplomatic events that put China on the world stage.
Events such as the handover of Hong Kong to the Chinese after one hundred years of British
rule as well as the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade all allowed
Jiang’s presidency and his foreign policy to develop in different ways.
Jiang Zemin had a distinct view of China and what its place should be on the world
stage and held true to those beliefs. Jiang differed from Deng Xiaoping because he was not
solely focused on economic growth. Rather, he wanted China to pursue growth and
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prosperity by playing a more active role in the international community. Jiang Zemin is
representative of the change in foreign policies throughout the entire international
community during the 1990s. Since he is the second leader to assume supremacy in the
People’s Republic of China, a variation across the decades preceding his rule is evident.
Jiang also provides a good contrast with other Chinese leaders because of his distinct foreign
policy behavior and vision for China in the coming years.

Hu Jintao: 2003-2013
The final leader that will be analyzed is Hu Jintao. Hu provides a different take on
leadership in the People’s Republic of China. Hu Jintao marks a new generation of leaders in
China. This new generation of leadership has allowed for different perspectives on China’s
role in the international system because they experienced the China of Mao Zedong and the
new China developed by Deng Xiaoping.
Hu Jintao has led China throughout the new millennium and through a myriad of
different foreign policy challenges. These challenges stem from China’s status as the second
largest economy in the world as well as China becoming a more prominent and influential
leader in world politics. Hu Jintao was one of the most active Chinese leaders in history and
has tried to sell Chinese ideas and culture to the rest of the world. This is very different than
Deng and Jiang because Hu has slowly become iconic of the Chinese view of international
relations and the international system in general. The perspective of Hu and the policies
under his leadership give a stark contrast of styles between different leaders of China
throughout history.
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Other methodological approaches, such as case studies, sampling, or interviews could also be applicable to my
research question. Sampling holds merit to my hypothesis, though I do not have all resources necessary to
conduct polling of Chinese leaders. Interviewing Chinese leaders would be another possible methodological
approach I could take, though leaders that I would need to interview have passed away. Therefore, the best way
to gain a complete understanding of my research question and give my hypothesis the best possible test is
through content analysis.
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第二章：研究设计和方法论

介绍
上一章总结了有关的文献和理论。本章将介绍方法论和研究设计。
第一，我会表现我的假设和给一个原因的图解。之后，我会解释我的自变
量和因变数是什么。最后，我会描述一个经典案例及其内容分析。

研究设计
我的假设是国家领导的国家角色的概念支配该国外交政策的行为。
我有这个假设，因为很多政治学者说国家角色的概念和外交政策的行为有
微妙的关系。很多政治学者对文化和历史非常看重，因为这些都能给国家
角色的概念产生影响。基本上，每个国家角色的概念总会支配外交政策的
行为。
这个是一个原因的图解：
自变量

因变数

国家角色的概念

外交政策的行为
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自变量：领导的国家角色的概念
为了印证领导的国家角色的概念，我参照了从1978年到2012年间的
一些数据。这些数据集中在以下三个方面：经济情况，对外开放和自我封
闭和内国的发展。领导的外交政策的行为看似与这些无关，但是国家领导
必须考虑这些方面以制定外交策略。我不认为一个国家角色的概念和国家
领导的外交政策的行为是一样的。我认为一个国家角色的概念可以预言其
外交政策的行为。以下三个方面可以作为判断一个国家的角色概念的主要
依据。

第一个方面：经济情况
一个经济情况很好的的国家能影响很多外国和本国的外交政策。经
济情况跟国家的人民有关。如果一个国家的经济情况很好，该国民众不会
批评领导们的外交政策。所以经济情况会越来越好。
在本文中，我会用人类发展指数来综合评价一个国家。比如说，一
个国家的民众有较高的寿命, 平均受教育年限和国民总收入。如果一个国
家有较高的人类发展指数，该国领导的国家角色的概念是成为在国际上有
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影响的国家。但是如果一个国家的的人类发展指数很低，他们的国家角色
的概念是差不多自我封闭的。

第二方面：对外开放和自我封闭
今天的世界是更复杂的。差不多每两个国家间都有外交关系。领导
们应该决定如果他们的国家成为国际化的或者自我封闭的。有两个方法决
定如果一个国家是国际化的或者自我封闭的。第一个是领导们怎么样干
预。第二个是国际组织怎么样。
因为我们的世界是互相联系的，一个国家跟他们的军队在世界上有
影响。领导们认为他们必须干预每个冲突。别的领导们没有这个看法。所
以如果一个国家觉得必须干预，领导的国家角色的概念是非常国际制的。
要不然他们的国家角色的概念非常自我封闭的。
其次，国际组织非常重要。国际组织决定更重要的世界政策和帮助
国家发展。领导可以选择加入国际组织或者不加入。如果他们决定加入他
们就在更大的舞台上有一个新的国家角色。有的国家觉得他们不应该加入
任何国际组织。所以他们会有自我封闭的国家角色的概念。
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第三个方面：国内的发展的重视程度
很多领导们重视他们国家的发展。一个非常发达的国家是一个强大
的国家。如果领导觉得发展是最重要的问题，他们的国家角色的概念是围
绕国家发展而定位的。但是要是领导觉得发展不太重要，他们可以有非常
国际制的国家角色的概念。

国家角色的概念
美国政治学者提出领导可以有很多国家角色的概念。如果世界有非
常多的国家角色的概念，我只能例举其中四个。这四个是反帝代理， 区
域领袖， 积极独立，和国内发展。
反帝代理的国家角色的概念认为帝国主义的国家不应该告诉别的国
家应该做什么。反帝代理是奉行自我封闭的。 区域领袖的国家角色的概
念是领导觉得他们的国家强大因此其他国家在指定外交政策时必须尊重他
们的国家的意见。积极独立的国家角色的概念不受其他的国家政策左右而
做自己国家要做的。国内发展的国家角色的概念顾名思义，发展是国家最
重要的问题。
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这个图表表现领导的国家角色的概念的迹象和国家角色的概念的关
系。
第二个图表：领导的国家角色的概念的迹象和国家角色的概念的关系
反帝代理

区域领袖
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中−高

高
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高
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内国发展的兴趣 高
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经济情况

因变数：外交政策的行为
政治学者会从有很多方面权衡外交政策的行为。本文主要关注三个
方面：大国的关系，军事力量，和经济规模。
有的国家在世界上非常强大。其他的国家必须跟那些国家保持友好
的关系。例如美国和俄罗斯／苏联就是这样的国家。中国，美国和俄罗斯
／苏联有很重要的关系。如果美国和中国没有好的关系，他们两个国家不
能成为重要的国家。俄罗斯／苏联和中国有非常长的历史。历史上两国关
系有的时候好，有的时候坏。
军事实力非常重要。中国有世界最大规模的军队。他们可以在很多
地方有影响。中国军费很高。所以我会看到别的领导花多少钱，我也会看

76

到中国的军事实力。在1970年，中国的军事不太现代化。但是今天，他们
的军事差不多现代化了。所以我会看别的国家的现代版本的政策。
最后经济规模非常重要。今天的中国是世界第二大的经济体。但是
他们在1970年经济规模还不是那么大。不同的领导有不同的经济政策。另
外中国跟很多国家有好的外交贸易关系。贸易非常重要。不同的领导也有
不同的贸易政策。所以我会看领导和贸易政策的关系，以及跟他们的国家
角色的概念的关系。
这个是一个图表表现自变量和因变数的关系：
第三个图表：自变量和因变数的关系
反帝代理
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方法论
这部分主要通过分析三位中国领导经典案例来解析。即邓小平，江
泽民和胡锦涛时代中国的国家角色的概念及其外交政策的行为。为了了解
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他们的国家角色的概念，我会用内容分析。通过内容分析，我会看到他们
的最重要的演说和决定他们的国家角色的概念。
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Chapter Three: Deng Xiaoping and Chinese Foreign Policy after Mao’s
Death

This chapter presents the case of Deng Xiaoping and the policies that were enacted
while he was China’s paramount leader from 1978-1992. The chapter first provides essential
background information on the life of Deng, and then provides evidence of Deng’s national
role conceptions. An analysis of Deng’s foreign policy behavior follows. Finally, a short
analysis of the independent and dependent variables in relationship to the hypothesis of the
study concludes the chapter.

Background Information
Deng Xiaoping has become one of the most revered leaders in Chinese history. Deng
created a path for China to become more prominent and influential on the world stage and
developed ways in which the Chinese people could showcase their prowess in the
international community. Though Deng Xiaoping was not always welcomed by high level
members of the Communist Party of China, he cultivated a way of thinking and a personality
that was able to overcome the skepticism surrounding his name. Deng Xiaoping, in many
ways, is credited with creating the China that the world sees today. From the reform policies
enacted during his rule, to the modernization efforts that took place under his watch, Deng
will always be remembered for developing innovative ways for China to be more influential
in the international community.
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Deng Xiaoping was born on August 22, 1904, in Sichuan Province to a family of
landlords.1 Deng’s father believed that he would accomplish many prominent things during
his lifetime and sent Deng to get the best education possible.2 After attending high school in
Chongqing, Deng enrolled in a program to prepare him to study in France. At the age of 16,
Deng traveled to France where he worked and studied. While in France, Deng’s political
career began to blossom. During Deng’s time in France, he became more active in
Communist affiliated affairs, and was able to work with many future leaders of the Chinese
Communist Party. 3
In 1926, Deng’s political aspirations and Communist ideology began to be further
developed. Deng traveled to the Soviet Union in 1926 where he attended Eastern University
and Sun Yat-sen University. 4 Both of these universities catered to potential revolutionaries
that would spread the Communist revolution throughout all places in the world. It is
speculated that Deng officially joined the Communist Party while attending these
universities.5
During the throes of the Communist Revolution, Deng was sent with other young
Chinese communists to help support the revolution.6 Deng Xiaoping’s talents were not used
as a soldier, rather Deng provided political instruction for the young members of the
revolutionary forces.7 After receiving many promotions throughout the 1920s and 1930s,
during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Deng became closer to the leader of the Communist
Revolution, Mao Zedong.8 Deng Xiaoping was seen as a, “...[Communist] Party Man in the
eyes of the troops, but simultaneously as a military man in the eyes of...” central Party
leaders.9
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When the People’s Republic of China was officially established in 1949, Deng
worked closely with Mao.10 Deng Xiaoping helped establish communist principles
throughout the country and worked tirelessly to spread Mao’s ideology to all of China.
However, Deng did not always agree with Mao’s policies. After the Great Leap Forward and
the beginnings of the Cultural Revolution, Deng became increasingly skeptical of what Mao
thought was best for the country. In 1969, Deng was first purged by Mao and other high
level officials.11 Deng Xiaoping was sent to Jiangxi Province so that he and other higher
level officials would not threaten the power and authority of Mao.12 Deng was not invited
back to Beijing until February 1973 after nearly seven years of Mao constantly criticizing
him for his reformist ideology.13 In December 1973, Mao seemingly had a change of heart
regarding Deng and decided to elevate Deng to a full member of the Politburo as well as a
member of the Central Military Commission.14 Because of his new found status, Deng was
able to meet with high ranking foreign officials and began to again become more prominent
in Chinese politics.
In 1976, as Mao’s health deteriorated and other high level members of the Chinese
Communist Party passed away, Deng was again purged from the Party. After having a falling
out with Mao in 1976, Deng was not chosen as Mao’s successor.15 Instead Deng was
relieved of all his duties within the Communist Party of China on April 7, 1976.16 After the
death of Mao in September 1976, there was no prominent leader of China. However, in
August, 1977, Deng regained his prominence as an influential leader in the Communist Party
of China.17
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It was after this point that Deng Xiaoping became the de facto leader of China. From
late 1977 until his death in 1997, Deng Xiaoping created the many policies that credit China
with the immense amount of growth and development that has occurred over the past thirtyfive years. Deng’s influence on the policies that China has undertaken throughout last
quarter of the twentieth century are a testament of Deng’s ability to cultivate strong relations
within the Communist Party. In addition, Deng’s reformist ideology and awareness of what
the average Chinese citizen needed allowed him to gain the trust of the Chinese people.
Though Deng Xiaoping was met with much criticism before his paramount rule, he will
always be remembered as creating the China that has become so influential in the
international community.

Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions
Deng Xiaoping gave many influential speeches throughout his political career. Deng
was known as a man of few words and gave many speeches revolving around themes that
common people would understand. Two of Deng’s most essential speeches were analyzed to
develop his national role conceptions. These influential speeches displayed Deng’s thoughts
regarding all aspects of Chinese life. Deng’s Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the
Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China provides important insights
into the policies that were created that would start the economic growth that China would
pursue in the coming years.18 The Third Plenary Session, which occurred in October 1984,
started the more comprehensive economic reforms that China would practice in the following
years.
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The other speech analyzed is a compilation of speeches given during Deng’s Southern
Tour in 1992. The Southern Tour was Deng’s way of promoting the policies that he believed
needed to be enacted even after not being in power. 19 All of the speeches revolved around
similar themes including the need to further strengthen China’s economy and improve the
well-being of Chinese citizens. While there were many speeches given during his tour to
cities and industrial centers in Southern China, the speeches provide the most direct way of
seeing Deng’s true thoughts on the path China should take in the coming years. Having
nothing to lose, politically speaking, Deng was able to provide his take on what was
necessary for China to pursue in order to become more influential in world politics. The
exact document coded is the main talking points given during Deng’s speech tour in Southern
China.

Deng Xiaoping’s Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of
the Communist Party of China, 1984
In the following section, an analysis of Deng’s speech at the Third Plenary Session of
the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China is provided. For this
speech and his speeches during his Southern Tour, the indicators of national role conceptions
are analyzed in order to gain a more complete picture of Deng’s remarks in terms of the
independent variable. Some of the explanations are supplemented with the actual words of
each speech to give specific examples of how different words and phrases are used. By
analyzing the data in this manner, a more comprehensive study of Deng’s national role
conceptions becomes apparent. This creates a better understanding of Deng Xiaoping and
the development of his national role conceptions.
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Socioeconomic Status
Deng Xiaoping made six references to socioeconomic status in his speech at the Third
Plenary Session. All of these references were made in terms of promoting more education in
the People’s Republic of China. Though the number of references to education may be small,
the importance each mention holds signifies that Deng Xiaoping believed education was
essential to the development of a strong China.
For example, Deng stated, “现在我们是捉襟见肘，要增加一点教育经费、科研经
费，困难得很。至于人民生活，到本世纪末达到小康水平，比现在要好得多.”20 This
sentence emphasized the need for more funding in education to occur. Without substantial
funding in terms of education, China would not be able to pursue the policies that have
allowed the country to develop and flourish. Deng also displayed his awareness of the plight
of citizens throughout China. In his speech at the Third Plenary Session in 1984, Deng
described in detail the need for reforms to help citizens, specifically in Suzhou Province:21
我了解了一下苏州的生活水平。在苏州，第一是人不往上海、北京跑，恐怕
苏南大部分地方的人都不往外地跑， 乐于当地的生活；第二，每个人平均
二十多平方米的住房；第三，中小学教育普及了，自己拿钱办教育；第四，
人民不但吃穿问题解决了，用的问题，什么电视机， 新的几大件，很多人
也都解决了；第五，人们的精神面貌有了很大的变化，什么违法乱纪、犯罪
行为大大减少
In this excerpt, Deng emphasized that he understood the conditions under which some people
in the People’s Republic of China were still living. Deng alluded to the need for education to
become affordable and more accessible to all people.
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Although the number of references to socioeconomic status is low, the data suggest
that Deng Xiaoping holds socioeconomic status in very high regards. Deng attempted to
bring the hardships of normal Chinese citizens to light for high ranking members of the
Chinese government. Through this, he tried to develop a more cohesive understanding of the
needs of Chinese citizens. Having acknowledged the difficulties that surround many Chinese
citizens, especially regarding education, Deng believed the socioeconomic status of many
Chinese citizens needed to be improved. This allowed Deng to place an important emphasis
on the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens.

Internationalism versus Isolationism
In his speech to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Committee of the
Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping made seven reference that showcased Deng
holding a more internationalist perspective on world politics. There were not any references
made to being more isolationist in his political thinking. All of the seven references to being
more internationalist came in the form of emphasizing sovereignty.
Of the references to sovereignty made in Deng’s speech at the Third Plenary Session,
a majority were made regarding the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong from Great Britain
to China that would occur in 1997. Deng stated, “...主权问题是不能谈判的...” which
emphasized the importance that sovereignty played in the development of China’s
international presence. 22 Deng believed that protecting China’s sovereignty was essential for
the further expansion of China’s influence throughout the world. In addition, the references
to sovereignty displayed the awareness Deng had of the international system. In his speech
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to the Third Plenary Session, Deng showed that sovereignty and the protection of sovereignty
were essential to help China take on more prominent roles in the international system.
Overall, the data suggest that Deng was seemingly more internationalist in nature
rather than isolationist. By stating the importance of sovereignty and retaining sovereignty
over China’s possessions, Deng alluded to the fact that sovereignty was essential to all
aspects of life in China. The data show that Deng believed sovereignty was extremely
important if China wished to become more influential in world politics.

Interest in Development
Deng Xiaoping made three references that alluded to having a strong interest in
development in his speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission
of the Communist Party of China. The references were all made in terms of economic
development. Since the speech at the Third Plenary Session revolved around themes of
China’s economy, it is surprising that there were not more references made to development in
Deng’s remarks. However, the three references to economic development provided an
insight into Deng’s plan to create a more developed and prosperous China.
In his speech, Deng stated, “...经济发展是个基础，在这个基础上工作就好做了,”
which displayed how important economic development was to Deng Xiaoping.23 Deng
believed that economic development would be the backbone of everything China would
accomplish in the coming years. Without economic development, China would not be able to
become the influential power that Deng so passionately wanted China to become. Deng also
believed that, “再花三十年到五十年时间，就可以接近经济发达国家的水平,” which
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emphasized that it would take time for China to become as developed as other countries in
the world.24 Deng also showed that without the policies that China was enacting at that time,
China would not be able to reach that economic development he so desperately wanted China
to achieve and stated, “你不开放，再来个闭关自守，五十年要接近经济发达国家水平，
肯定不可能.”25
In summary, while Deng did not make a large number of direct mentions of the
different indicators of national role conceptions in his speech at the Third Plenary Session of
the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China, he still made a direct
effort to emphasize the need to improve the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens and
improve China’s economic development. The data suggest that Deng believed these things to
be very important as well as displays that Deng Xiaoping was seemingly more
internationalist when thinking about world politics.

Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour Speech, 1992
Socioeconomic Status
In Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour Speech, there were nine references made to
socioeconomic status. These references ranged from promoting education to discussing the
importance of the income of Chinese citizens. Although the number of references made to
socioeconomic status is small, the importance of the references resonates throughout the
entirety of Deng’s speech.
In his Southern Tour Speech, Deng made eight references to education. Deng
believed that education was essential for all Chinese citizens so that China could become
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more influential in the international community. Deng emphasized that education was of
extreme importance, especially in terms of educating Chinese citizens on the ideas of
Socialism and Communism, and stated, “所以，要把我们的军队教育好，把我们的专政
机构教育好，把共产党员教育好，把人民和青年教育好.”26 This statement displayed
Deng’s thoughts about the education of all Chinese citizens and the need for an education to
include an emphasis on the Communist Party of China. Without the CPC, China would not
be able to develop into the important world power that Deng wished China to become.
In addition to education, Deng also stated, “...农民收入大幅度增加...” which
displayed Deng’s commitment to improving the incomes of Chinese citizens living in rural
areas. While Deng emphasized the need to develop China, he also understood that in order
for all of China to become developed, people living in rural areas also needed to have an
increase in income. This would allow for China’s development to be more comprehensive
and affect the livelihood of all people.
Overall, the data show that Deng placed a low emphasis on socioeconomic status.
However, as with his speech at the Third Plenary Session, the references to socioeconomic
made Deng Xiaoping seem like he placed a high emphasis on socioeconomic status during
his Southern Tour Speech. Deng realized the need to improve the socioeconomic status of all
Chinese citizens and the speech reflects that realization. The data suggest that although there
was a low number of references made, Deng still placed a very large emphasis on the
socioeconomic status of the Chinese people.
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Internationalism versus Isolationism
In Deng’s Southern Tour Speech, there were not any references made to Deng being
more internationalist or isolationist. According to the coding scheme provided in Chapter
Two, none of the terms or phrases appeared in the speech. Because of this, it cannot be
determined if Deng was more internationalist or isolationist when thinking about world
politics in 1992. However, it can be assumed that because China was growing at very fast
rates during Deng’s time in power, he would hold a more internationalist outlook on politics.
Without having an internationalist view, Deng Xiaoping would not have adhered to the
policies that promoted the growth and economic development of China.

Interest in Development
Deng Xiaoping expressed an interest in development fourteen times in his Southern
Tour Speech in 1992. These references mainly came in the form of promoting the idea of
economic development in order to create a more influential China. However, there were
other references made to having peaceful development as well. Though the number is low,
Deng still displayed a large interest in trying to promote the economic development that has
helped China develop since the beginning of his leadership.
Deng believed that China should strive to improve the economic development that
had already made China more powerful than it had ever been. Deng stated, “我国的经济发
展，总要力争隔几年上一个台阶,” which showed his dedication to improving the
economic development that had already brought great prosperity to the country.27 Deng also
believed that economic development must rely on the developments that occur in science and
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education and said, “经济发展得快一点，必须依靠科技和教育.”28 The data suggest that
Deng seemed to understand the necessity of economic development in order to better
Chinese society. Deng showed that economic development needed to be attained in order for
China to become more competitive in the international community.
Deng also stated, “世界和平与发展这两大问题，至今一个也没有解决.” 29 While
this quote is directly pertaining to the peace and development that should be occurring
through the world, it can also be applicable to Deng’s view of China. Without having
development that is peaceful in nature, one would not be able to fully achieve what is
necessary to make China more powerful in the international community. Developing in nonpeaceful ways would hinder the overall development of the People’s Republic of China.
Deng realized that China, and the world, need to pursue development that is peaceful in
nature in order to keep a stable environment for all countries to better their economies.
In summary, the data suggest that Deng placed a low emphasis on socioeconomic
status and a medium emphasis on interest in development. However, because of the
importance of both categories, and the gravity of the words that he spoke during his Southern
Tour, one can assume that Deng placed both categories in high regard. In addition, since the
data show that there were not any references made to internationalism or isolationism, it can
be assumed that Deng would be more internationalist. The policies that were enacted during
Deng’s rule, like that of Opening and Reforming, are consistent with a more internationalist
view.
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Deng Xiaoping’s National Role Conceptions
Overall, in the two speeches analyzed, fifteen total references were made to
improving the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens. While low numbers were displayed
in each speech, the total number of references suggest that Deng placed a medium emphasis
on socioeconomic status. However, the data suggest that while the number of references
were rather low, the references were given with extreme importance. The data also suggest
that Deng Xiaoping was seemingly more internationalist than isolationist when thinking
about world politics. Deng referenced a more internationalist tone seven times and there
were not any references made to being isolationist. This is not surprising given the reformist
nature of Deng and the importance he placed on integrating China with the rest of the world.
Finally, seventeen references were made in conjunction with having an interest in
development. However, because of the reformist nature of Deng, this can be considered to
be a high interest in development. Deng Xiaoping wished to have China become more
powerful and thought that the best way to do that was through economic development. This
alludes to the fact that Deng Xiaoping had a high interest in development.
Given the content of Deng’s speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central
Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China and his Southern Tour Speech, Deng
is best characterized as holding the regional leader and internal development national role
conceptions. Deng wished to take China in a different direction than it had been going
during the rule of Mao Zedong. He wanted China to become more influential and assume
leadership positions throughout the world. Both the regional leader and internal development
national role conceptions manifest themselves when the leader placed high emphasis on
socioeconomic status, had an internationalist view on world politics, and had high interest in
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development. The data suggest that Deng Xiaoping met the criteria in all three categories.
The regional leader and internal development national role conceptions display what Deng
hoped China would achieve in the future. These national role conceptions then, as
hypothesized, should correspond to certain foreign policy behavior.

Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior
Deng Xiaoping led China when it was undergoing substantial change in its foreign
policy. During the Mao Zedong era, China was virtually cut off from the outside world and
did not actively seek to express their power in different ways. However, once Deng came to
power, he thought China should take a different stance on international affairs and become
more involved with the rest of the international system. Understanding Deng’s foreign policy
enables a more complete understanding of China’s standing in the international system to
emerge. In line with the research design and methodology provided in Chapter Two, the
three aspects of Chinese foreign policy during the Deng era that are analyzed are China’s
diplomatic relations with great powers, China’s military power, and China’s economic power.
These three aspects of foreign policy provide a comprehensive understanding of Deng’s
foreign policy and the transformation that China was making during Deng Xiaoping’s
leadership.

Diplomatic Relations with Great Powers
Deng Xiaoping oversaw China go through substantial changes in its relations with
great powers. From resuming official diplomatic relations with the United States to dealing

93

with the fall of the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping led China through large shocks to the
international system. In this study, China’s relations with the United States and the Soviet
Union during the leadership of Deng are analyzed to give important insights to Chinese
foreign policy at this time. While it is important to note that there are many facets to the
relationship between the countries, the diplomatic relationship provides the most cohesive
insights in the general relationship between the countries and China’s foreign policy
behavior.

Sino-US Diplomatic Relations
Deng Xiaoping presided over a very important time in Sino-US relations. Starting in
1972, the United States and China began to show signs of rapprochement. After US
President Nixon’s historic visit to the People’s Republic of China in 1972, almost fifty years
of hostility began to come to a close.30 Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of
China, the United States officially recognized Taiwan as the true China. However, in the
1970s, that idea began to evolve and people began to believe that the United States should
recognize the People’s Republic of China as the true China. While President Nixon and Mao
Zedong were the catalysts to this change, Deng Xiaoping led the official normalization of
Sino-US relations.
On January 1, 1979, China and the United States officially normalized diplomatic
relations.31 This meant that the United States officially recognized the People’s Republic of
China as the true China. Deng Xiaoping played a large part in this normalization process and
was invited to the United States soon after relations were restored.32 With this trip, Deng
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hoped to reflect, “...Chinese interests in American high technology...” rather than display
affection to American life and values.33 The trip was heralded as a great success and the
establishment of official diplomatic relations between China and the United States brought
two of the most powerful countries in the world closer together.
In the following years, Sino-US relations were beginning to make up for lost time.
Perhaps the most important year following the normalization of relations was 1985. In 1985,
the United States and China signed many agreements that would bring the countries closer
together. Acting as an envoy of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese President Li Xiannian traveled to
the United states in July 1985.34 During his trip to the United States, China and the United
States signed multiple bilateral agreements. These agreements included a, “...pact opening
the way for US nuclear technology, plant, and equipment sales to China,” as well as, “...a
new accord on cultural exchanges, a protocol on educational exchange, and a fisheries
agreement.”35
Deng Xiaoping also believed that China and the United States should create a
stronger military partnership. To facilitate this, China and the US started exchange programs
for Chinese and US military officers and the United States made China eligible for Foreign
Military Sales.36 This brought the relationship between the United States and China closer
together and created a strong partnership for the development of future relations.
However, 1989 brought much turmoil to Sino-US relations. After Deng Xiaoping’s
crackdown on the Tian’anmen Square protests and the ensuing Tian’anmen incident, Sino-US
relations started to unravel. The aftermath of the Tian’anmen Square incident brought
economic and diplomatic sanctions to China.37 The United States would not allow China to
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perform such human rights abuses and President George H.W. Bush thought it was must
appropriate to apply economic sanctions to China. Deng Xiaoping and other leaders in the
Chinese government did not believe China deserved international punishment and they found
ways around the sanctions that were imposed on them.38
Though China and the United States experienced some turbulence in their diplomatic
relations, the data suggest that overall, Sino-US relations during the rule of Deng Xiaoping
were good. From the normalization of bilateral relations to the establishment of many
agreements between the two countries, China and the United States experienced good
relations while Deng Xiaoping was in power. Through diplomacy and other measures, SinoUS relations developed in a way that suggests Deng was very aware of the importance of the
partnership between the two countries.

Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations
During the Mao era, China and the Soviet Union had gone through a rather
tumultuous period regarding their relations. After having a strong bilateral partnership in the
1950s, the 1970s saw Sino-Soviet Relations deteriorate substantially.39 Deng Xiaoping came
to power at a time when China’s differences with the Soviet Union needed to be reconciled
so that both countries could become more powerful. In addition, Deng Xiaoping oversaw
China’s transition in relations with the Soviet Union to that of Russia after the fall of the
Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Throughout Deng’s time in power, Sino-Soviet Relations
began to face the same rapprochement as Sino-US relations which manifested itself through
China and the Soviet Union cooperating in many different areas.
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The beginning of the 1980s saw China and the Soviet Union at odds over many
things.40 Differences over regional issues, such as the Vietnamese alliance with the Soviet
Union, brought Sino-Soviet Relations to almost a standstill.41 However, at the end of 1984,
the Sino-Soviet relationship began to improve. In December 1984, China saw its first highlevel visitor from the Soviet Union in the past fifteen years. Soviet Vice-Premier Ivan
Arkhipov traveled to Beijing where he signed, “...preliminary accords calling for trade
expansion, Soviet-assisted modernization of Chinese factories, and scientific and
technological exchanges.”42 While China and the Soviet did not have official normal
relations at that time, Arkhipov’s visit to Beijing marked the beginning of normalization
efforts.
In July 1985, China’s Vice-Premier Yao Yilin traveled to Moscow as an envoy of
Deng Xiaoping. During his time in Moscow, China and the Soviet Union made a pact to
begin educational exchange programs and called to boost trade between both countries.43 In
addition, the Soviet Union agreed to help China construct and modernize factories that
specialized in, “...electrical power generation, metals, machinery manufacturing, coal,
chemicals, and transportation.”44
However, China and the Soviet Union also experienced some apprehension regarding
whether their relations could be normalized. China was not happy that Soviet troops were
stationed at the Chinese border and that the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan. Chinese
leaders made clear that these obstacles would need to be removed in order for normalized
relations to occur.45
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The end of the 1980s saw China and the Soviet Union restore normal relations. In
May 1989, China and the Soviet Union officially normalized relations.46 This brought the
end of the hostilities between the two countries that had been occurring since the 1970s.
Border negotiations and arms control talks ensued after the official relations had resumed.47
The fall of the Soviet Union saw a large threat disappear from China. Relations with Russia
started on a much better note than China’s relations with the Soviet Union.48
The data suggest that China’s relations with the Soviet Union during the leadership of
Deng Xiaoping were good overall. Though there were some tense moments in the
relationship, China and the Soviet Union worked together to overcome the differences the
countries shared. Because the data suggest Sino-US relations and Sino-Soviet relations were
both good, China diplomatic relations with great powers can also be characterized as good
while Deng Xiaoping was in power. This is not surprising given that Deng wanted to make
China more open and accessible to countries throughout the world. The data suggest that
Deng was successful in doing this and created strong partnerships with two of the most
important countries in the world.

Military Power
At the beginning of Deng’s rise to power in 1978, the People’s Republic of China had
already seen a decrease in the country’s military spending. Deng Xiaoping wished to
decentralize political and economic decision-making and the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) was one of the many organizations Deng wanted to decentralize.49 In order to do this,
Deng sought to reverse the policies of Mao Zedong and began to cut military spending.
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Throughout the 1980s, military spending decreased by about 3.5% every year though China’s
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was steadily rising. Nolt writes that China’s defense
spending reached a high at nearly 10% of its GDP in the 1960s and 1970s, but since then it,
“...has declined to about one quarter of that peak percentage.”50
Though Deng was successful at decreasing China’s military spending as a percentage
of GDP, he also decided to improve the modernization of the Chinese military. During the
Mao era, many of the weapons that were used by soldiers in the PLA were made in China.
These designs became increasingly obsolete so Deng decided to cut Chinese production and
decided to import more sophisticated weaponry from other countries.51 In 1982, the People’s
Republic of China began to import weapons made in the United States which would
substantially modernize the People’s Liberation Army.52 Though the defense spending cuts
seemed to be harmful to China’s overall military, they actually created avenues for a large
military modernization effort which increased the real military power of China.
In addition to the spending cuts, Deng also believed that China should decrease the
number of members of the People’s Liberation Army. At the beginning of Deng’s rule, the
PLA had nearly four million members.53 However, Deng realized that this number would not
be sustainable and there needed to be a cut to the number of soldiers. Deng Xiaoping
believed that large-scale war would not occur between either the Soviet Union and China or
China and the United States and that there would be no need to harbor that many troops.
Therefore, in 1985 the Chinese government decided to cut one million troops from the
PLA.54 This brought the total number of members of the People’s Liberation Army to three
million. Within this cut of one million troops would be a 10% decrease in the number of
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officers in the PLA.55 During the rest of Deng Xiaoping’s rule, the number of soldiers in the
PLA remained rather constant at three million.
Though Deng Xiaoping believed that the military should have less power and cut
spending and the number of troops in the military, the effects of those changes allowed
China’s military to become more powerful than they were during the Mao era. Military
modernization created a military that would be more capable of withstanding conflict with
other countries. In addition, the cuts in military personnel allowed the People’s Liberation
Army to be more efficient which enabled the military establishment to be more powerful.
The data suggest, that through all of the cuts in China’s military, the overall military power
during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping was high.

Economic Power
As Deng Xiaoping ascended to the upper echelons of Chinese government, the
Chinese economy was performing poorly. Due to the seemingly contradictory policies of the
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China’s economy was not operating at its
optimum level. Deng realized this and decided that instead of being the closed country that it
was during Mao’s rule, China should instead open its doors to foreign nations and reform
some of the policies that almost led China to the brink of economic collapse. After being in
power for only two years, Deng increased China’s trade as a percentage of GDP from 5.3%
in 1970 to nearly 21% in 1980.56 This stark contrast to the policies of Mao Zedong suggests
that Deng was determined to bring China out of the economic hole in which it saw itself and
become more powerful on the world stage.
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Economic growth in the People’s Republic of China was slow during the beginning of
Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. Dittmer asserts that China’s growth in Gross National Product
(GNP) decreased from nearly 12% in 1978 to only 5% in 1980.57 Data from the World Bank
suggest that China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the same time period rose from
almost $150 billion in 1978 to nearly $190 billion in 1980.58 Though the growth during
those first two years of Deng’s rule may have been slow, China’s GDP increased by about
$40 billion. Continuing the trend of increasing GDP, in 1985, Deng’s sixth year in power,
China’s GDP surpassed $300 billion for the first time in history.59 And in 1992, the final year
of Deng Xiaoping’s rule, China’s GDP totaled over $400 billion. In terms of per capita Gross
National Income (GNI), China experienced healthy growth. In 1980, China’s GNI per capita
was only $250. However, in 1992, Deng’s policies allowed GNI per capita to increase to
over $1000.60 This increase suggests that Deng’s policies were developed to allow all people
to feel the effects of China’s rise in economic power. The dramatic increase in China’s GDP
and GNI per capita during Deng Xiaoping’s time in power displays the importance Deng
placed on opening China to the rest of the world and reforming different sectors of China’s
economy.
China’s trade as a percentage of GDP also saw a substantial increase throughout the
years of Deng’s leadership. In 1980, trade was only 21% of China’s GDP and increased to
22% of GDP in 1985. However, by the end of Deng’s rule, trade accounted for over 36% of
GDP.61 Following this trend, China’s trade with the United States also increased. In 1985,
China had a $6 million trade surplus with the United States. In 1992, that trade surplus
increased to over $18 billion.62 These data suggest that China’s opening to other countries
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throughout the world was very prominent and helped China’s economy become more
powerful in the international system. Deng Xiaoping, and his reformist policies, created new
waves of Chinese economic power that would help foster immense economic development
over the following thirty years.
The changes in China’s GDP, GNI per capita, trade as a percentage of GDP, and
China’s trade surplus with the United States during a portion of Deng’s time in power can be
seen in the following table:63
Figure 4: Changes in Deng Xiaoping’s Economic Power
1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

GDP

$306
billion

$297
billion

$270
billion

$309
billion

$343
billion

$356
billion

$379
billion

$422
billion

GNI per
Capita

$500

$550

$620

$700

$750

$800

$890

$1020

Trade as
% of
GDP

22.5%

22.5%

28.9%

30.9%

29.2%

29.1%

31.6%

36.1%

Trade
Surplus

$6
million

$1.6
billion

$2.7
billion

$3.4
billion

$6.2
billion

$10.4
billion

$12.6
billion

$18.3
billion

The data suggest that because of the open and reform policies of Deng Xiaoping,
China’s economic power during Deng’s rule was high. China saw large increase in its GDP
as well as its trade which shows that China’s economic power was steadily rising. Deng
Xiaoping laid the foundation for the dramatic increase in economic power that China has
experienced over the last decade. Because of his policies, Deng was able to create a China
that would be able to exert its economic power throughout the rest of the international
system.

102

Analysis
According to the criteria of this study, Deng Xiaoping appears to hold the national
role conceptions of regional leader and internal development. The data suggest that not all of
the proposed relations between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior were
true. Of the possible six relationships that determine whether national role conceptions affect
foreign policy behavior, four of them were found to be true. Since this is a majority of the
relationships, there is an overall relationship between Deng Xiaoping’s national role
conceptions and his foreign policy behavior.
In terms of the regional leader national role conception, the data suggest that all of the
relationships between the role conception and foreign policy behavior were true. With the
regional leader national role conception, one would expect to see high levels of military and
economic power as well as good diplomatic relations with great powers. Deng exhibited all
of these traits. This suggests that Deng supported China becoming more influential in the
region and throughout the rest of the world. With his reformist ideology and the open and
reform policies that occurred under his watch, it is not surprising that Deng Xiaoping
displayed all of the traits of a regional leader.
The internal development national role conception was not as convincing as the
former conception. With the internal development role conception, the leader was predicted
to pursue policies that included low levels of military power, high levels of economic power,
and indifferent diplomatic relations with great powers. On this front, only one of these
relationships was correctly predicted. Deng Xiaoping exhibited high levels of economic
power, but did not show behavior that would indicate low levels of military power and
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indifferent relations with great powers. Since a majority of the relationships within this
national role conception were not true, the data suggest that the internal development role
conception was only slightly related to Deng’s foreign policy behavior.
Overall, four of the six proposed relations between national role conceptions and
foreign policy behavior were correctly predicted. The regional leader national role
conception manifested itself correctly in all three of Deng’s foreign policy behavior that were
studied. However, within the internal development national role conception, only one
relationship was evident. This suggests that in the case of Deng Xiaoping, national role
conceptions had a minimal effect on the foreign policy behavior of China during his
leadership.

1

Benjamin Yang, “The Making of a Pragmatic Communist: The Early Life of Deng Xiaoping, 1904-1949,” The
China Quarterly 35 (September 1993), p. 444.
2

Ibid., 445.

3

Ibid., 446

4

Ibid.

5

Ibid., 447.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid., 448.

8

Ibid., 453.

9

Ibid.

10

Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011),
p. 42.
11

Ibid., 44.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid., 67.

14

Ibid., 79.

15

Ibid., 161.

104
16

Ibid., 169.

17

Ibid., 200.

18

Deng Xiaoping never gave the Opening Address to the Communist Party of China National Congress.
Therefore, these two speeches were analyzed in lieu of the Opening Address.
19

Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, 664.

20

Deng Xiaoping, Speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist
Party of China, Beijing, China, 22 October 1984, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/
69112/69113/69684/69696/4949937.html (accessed February 2, 2013), p. 4.
21

Ibid.

22

Ibid., 2.

23

Ibid., 4.

24

Ibid.

25

Ibid., 5.

26

Deng Xiaoping, Southern Tour Speech, Wuchang, China, 18 January 1992, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/
69112/69113/69684/69696/4950062.html (accessed February 2, 2013), p. 6.
27

Ibid., 4.

28

Ibid., 5.

29

Ibid., 8.

30

Huan Xiang, “On Sino-US Relations,” Foreign Affairs 60:1 (Fall 1981), p. 36.

31

Joyce K. Kallgren, “China in 1979: On Turning Thirty,” Asian Survey 20:1 (January 1980), p. 12.

32

Ibid.

33

Ibid.

34

Richard Baum, “China in 1985: The Greening of the Revolution,” Asian Survey 26:1 (January 1986), p. 49.

35

Ibid.

36

June Teufel Dreyer, “US-China Relations: Engagement or Talking Past Each Other?” Journal of
Contemporary China 17:57 (November 2008), p. 597.
37

Harry Harding, “China’s American Dilemma,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 519 (January 1992), p. 14.
38

Dreyer, “US-China Relations,” 597.

39

Gerald Segal, “China and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union,” Asian Survey 32:9 (September 1992), p.
848.
40

Kallgren, “China in 1979,” 15.

41

Ibid., 16.

42

Baum, “China in 1985,” 47.

105
43

Ibid.

44

Ibid.

45

Ibid., 48.

46

Segal, “China and the Disintegration,” 855.

47

Ibid.

48

Ibid., 868.

49

James H. Nolt, “China’s Declining Military Power,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 9:1 (Spring 2002),
p. 323.
50

Ibid.

51

Ibid., 324.

52

Dreyer, “US-China Relations,” 597.

53

Nolt, “China’s Declining,” 326.

54

China’s National Defense, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, July
1998, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm (accessed January 15, 2013), p. 15.
55

Baum, “China in 1985,” 37.

56

World Bank, World Bank Data on China, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china (accessed January 20,
2013).
57

Lowell Dittmer, “China in 1980: Modernization and its Discontents,” Asian Survey 21:1 (January 1981), p.
32.
58

World Bank, World Bank Data on China.

59

Ibid.

60

Ibid.

61

Ibid.

62

“Trade in Goods with China,” http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html (accessed January 30,
2012).
63

World Bank, World Bank Data on China,; “Trade in Goods with China,”

107

第三章：邓小平和中国外交政策

介绍
这一章是邓小平的经典案例。首先我会介绍邓小平的背景信息。之
后，我会分析我的自变量和确定邓小平的国家角色的概念。分析自变量以
后，我会介绍邓小平的外交政策的行为。最后，我会分析我的自变量和我
的因变数，然后确定邓小平的国家角色的概念是否和他的外交政策行为有
关。

邓小平的背景信息
邓小平于1904年出生于四川省。他的家人有房产，所以邓能有很好
的童年。邓小平16岁的时候去法国工作和留学。在法国，邓小平开始学共
产主义。而且他能跟别的中国领导人，比如说周恩来，一起工作。可是
1926年的时候，邓小平去俄罗斯。在俄罗斯，他上了东方大学和孙中山大
学。这两个大学帮助了邓小平在政治上的看法，所以邓小平加入了共产
党。
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中国共产革命的时候，邓小平去支持中国共产党员。共产革命的时
候邓小平跟毛泽东建立了一个好的关系。邓跟毛一起帮助建立中华人民共
和国。文化革命的时候，邓小平倒台了。1973年邓小平被平反了。
毛泽东死了以后，中国人不知道谁是领导。1976年邓小平再次倒
台。可是1977年8月，邓再次恢复工作。恢复工作以后，邓小平综合领
导。他成为中国最重要的领导。邓小平开始中国的改革开放。这个政策给
中国带来了巨大的影响。

自变量：国家角色的概念
我看了邓小平的两个报告。这两个报告是在中央顾问委员会第三次
全体会议上的讲话和在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点。在中央
顾问委员会第三次全体会议上的讲话是，中国最重要的领导人决定他们必
须执行邓小平的经济政策。在武昌、深圳、珠海、上海等地的谈话要点
是，邓小平去中国的南部讲他的看法。
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邓小平在中央顾问委员会第三次全体会议上的讲话和在武昌、深圳、珠
海、上海等地的谈话要点

在这两个报告中，邓小平都说了他对经济和社会的看法。 我会分析
这个报告并确定他的国家角色的概念。

经济情况
在邓小平的两个重要的报告中，他提到了经济情况15次。他也说别
的字，比如：他说‘教育’ 14次，和说‘收入’ 1次。
邓小平觉得教育是非常重要。他在很多地方考虑到了教育。比如，
他说，“要把我们的军队教育好，把我们的专政机构教育好，把共产党员
教育好，把人民和青年教育好。” 邓小平说中国必须提高他们的教育质
量。邓小平觉得教育非常重要。他认为中国必须提高教育系统和质量。如
果他们不能提高教育质量，中国不能在世界上竞争。邓小平认为人民的经
济情况必须提高。他提到了经济情比较少，可是他的意思是非常重要，所
以我能分类这个部分：高。
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对外开放和自我封闭
在那些报告中，邓小平不提倡自我封闭。可是他提到了对外开放15
次。邓说‘主权’7次。他不说“自我封闭”的字。说到“主权”的时候，邓说中
国应该也必须保护他们的主权。邓小平是一个对外开放的领导，不是自我
封闭的。

对国内发展的重视程度
在那些报告中，邓小平提到了“国内发展”17次。他认为中国必须发
展经济，成为一个非常重要的国家。邓小平说到“经济发展”16次，“和平
发展”1次。邓小平觉得中国必须改变他们的经济政策。所以他觉得国内发
展是非常重要的。邓小平说，“就是因为我们搞了改革开放，促进了经济
发展，人民生活得到了改善。” 他的意思是中国必须改变经济系统也尝试
提高人民的生活。 邓小平觉得发展非常重要。因为他提到了“国内发展”很
多次，我能分类这个部分：高。

邓小平的国家角色的概念
邓小平觉得经济情况和国内发展都很有意思，也非常重要。他也是
一个对外开放的领导。所以邓小平的国家角色的概念是， 区域领袖和国
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内发展。这两个国家角色的概念表现了邓小平的个性。而且，邓的国家角
色的概念可以告诉别的国家中国外交政策行为。

因变数：中国外交政策行为
邓小平成为中国最重要的领导的时候，中国跟别的国家的关系不太
好。中国没有跟美国建立友好的关系，中国和苏联的关系真的不好。可是
邓要开始有好的关系。改革开放的时候，邓小平要修复中国和别的国家的
关系。

大国关系
1979年1月1日中国和美国建立正式的外交关系。这个非常重要，因
为中国终于跟世界上的最大的国家建立了外交关系。邓小平也到了美国。
在美国，他要告诉美国领导人，中国要跟美国发展贸易。这个访问表现中
国的跟美国新的关系。
1985年，中国和美国签署了很多协议。这个协议是跟核技术核文化
的交流有关。这个都帮助发展中美关系。可是1989年，中美关系不太好。
天安门事件以后，美国对中国进行经济制裁。邓小平觉得中国不应该有这
个制裁。总之，中美关系非常不好。

112

中国跟苏联的关系跟中美关系差不多一样。毛泽东的时候，中国和
苏联没有好的关系。可是邓小平要发展好的关系。1984年中国和苏联签署
很多非常重要的协议。那些协议跟贸易有关。那些协议非常重要，因为中
国和苏联还没有好的贸易关系。所以中国和苏联能开始很多贸易。
总之邓小平时期的大国关系很好。这三个国家都一起合作，并且发
展非常重要的关系。

军权
邓小平成为中国的主席的时候，中国的军事不是世界上最强大的。
中国有差不多四百万的士兵。可是1985年的时候，邓小平说他要减少中国
的士兵。为了减少士兵，中国会发展他们的军队现代化建设。所以1985
年，中国的军队只有3百万士兵。同时中国的军队有很多现代化建设。而
且中国花很多钱在他们的军事方面。虽然中国没有那么多士兵，但中国的
军队还是非常强大的。

经济权
邓小平要发展中国的经济。所以他开始中国改革开放的政策。1979
年，中国的经济发展不太好。可是中国经济发展地很快。1985年，中国的
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国内生产总值是300亿美元。在1992年，中国的国内生产总值是差不多400
亿美元。这个非常好，表现中国的经济权。邓小平的时期，中国的经济提
高得真快。邓小平和他的改革开放政策帮助中国的经济发展。

分析
从以上的情况，可以看出我的假设差不多是对的。我认为中国领导
的国家角色的概念跟他们的外交政策有关。邓小平的国家角色的概念，
区域领袖跟他的外交政策行为也是一样的。可是他的别的国家角色的概
念，关于内部发展是不对的。所以我不能明确我的假设是完全对的或者不
对。
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Chapter Four: Jiang Zemin and Chinese Foreign Policy in the 1990s

This chapter presents the case of Jiang Zemin and the policies that were enacted
during his time as President of China from 1993-2003. First, the chapter surveys relevant
background information on the life of Jiang Zemin, and then provides evidence of Jiang’s
national role conceptions. Next, an analysis of Jiang’s foreign policy behavior is provided.
This chapter ends with a short analysis of the independent and dependent variables in
relationship to the hypothesis of the study.

Background Information
Becoming the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in 1989, Jiang
Zemin’s rule over one of the most dynamic countries in the world began. 1 Though he did not
attain leadership of all facets of the Chinese government, such as control of the People’s
Liberation Army and the elusive presidential title until the early 1990s, Jiang had already
established himself as an important figure in Chinese political history. Jiang was able to
prove that he was capable of leading one of the greatest economic transformations the world
had seen.
Jiang Zemin was born in 1926, in Jiangsu Province to a family of intellectuals that
highly valued Chinese culture.2 Jiang placed large importance on the Confucian traditions of
morality and filial piety. The Confucian traditions encompass many aspects of Chinese
culture and Jiang embraced the ideals of morality that Confucius pursued. As Xiao writes,
“[t]here is a practical demand of China to stand on a moral high ground,” which shows the
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importance of morality in the Chinese way of thinking.3 Being moral also creates a
justification for wanting to raise the socioeconomic status of a country’s population. In this
case, Jiang wanted to see China develop in a way that would allow for a higher
socioeconomic status for the Chinese population.
Jiang grew up during the Japanese occupation of China (1931-1945).4 This period
was part of what has become known as the “century of humiliation” where China was
essentially colonized by great powers throughout the world. Japan had arguably the largest
role in this by forcing China to succumb to the demands of the Japanese empire. Growing up
in this type of world, Jiang knew that he wanted China to become strong and independent in
the international community. Seeing the atrocities that Japan committed on the Chinese
people made Jiang want to try to change the way China was viewed by all people. Jiang felt
as though China should be the country that would take a more prominent role in the
international system and not be isolated by the needs of other countries instead of
succumbing to the demands of an imperial power.5
Jiang joined the Communist Party of China in 1946, as a student studying electrical
and power engineering in Shanghai.6 While in college, Jiang assisted the Communist Party
in many different ways. He led student movements promoting the ideals of the party and
also worked underground as a low-level member in the political organization. After
graduating from college, Jiang held many jobs in the growing industrial sector of Shanghai.
He assumed many top leadership positions at different factories in Shanghai and was
beginning to make a name for himself in that field. However, during the Great Proletariat
Cultural Revolution, Jiang experienced politics firsthand. In the midst of the Cultural
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Revolution, Jiang was relieved of his position as Director of the Wuhan Power Engineering
Research Institute and forced to spend the rest of the Cultural Revolution in fear.
While surviving the Cultural Revolution, Jiang was forced to attend a Communist
Party cadre school to be politically reeducated. After his reeducation, Jiang traveled to
Beijing and became the vice director of the Bureau of Foreign Affairs of the First Ministry of
Machine-Building Industry. This was Jiang’s first formal government position. From this
point on, Jiang would become an important figure in Chinese politics and assume many
leadership positions in the Communist Party of China.
During Jiang Zemin’s time as president of China (1993-2003), many different foreign
policy challenges faced the country. For example, Jiang had to oversee China’s response to
the United States’ accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. In
addition, Jiang was forced to deal with the collision of a United States Navy EP-3 and a
Chinese Navy fighter jet over the South China Sea in 2001.7 Both of these incidents created
many problems that Jiang needed to overcome and showed the capabilities of Jiang as a
leader. In addition, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States provided
Jiang another opportunity to prove China’s developing role as a leader in the international
community.
Jiang Zemin did many things to try to help the Chinese people and attempted to
develop China into a world power. From a focus on the economic development of the
People’s Republic of China to improving the socioeconomic status of the Chinese people,
Jiang Zemin has been heralded as a very influential leader in Chinese history. From his
unconventional background in engineering, to his political reeducation during the Cultural
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Revolution, Jiang proved to be a true leader and helped China overcome many obstacles in
order to become a leading country in international politics.

Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions
Two speeches were coded and analyzed for the purpose of gaining insight into the
way in which Jiang Zemin views himself and the role China holds in the international
system. These speeches were the opening remarks Jiang gave at the 15th and 16th
Community Party of China National Party Congress (NPC) given in 1997 and 2002
respectfully. The opening address is the most important speech given during the National
Party Congress. In the address, the President of China provides a look into the development
of the country over the last five years. The address also lays out a plan for the further
development of the country and sets areas that should be focused on in order for the People’s
Republic of China to become more influential in the international community.
As the opening speech acts as the ‘state of the union’ address, one can see how the
country has changed since the last NPC and also can be used to develop a clearer
understanding of how Jiang’s impressions of China have also changed. This speech gives the
rest of the world a look at China’s aspirations in the international community and creates the
impression that China is developing in ways that will not only assist the China but also assist
the greater development of the world.
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Jiang Zemin’s 15th National Party Congress Opening Address, 1997
In the following section, an analysis of Jiang’s opening remarks at the 15th National
Party Congress is provided. For each address, the indicators of national role conceptions are
analyzed in order to gain a full picture of his speech in terms of the independent variable.
Some of the explanations are supplemented with the actual words of his address to give
specific examples of how different words and phrases are being used. By analyzing the data
in this manner, a more comprehensive study of Jiang Zemin’s national role conceptions can
be provided. This allows for a better understanding of Jiang Zemin and the development of
his national role conceptions.

Socioeconomic Status
For the first indicator of national role conceptions, socioeconomic status, Jiang’s 15th
National Party Congress Opening address made more references than expected. In total, in
terms of the coding scheme used, there were forty-eight references to socioeconomic status.
These references ranged from speaking about societal life, to the importance of education in
the development of China, and the need for the incomes of Chinese citizens, mainly in rural
areas, to be raised in the next years.
For example, Jiang made three references to the social life of Chinese citizens. The
following quote provides Jiang’s thoughts on the development of Chinese social life and
makes two references to the social life of Chinese citizens:8
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我国经济、政治、文化和社会生活各方面存在着 种种矛盾，阶级矛盾由于国
际国内因素还将在一定范围内长期存在，但社会的主要矛盾是人民日益增长
的物质文化需要同落后的社会生产之间的矛盾，这个主要矛盾贯穿我国社会
主义初级阶段的整个过程和社会生活的各个方面。这就决定了我们必须把经
济建设作为全党全国工作的中心，各项工作都要服从和服务于这个中心。
While this quote emphasized the need for socialism to create economic opportunity for the
Chinese people, it also showed how Jiang wanted to place emphasis on the improvement of
Chinese citizens’ socioeconomic status through bettering their social livelihoods.
In addition to making references to societal life, Jiang also placed a large emphasis on
education. In total, education was mentioned thirty-one times in this address. In this excerpt
from Jiang’s address, he emphasized the need for the development of education and an
improvement of the quality of education in the People’s Republic of China. In this excerpt
alone, ten references are made to education:9
发展教育和科学，是文化建设的基础工程。培养同现代化要求相适应的数以
亿计高素质的劳动者和数以千万计的专门人才，发挥我国巨大人力资源的优
势，关系二十一世纪社会主义事业的全局。要切实把教育摆在优先发展的战
略地 位。尊师重教，加强师资队伍建设。发挥各方面的积极性，大力普及
九年义务教育、扫除青壮年文盲，积极发展各种形式的职业教育和成人教
育，稳步发展高等教 育。优化教育结构，加快高等教育管理体制改革步
伐，合理配置教育资源，提高教学质量和办学效益。认真贯彻党的教育方
针，重视受教育者素质的提高，培养德智 体等全面发展的社会主义事业的
建设者和接班人。努力提高科技水平，普及科技知识，引导人们树立科学精
神，掌握科学方法，鼓励创造发明。消除愚昧，反对封建 迷信活动。积极
发展哲学社会科学，这对于坚持马克思主义在我国意识形态领域的指导地
位，对于探索有中国特色社会主义的发展规律，增强我们认识世界、改造世
界的能力，有着重要意义。
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This section of Jiang’s address exposed his commitment to the improvement to the education
system of China and to the need to enhance the quality of education for the future leaders of
China.
Finally, Jiang made fourteen references to income in his opening address to the 15th
National Party Congress. Jiang seemed to stress the need to increase the income of Chinese
citizens throughout the country. However, there was a strong emphasis placed on increasing
the incomes of those living in the country side. Phrases such as, “农民收入增加,” displayed
the importance Jiang has placed on the need to increase the income of Chinese citizens,
especially those living rural areas. 10
Overall, patterns of the indicators of national role conceptions suggest that the need to
improve the general socioeconomic status of the Chinese people is considered to be a high
priority for Jiang Zemin when this speech was given. The data included forty-eight
references to improving the socioeconomic status of the Chinese people. Because of the data
pattern, Jiang can be categorized as holding these ideals dear to him which would allow him
to pursue policies that will increase the livelihood of Chinese citizens.

Internationalism versus Isolationism
In terms of the second indicator of national role conceptions, Jiang’s opening address
to the 15th National Party Congress made fewer references to China being more
internationalist or isolationist. In fact, no terms or phrases were presented that made Jiang
seem to be isolationist in nature. Though only five total references were made, each
reference alluded to China being more internationalist in nature.
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Jiang made three references to sovereignty. These were mainly given in terms of
protecting China’s national sovereignty and occurred in phrases such as, “维护国家主权的
原则性.”11 By speaking in this way about protecting the People’s Republic of China, Jiang
showed his realization that China is part of an international society where the most important
thing is to protect the state’s interests. While this could be interpreted as being isolationist,
making these references to the protection of the state suggests that Jiang is aware of the
international nature of the world in the twentieth century. References to sovereignty
displayed Jiang’s understanding of the international system and showed that the protection of
the state is extremely important in the international system.
Jiang also made one remark in favor of international organizations and stated, “要积
极参与多边外交活动，充分发挥我国在联合国以及其他国际组织中的作用.”12 This
statement suggests Jiang wished for China to have a more active role in the United Nations
and other international organizations. Jiang displayed the importance of international
cooperation and globalization, thus alluding to the fact that he is more internationalist in
nature. Finally, Jiang made one positive reference to globalization in his opening address.
Jiang stated, “面对经济、科技全球化趋势，我们要以更加积极的姿态走向世界，完善
全方位、多层次、宽领域的对外开放格局，发展开放型经济，增强国际竞争力，促进
经济结构优化和国民经济素质提高,” which showed that he believed globalization to be
very important especially in terms of developing the economies of nations throughout the
world.13
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The data suggest that Jiang Zemin is seemingly more internationalist than isolationist.
By stating the importance of globalization, international organizations, and sovereignty, Jiang
Zemin seems to be more internationalist when thinking about global politics. The data did
not provide any reference to being more isolationist proposing that Jiang deems an
internationalist attitude more important in world politics. This should then be reflected in the
policies that he would pursue as President of the People’s Republic of China.

Interest in Development
The third indicator of national role conceptions, interest in development, was not as
prevalent as the first indicator, but occurred many times more than the second indicator.
Jiang made twenty-four total references to increasing the development of the People’s
Republic of China during the next five years. The references made in this category were
mainly economic in nature and were focused on the internal development of China.
Jiang Zemin made seventeen references to economic development in his opening
address to the 15th National Party Congress. Some of these mentions of economic
development referred to the need to enhance China’s global standing in economics. Other
references were made such as, “在经济发展的基础上，使全国人民过上小康生活...”
stating that economic development was necessary in order to better the livelihood of the
Chinese population.14 Mentions of economic development also arose when speaking of rural
areas and the need for the Chinese countryside to obtain the same amount of economic
development as costal China. Ever since the beginning Deng Xiaoping’s Open and Reform
policies, economic development has been a high priority for Chinese leaders. They realized
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that in order to become a strong country in the international community, their economy must
be strong and well developed. Jiang seemed to embrace this thinking which suggests he
hopes to still pursue policies that promote the economic development of China.
In addition to economic development, Jiang also placed a strong emphasis on the
need for China to pursue peaceful development. Peaceful development was mentioned seven
times in his 1997 opening address. Peaceful development refers to the need for China to
aspire to economic development for peaceful purposes, without trying to incite fear into other
countries due to China’s rise in power. Peace and development is used to describe China’s
internal growth as essential to the Chinese for its rise in the international system. Jiang also
stated, “和平与发展已成为当今时代的主题,” which provides an important insight as to
what is a priority for China, saying that peace and development are both essential to China
becoming more prominent in the international community.15 While it is evident that Jiang is
placing an emphasis on internal development, it is surprising that there were not more
references made to something that seems so important to the Chinese government.
In summary, the 15th National Party Congress opening address suggested that Jiang
Zemin placed a high level of emphasis on socioeconomic status and had a high level of
interest in development. These are both consistent with what China was experiencing at the
time the remarks were given. In addition, the data showed that Jiang also expressed a more
internationalist tone which displays his interest in a more globalized world and a need for all
states to respect the sovereignty of all countries.
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Jiang Zemin’s 16th National Party Congress Opening Address, 2002
Socioeconomic Status
In Jiang’s address to the 16th Communist Party of China National Party Congress in
2002, many similarities were shared with the speech given five years prior. In the 16th NPC
speech, fifty-six references were made to socioeconomic status. These references were again
made in relationship to education, income, and societal life but there were additional
references to promoting health.
Jiang made thirty-four references to education, which is only three more than in the
address given five years earlier. Again, a majority of the references were made to promoting
the development of education and enhancing the quality of education in China. In the
following excerpt, Jiang mentioned education fifteen times and in many different manners:16
大力发展教育和科学事业。教育是发展科学技术和培养人才的基础，在现
代化建设中具有先导性全局性作用，必须摆在优先发展的战略地位。全面
贯彻党的教育方针，坚持教育 为社会主义现代化建设服务，为人民服
务，与生产劳动和社会实践相结合，培养德智体美全面发展的社会主义建
设者和接班人。坚持教育创新，深化教育改革，优化 教育结构，合理配
置教育资源，提高教育质量和管理水平，全面推进素质教育，造就数以亿
计的高素质劳动者、数以千万计的专门人才和一大批拔尖创新人才。加强
教师队伍建设，提高教师的师德和业务水平。继续普及九年义务教育。加
强职业教育和培训，发展继续教育，构建终身教育体系。加大对教育的投
入和对农村教育的 支持，鼓励社会力量办学。完善国家资助贫困学生的
政策和制度。制定科学和技术长远发展规划。加强科学基础设施建设。普
及科学知识，弘扬科学精神。坚持社会 科学和自然科学并重，充分发挥
哲学社会科学在经济和社会发展中的重要作用。在全社会形成崇尚科学、
鼓励创新、反对迷信和伪科学的良好氛围。

126

In this statement, Jiang mentioned the need to promote education in the countryside while
also making sure that all people have access to education. Advocating education is a direct
way of again showing Jiang’s commitment to enhancing the socioeconomic status of China.
Jiang made eighteen references to income in the 2002 address. Income was again
perceived as being important to all people, but Jiang made specific calls to increase the
income of those living in the countryside. However, there were also phrases used that would
refer to the incomes of citizens to rise such as, “提高低收入者收入水平.”17 As income is a
direct indicator of socioeconomic status, the data suggest Jiang placed high importance on
socioeconomic status.
Finally, Jiang made three references to the health of Chinese citizens and one
reference to improving societal life. The references to health were made in conjunction with
promoting science and technology. However, the phrase, “支持健康有益文化,” displayed
how Jiang wants to promote a healthy culture in Chinese society.18 Doing so improves the
socioeconomic status of the Chinese population.
Jiang, overall, again made socioeconomic status a high priority in his 2002 address.
By making a total of fifty-six references to improving the socioeconomic status of China, the
data suggest Jiang wanted to pursue policies that will enhance the image of China throughout
the rest of the international community. Jiang again is perceived as wanting to deem these
ideals as being very important and would possibly pursue policies that would enhance the
socioeconomic development of Chinese citizens.
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Internationalism versus Isolationism
Jiang Zemin made ten total references to being more internationalist when looking at
world politics in his opening address to the 16th National Party Congress. Again, the data
showed that there were not any references made that were promoting an isolationist ideology.
While more references were made to being internationalist than in the 1997 address, having
given only five more references in 2002 does not substantially change Jiang’s thoughts on
being more internationalist.
Jiang Zemin made six references to sovereignty in the 2002 speech. Sovereignty was
mentioned in terms of promoting the security of the country and protecting national interests.
For example, the following statement showed that China’s sovereignty is contingent upon the
promotion of internationalist ideals in the international system, “我们从容应对一系列关系
我国主权和安全的国际突发事件.”19 This statement also showed that China is an
important player in an international community that is becoming more and more
interconnected.
Globalization was mentioned four times in Jiang’s opening address. In 2002, China
was becoming more and more economically powerful. Their economic growth was
contingent upon the globalized nature of the international system. Jiang emphasized the need
for economic globalization and said, “世界多极化和经济全球化趋势的发展,” and provided
evidence of wanting the world to become more globalized.20 A more globalized society
would also help China’s development and help China become more influential in the
international community.
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The patterns in the data suggest that Jiang was trying to promote more internationalist
ideologies while not adhering to isolationist policies. Internationalist policies would allow
China to become more powerful and influential on the world stage. Therefore, Jiang would
hope to promote internationalist policies that would enhance China and create a better image
of China in the international community.

Interest in Development
Jiang Zemin mentioned words and phrases that would promote a high level of interest
in development eighteen times. These included references to economic development and
peaceful development. While this is less than the amount of times development was
mentioned in 1997, it is still a high number that shows the importance Jiang placed on the
development of his country. In order for China to be successful in the international
community, the country must be developed in a way that will promote the improvement of
China’s image in the international community.
Jiang mentioned economic development fifteen times in the opening address of the
16th NPC. Economic development was mentioned as being extremely important to the
development of the country and necessary in order to make China more influential on the
world stage. Jiang also stated that the Chinese government should help promote the private
sector of the Chinese economy and stated, “支持和引导非公有制经济发展.”21 Though
China officially heralds a socialist economy, through this statement, Jiang acknowledged the
need for China to also embrace the private sector in the economic development of the
country.
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Jiang Zemin also made three references to peaceful development. Peaceful
development references were made in terms of creating a world that can experience peace
and development at the same time. A world that could develop in peaceful ways would allow
for more comprehensive development of China’s internal economy. Having a developed
economy is extremely important to the People’s Republic of China and is necessary in order
for the country to be more influential in the global economy.
In summary, the data suggest that Jiang placed a high emphasis on socioeconomic
status and a high level of interest in development. The data also indicate that he also
expressed a more internationalist tone when giving this address which corresponds, again, to
the speech given five years prior. These characterizations show how China had again been
changing throughout the last five years and how Jiang had been embracing the new found
status of China.

Jiang Zemin’s National Role Conceptions
Overall, in the two speeches, Jiang made a total of one hundred four references to
improving the socioeconomic status of China’s citizens. In both speeches, socioeconomic
status was mentioned many times. In terms of internationalism versus isolationism, Jiang
Zemin was starkly more internationalist with fifteen total references made. Finally, Jiang
expressed high levels of interest in development in both speeches with a total of forty-two
mentions of development. The combination of high levels socioeconomic status, high levels
of interest in development, and an internationalist political view is not surprising given the
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time the speeches were both given. China was improving its socioeconomic status and also
its economy while also becoming more influential in world politics.
Given the content of two of Jiang Zemin’s opening address to the Communist Party of
China National Party Congress, Jiang is best characterized as holding the regional leader and
internal development national role conceptions. Because Jiang provided a multitude of
references to socioeconomic status in both speeches analyzed, an internationalist view in
both speeches, and high references to development, the regional leader and internal
development national role conceptions are quite fitting for what was being said at the two
National Party Congresses. Holding these national role conceptions makes China seem to
want more responsibility in the international system while also making sure that the country
is able to sustain itself economically. The regional leader and internal development national
role conceptions can be seen in the two speeches as working together in order to promote the
creation of a powerful Chinese state. This state would not only be powerful in terms of
political might, but also economically. These national role conceptions, then, as
hypothesized, should correspond to certain foreign policy behavior.

Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior
In order to gain a comprehensive perspective of the foreign policy behavior of China
under Jiang Zemin’s leadership, three categories were studied. In line with the research
design and methodology provided in Chapter Two, the three aspects of Chinese foreign
policy that are analyzed are China’s diplomatic relations with great powers, China’s military
power, and China’s economic power. These three indicators will allow for an overall picture
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of China’s foreign policy. While there are many different ways to analyze a country’s foreign
policy behavior, the areas of Chinese foreign policy that were analyzed provide important
insights into the development of Chinese foreign policy during the Jiang era.

Diplomatic Relations with Great Powers
One way to gauge the behavior of a country is to further understand the country’s
relations with other great powers. In the case of this study, China’s relations with the United
States and Russia during the presidency of Jiang Zemin are analyzed to give important
insights to Chinese foreign policy during this time. While it is important to know many
facets of the relationship between the two countries, the diplomatic relationship provides the
most cohesive insights into the general relationship between the two countries

Sino-US Diplomatic Relations
The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China during
Jiang Zemin’s time as President of China faced many different challenges. While there was
much cooperation during the latter part of Jiang’s term, the beginning of his time as President
of China did not seem to herald the same optimism as the end of his time as president. From
trade relations and human rights, to crises in the Taiwan Straight, China and the United States
appeared to develop a stronger relationship as time passed.
When Jiang became the Chinese President in 1993, the relations between the United
States and China were strained. According to David Shambaugh, after the Tian’anmen
Square incident in the summer of 1989, the Sino-American relationship was very tense.
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Economic sanctions were placed on China because of the alleged abuses occurring after
student protests, which created much distress between the two countries.22 In addition to the
economic sanctions, the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) trade status of China towards the
United States was soon to expire. Having MFN status meant that China would be able to
trade more freely and easily with the United States. In the early 1990s, one of the most
important aspects of the relationship between China and the United States was to see the
renewal of the MFN status.23
Both countries knew that it was of utmost importance to renew this status, but US
President Bill Clinton felt domestic opposition to doing so. Many people in the United States
believed that renewing China’s MFN status should only be allowed if China improved its
human rights record.24 However, both sides understood that not renewing China’s MFN
status would bring a wide variety of negative consequences to both countries.25
During this tense time, Jiang Zemin and President Clinton held their first summit
meeting at the APEC conference which occurred in November, 1993. At this meeting, both
sides tried to negotiate the renewal of China’s MFN status. Clinton and the United States
were determined to only renew the MFN status if China improved its human rights record.
Contrasting that, China argued that renewal was necessary in order to keep their economy
growing.26 Both countries retained their position and nothing was made of the first meeting
of the heads of state from both countries since 1989.
However, in the following year, President Clinton had a change of heart and decided
to delink the renewal of China’s MFN status to its human rights record.27 On May 26, 1994,
Clinton formally announced the severing of the connection between human rights and MFN
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status.28 This brought about a new era of Sino-American relations. After having a tense start
to the beginning of the decade, China and the United States grew closer together and began
to further develop their relationship.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, Sino-American
relations again began to see more cooperation.29 Both China and the United States saw
terrorism as a threat and started to cooperate on many different levels. The governments of
China and the United States wanted to further improve their relationships and deemed
cooperation on both nuclear nonproliferation policies and counterterrorism would be the best
avenues to achieve a better relationship.30 Through diplomacy and other means, the Chinese
government, under Jiang was able to procure an important partnership in the United States.
This culminated in the meeting of President Jiang and President George W. Bush at the
APEC summit in 2001 where they agreed on cooperating on certain counterterrorism
measures.31
Because of the use of diplomacy in renewing China’s Most-Favored Nation status as
well as the cooperation in the post-9/11 world, the diplomatic relations between the United
States and the People’s Republic of China can be characterized as being good. While there
were some tense events that could have tarnished the relationship, history shows that Jiang
Zemin was able to cultivate a lasting, working, relationship between the United States and
China. Diplomacy and other cooperative measures were essential in the development of this
relationship and suggests that Jiang thought Sino-American relations were of utmost
importance.
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Sino-Russian Diplomatic Relations
During Jiang Zemin’s leadership, Sino-Russian relations were experiencing
something that had not occurred in recent memory. The disintegration of the Soviet Union
created many hurdles for Jiang Zemin to overcome. However, for a majority of Jiang’s rule,
Russia and China developed another strong working partnership. From the beginning of the
decade to the end, Sino-Russians relations remained relatively stable and allowed for much
growth between the two countries.
Jiang Zemin presided over many different diplomatic agreements with Russia during
his time as Chinese President.32 In 1993, Jiang signed a five-year Military Cooperation pact
which created many avenues for more cooperation to develop. Following that, in September
1994, China and Russia signed agreements for, “...mutual nonaggression, mutual detargetting
of strategic weapons, and non-first use of nuclear force....”33 Finally, in 1997, Russia and
China signed, “...agreements on trade, oil, and gas development and cultural cooperation.”34
Needless to say, there was much cooperation between the Chinese and Russians. This
cooperation suggests that both countries deemed the other country extremely important and
would do what needed to be done in order to cultivate a working relationship.
Perhaps the most telling sign of Sino-Russian cooperation occurred at a Russia-China
Summit meeting in 1996. At the meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin commented that he
believed Sino-Russian relations should be elevated to a, “...strategic partnership for the
twenty-first century.”35 Jiang agreed to this notion and Sino-Russian relations developed into
an extremely important partnership that would benefit both nations. Following this
groundbreaking cooperative effort, in 2001, China and Russia signed the Treaty of Good-
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Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.36 This brought the China and Russia even closer
together as strategic partners and allies in the international system.
Jiang’s use of diplomacy in China’s relations with Russia suggests that the overall
relations between the countries were good. Many agreements were made which would
strengthen the relationship between Russia and China. Because China’s relations with both
great powers were positive during Jiang’s time in power, the overall diplomatic relations
between China and the United States and Russia were also good. Many forms of cooperation
between the countries was evident and history has shown that important relationships have
developed over time because of the cultivation of relations during Jiang’s leadership.

Military Power
One of the most important aspects of a country’s foreign policy comes from their
military. In many cases, the military allows for a direct avenue for a specific foreign policy
to be established. During Jiang’s time as president, the Chinese military had undergone
different forms of modernization as well as established itself as the largest group of armed
forces in the world. This has not come without changes in policy that would show the
military acting in ways pursuant of certain foreign policies.
When Jiang Zemin took office in the spring of 1993, the size of China’s military, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), ranked as the largest military force in the world with nearly
3 million members.37 However, in September 1997, the Chinese government announced a
plan to reduce the size of the PLA by 500,000 men.38 This reduction would be a part of the
larger movement to improve the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army beginning in
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the 1980s. The decrease in the number of soldiers in the PLA would come with a number of
different disarmament moves that would take place over the next three years. According to
Chinese National Defense white papers, once the reduction in troops took place, the total
number of forces would number 2.5 million.39
This still makes China the country with the world’s largest military. However,
reducing the number of troops and increasing the modernization of the People’s Liberation
Army would allow for a different type of military to emerge. This military would be more
powerful and better equipped to take on the tests that post-modern warfare creates.
Nonetheless, even a large reduction of troops, accompanied by vast military modernizations
shows the power that China’s military still had in the middle of the 1990s.
During the same time period, the Chinese government increased total spending on the
military. In 1995, during Jiang’s second year as president, the Chinese spent 63.67 billion
yuan on their military. Two years later, in 1997, China spent over 81 billion yuan on its
defense. Over two years, the Chinese increased the total spending on defense by nearly 20
billion yuan.40 Interestingly, the amount of money spent on national defense in terms of total
national budget decreased from 9.3 percent to 8.8 percent during the same period.41 While
this statistic seems counterintuitive, it actually adheres to what was happening to the Chinese
economy at the same time. As the Chinese economy grew, more money could be spent on
China’s national defense while at the same time increasing the amount of money spent in
other sectors of the economy. Nonetheless, the increase in spending over two years from
1995 to 1997 showed that China was still placing a strong emphasis on the People’s
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Liberation Army and increasing the potential for foreign policy behavior based on the
increasing value of the PLA.
In July 1997, China formally resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong. After one
hundred years of being a colony of the United Kingdom, the lease had ended and China was
now able to regain control of the area. This meant that China had to place troops in the
region in order to safeguard Hong Kong from external and internal threats. However, Hong
Kong was placed in a special category regarding its relationship with mainland China. Hong
Kong is officially known as a Special Administrative Region which gives it authority over
certain policies that are enacted within the region. However, in agreements with the Hong
Kong government, Jiang Zemin and mainland China were given control over the defense of
the area. The members of the Hong Kong Garrison, as it is known, must abide by both PLA
and Hong Kong regulations. This makes for an interesting dynamic when it comes to the
protection of the people area.42 The fact that the PLA has expanded to Hong Kong shows
that Chinese military power was every increasing during the late 1990s and would be a
potential indicator for military power to be a backbone of Jiang’s foreign policies.
Having adhered to the military reduction policies stated in 1997, the People’s
Liberation Army totaled less than 2.5 million men in 2000.43 However, China’s annual
defense spending for 2000 was over 121 billion yuan. 44 Again, this is almost a 20 billion
yuan increase in defense spending over three years. It seemed as though Jiang was hoping to
modernize and improve China’s military in order to take on more important roles in the
international system. Also, the percent of China’s national budget dedicated to defense and
armed service decreased from 8.8% in 1997 to 8.29% in 2000. 45 Expanding the amount of
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money spent on national defense provides sufficient detail as to the certain policies that were
enacted. Policies focusing on the need for a strong, modern military allowed the People’s
Liberation Army to become more important.
These increases in defense spending indicate that Jiang Zemin wanted China’s
military to grow and become a more powerful force in the international community. Jiang
enacted policies that would emphasize the need to increase the modernization of China’s
military, while at the same time reducing the number of troops in order to have better, welltrained soldiers that would be able to display China’s power on the world stage.
While the scope of this study is not to indicate all of the foreign policy challenges
Jiang faced, having a powerful military indicates that the PLA would be more likely to assist
in the pursuit of certain policies. A modernized military, with a large number of soldiers is
indicative of the possibilities of foreign policy behavior that would include different facets of
the military. The People’s Liberation Army would have a strong presence in the development
of certain policies given the amount of money spent on the defense forces as well as the
modernization that has occurred throughout Jiang’s rule.

Economic Power
Ever since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China’s economy has been steadily
growing. After the isolationist policies of Mao, changes needed to occur in order to allow
China to become a prominent member on the world stage. Through the policies of Deng
Xiaoping during the 1980s, China’s economic prowess continued to become more evident
around the world. These policies did not stop after the end of the decade. When Jiang Zemin
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became president in 1993, he continued to uphold the policies of Deng in order to create a
China with a leading economy by the beginning of the twenty-first century.
According to David Bachman, “[t]he Chinese economy was already blooming at the
start of 1993.”46 China’s economy had grown at the almost alarming rate of 12.8% the
previous year and had a per capita Gross National Income (GNI) of nearly $1600. 47 Through
these numbers, it is apparent that policies were being created in order to gain the highest
growth possible for the Chinese economy. The same year, the World Bank asserts that
international trade accounted for nearly 42% of China’s total Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).48 At this time, China was enacting policies that would allow for trade to move more
freely across borders and provide the Chinese markets with the opportunity to substantially
grow. Jiang pursued policies that, “...withdrew regulatory taxes on imports and lowered
import tariffs,” while also allowing more freedom in terms of exporting goods to other
countries.49
In the following years, China’s economy began overheating. Jiang and others feared
that inflation would become a large problem and could cause much unrest in the country.
Therefore, “...tight fiscal and monetary polices were enforced to rein in the over-heating
economy...” and allowed the Chinese to avoid extreme inflation that would have crippled its
economy.50 These measures, along with other programs, abled China to continue to grow and
become more powerful during the mid-1990s.
After three years of the anti-inflationary policies, China’s growth rate remained fairly
high at 8.8% in 1997.51 China’s GNP per capita in 1997 also rose to about $1820 which
accompanied the high growth rates.52 Trade was also increasing at extremely high rates
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during the last years of the 1990s. In 1997, China had a trade surplus of almost $14 billion
which consisted of a 26% increase in the number of exports leaving China and a 1.2%
decline in the number of imports coming into the country.53 According to Canalog, a
majority of the growth that China experienced during this time was a result of lessening
restrictions on exports and imports.54 Jiang pursued policies that would further open China’s
economy to other countries in the world.
However, perhaps the most telling factor of China’s economic power during the rule
of Jiang Zemin was Chinese ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.55
After over ten years of wanting to join the WTO, China was finally able to assume the ranks
of international economic recognition and became recognized has having economic power.
By joining the WTO, China was able to gain access to different export markets and expand
their economy even more.56 Entering the World Trade Organization, while helping China’s
international reputation, also allowed for the potential of many problems to occur. Cheng
wrote that during the first five years of China’s membership, about 40 million Chinese
citizens would lose their jobs because of the new restrictions that would be placed on the
Chinese economy.57 Though China had liberalized parts of their economy, there was still
much work to be done in order to become a true free market system.
During Jiang Zemin’s rule, China’s economy grew substantially beginning with a
GDP of over $440 billion dollars in 1993 and rising to over $1 trillion in Jiang’s last full year
in office in 2002.58 At the same time, trade increased substantially which resulted in China
becoming more globalized and interdependent. Because of the vast growth that China
experienced during Jiang’s rule, it is evident that China’s economic power surged
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substantially. China, by joining the WTO and pursuing policies that further opened their
economy, was able to show the world how powerful their economy had become. This
economic power resulted in policies that promoted trade between many countries, which
allowed China’s economy to flourish. For example, China’s trade with the United States
increased substantially during Jiang Zemin’s rule. In 1994, China had a trade surplus of over
$29 billion.59 Then, in 2002, Jiang’s last full year in office, China’s trade surplus with the
United States increased to over $103 billion.60 The increase in China’s trade surplus allowed
China to gain more power in the international system. It also created more stable relations
with the United States, adhering to Jiang’s foreign policy wants.
The changes in China’s GDP, GNI per capita, trade as a percentage of GDP, and
China’s trade surplus with the United States during Jiang’s time in power can be seen in the
following tables:61
Figure 5: Changes in Jiang Zemin’s Economic Power
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

GDP

$440
billion

$559
billion

$728
billion

$856
billion

$952
billion

$1.01
trillion

$1.08
trillion

$1.19
trillion

GNI per
Capita

$1170

$1340

$1480

$1640

$1820

$1960

$2120

$2340

Trade as
% of
GDP

41.9%

41.2%

38.8%

38%

39%

36.3%

37.6%

44.2%

Trade
Surplus

$22.7
billion

$29.5
billion

$33.7
billion

$39.5
billion

$49.7
billion

$56.9
billion

$68.6
billion

$83.8
billion
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2001

2002

GDP

$1.32 trillion

$1.45 trillion

GNI per Capita

$2560

$2840

Trade as % of GDP

43%

47.6%

Trade Surplus

$83 billion

$103 billion

With these policies, China’s foreign policy behavior became more interdependent
which allowed China to become more active in the region and the world. The data suggest
that Jiang Zemin placed much emphasis on economic growth during his leadership.
Therefore, China’s economic power during this time can be characterized as high.

Analysis
According to the criteria of this study, Jiang Zemin seems to hold the national role
conceptions of regional leader and internal development. The data suggest that not all of the
proposed relationships between Jiang’s national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior
maintained themselves. In the case of the national role conceptions, a majority of the overall
relationships were maintained which suggests that there is a relationship between the national
role conceptions of Jiang Zemin and his foreign policy behavior.
In terms of the regional leader national role conception, the hypothesis correctly
predicted the three relationships. With the regional leader conception, one would most likely
see high levels of military power, high levels of economic power, and good relations with
great powers. The data indicate Jiang Zemin had high levels of military and economic power
and his diplomatic relations between great powers was good. Therefore, in the case of the
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regional leader national role conception, Jiang Zemin’s foreign policy behavior can possibly
be attributed, in some way, to the regional leader national role conception
The internal development national role conception corresponded correctly to one of
the three relationships. The internal development national role conception would be more
likely to see indifferent diplomatic relations with great powers, low levels of military power,
and high levels of economic power. However, the data suggest that Jiang exhibited good
diplomatic relations with great powers and high levels of military power leading a majority
of the internal development national role conceptions not corresponding to distinct foreign
policy behavior. Though the data show that Jiang had strong economic power during his
time in office, two of the three proposed relationships between national role conceptions and
foreign policy behavior were not evident. This suggests that the internal development
national role conception did not lead to distinct foreign policy behavior as postulated. Since
a majority of the relationships within this national role conceptions were not true, the data
suggest that the internal development national role conception was only slightly related to
Jiang’s foreign policy behavior.
Overall, four of the six total proposed relationships were correctly predicted. Since
this a majority of correctly predicted relationships, the data suggest that national role
conceptions do have an effect on the foreign policy behavior of a leader. In the case of Jiang
Zemin, the information on foreign policy behavior indicates a possible relationship between
Jiang’s national role conceptions and his foreign policy behavior. However, within the
regional leader national role conception, all of the relationships between the role conception
and Jiang’s foreign policy behavior were true while only one relationship between the
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internal development national role conception and foreign policy behavior was evident. This
suggests that in the case of Jiang Zemin, national role conceptions had a marginal effect on
the foreign policy behavior of China during his leadership.
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第四章：江泽民和中国外交政策

介绍
这一章是江泽民的经典案例。首先我会描述江泽民的背景信息。之
后，我会分析我的自变量和确定江泽民的国家角色的概念。分析自变量以
后，我会描述江泽民的外交政策的行为。最后，我会分析我的自变量和我
的因变数，然后确定江泽民的国家角色的概念是否和他的外交政策行为有
关。

江泽民的背景信息
江泽民于1926年出生于江苏省。他的家人非常聪明，他们都认为中
国文化非常有意思。江觉得道德和孔子非常重要，江认为中国应该成为像
孔子所说的那样的国家。江在上海上大学，学习电气工程。在1946年，江
加入中国共产党。上大学的时候，江帮助了中国共产党。文化革命的时
候，江被迫参加一个共产党学校。这个学校是关于政治再教育的。上这个
学校以后，江去了北京。江泽民在一个外交组织工作。这个是江第一次从
事政治工作。江泽民在1989年成为中国共产党总书记，在1993年江泽民成
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为中华人民共和国的主席。作为主席的时候，江在外交方面有很多挑战。
但是，江能在其中表现出中国的力量。

自变量：国家角色的概念
我看了江泽民的两个报告。这两个报告是在中国共产党第全国代表
大会上的报告。这些报告是差不多跟美国的国情报告一样的。这些报告有
很多意思。每个五年，中国的领导会作一个报告，告诉中国人和世界人
民，中国的未来的计划。

江泽民在中国共产党第十五次和第十六全国代表大会上的报告
1997年9月12日和2002年10月9日，江泽民在全国代表大会作了报
告。我会分析这个报告和确定他的国家角色的概念。

经济情况
在江泽民的第十五次和第十六次全国代表大会上的报告，他提到了
经济情况104次。他也说别的字，比如：他说‘社会生活’ 4次，‘健康’ 3
次，他说‘教育’ 65次，和说‘收入’ 32次。
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江泽民觉得教育是非常重要。他在很多地方考虑到了教育。比如，
他说：

发展教育和科学，是文化建设的基础工程。培养同现代化要求相适应的数以
亿计高素质的劳动者和数以千万计的专门人才，发挥我国巨大人力资源的优
势，关系二十一世纪社会主义事业的全局。要切实把教育摆在优先发展的战
略地 位。尊师重教，加强师资队伍建设。发挥各方面的积极性，大力普及
九年义务教育、扫除青壮年文盲，积极发展各种形式的职业教育和成人教
育，稳步发展高等教 育。优化教育结构，加快高等教育管理体制改革步
伐，合理配置教育资源，提高教学质量和办学效益。认真贯彻党的教育方
针，重视受教育者素质的提高，培养德智 体等全面发展的社会主义事业的
建设者和接班人。努力提高科技水平，普及科技知识，引导人们树立科学精
神，掌握科学方法，鼓励创造发明。消除愚昧，反对封建 迷信活动。积极
发展哲学社会科学，这对于坚持马克思主义在我国意识形态领域的指导地
位，对于探索有中国特色社会主义的发展规律，增强我们认识世界、改造世
界的能力，有着重要意义。

这段话表明，江泽民觉得教育非常重要。他认为中国必须提高中国的教育
系统和质量。如果他们不能提高教育质量，中国不能在世界上竞争。江泽
民认为人民的经济情况必须提高。他参考了经济情况很多次，所以我能分
类这个部分：高。

对外开放和自我封闭
在那些报告中，江泽民不参考了自我封闭。可是他参考了对外开放
15次。江说‘主权’9次，‘国际组织’ 一次，和‘全球化’ 5次。说到主权的时

150

候，江说，“维护国家主权的原则性“。这个表明江泽民保护国家主权的承
诺。说 国际组织的时候，江泽民说国际组织非常重要，并且中国应该成
为一个全球的领导。最后，说全球化的时候，江泽民认为经济全球化非常
重要，每个国家应该参加经济全球化。江泽民是一个对外开放的领导，不
是自我封闭的。

对国内发展的重视程度
在那些报告中，江泽民提到了“国内发展”42次。他认为中国必须发
展经济，成为一个非常重要的国家。江泽民说到“经济发展”32次，“和平
发展”10次。在这两个报告之后，中国的经济得到了非常快的发展。所以
江泽民认为中国必须再发展。江泽民说，“和平与发展已成为当今时代的
主题” ，他的意思是中国会有非常好和和平的发展。江泽民觉得发展非常
重要。因为他参考了国内发展很多次，我能分类这个部分：高。

江泽民的国家角色的概念
江泽民觉得经济情况和国内发展都有意思，也非常重要。他也是一
个对外开放的领导。所以江泽民的国家角色的概念是， 区域领袖和国内
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发展。这两个国家角色的概念表现了江泽民的个性。而且，江的国家角色
的概念可以告诉别的国家中国外交政策行为。

因变数：中国外交政策行为
江泽民成为中国的总统的时候，中国在世界上的地位比较低。可是
他知道中国能提高他们的国际地位。为了知道江泽民的外交政策行为，我
看了三个别的部分。那些部分是中国跟大国的关系，中国的军权，和中国
的经济权。

大国关系
1993年的时候，国际关系改变了很多。冷战停了，苏联成为了俄罗
斯，美国也是一个很重要的国家。为了了解中国的大国关系，我会学习中
国跟美国和俄罗斯的关系。
1989年以后，中美关系不太好。天安门事件以后，美国对中国进行
经济制裁。中国真的不喜欢这个制裁，所以中美关系越来越恶化。美国克
林顿总统觉得美国不应该对中国实行经济制裁。可是，很多美国人认为他
们必须实行经济制裁。而且，中国的最惠国待遇需要恢复。美国人认为美
国不应该恢复中国的最惠国待遇，因为中国侵犯人权。但是1994年的时

152

候，克林顿总统告诉江泽民，美国会恢复中国的最惠国待遇。虽然中美关
系开始不好，但是他们要一起合作来发展好的关系。
中俄关系也越来越好。苏联成为俄罗斯的时候，中国不知道怎么应
对。可是江泽民和俄罗斯新的总统一起合作。他们一起签署了很多条约。
比如说，1993年中国和俄罗斯签署了一个军事合作的条约。1994年他们一
起签署一个核武器协议。最后和最重要的是在1996年，俄罗斯总统告诉江
泽民他们应该有一个战略合作伙伴关系。
总之江泽民的大国关系很好。这三个国家都一起合作，并且发展非
常重要的关系。

军权
江泽民成为中国的主席的时候，中国的军事是世界上最强大的。中
国有差不多三百万的士兵。可是1997年的时候，江泽民说他要减少中国的
士兵。为了减少士兵，中国会发展他们的军队现代化建设。所以2000年，
中国的军只有2500000士兵。同时中国的军有很多现代化建设。而且中国
花很多钱在他们的军事方面。1997年的时候，中国花81亿元在军事方
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面。2000年，中国花了121亿元。这个表明了江泽民的军事看法。中国的
军队有很多权力，他们的军事很好。

经济权
从邓小平的改革开放到1993年，中国的经济发展越来越好。1993年
的时候，中国经济发展地很快。1993年，中国的国内生产总值是440亿美
元。但是在2002年，中国的国内生产总值是差不多万亿美元。这个非常
好，表现中国的经济权。江泽民的时期，中国的经济提高的真快。

分析
从以上的情况，可以看出我的假设是差不多对的。我认为中国领导
的国家角色的概念跟他们的外交政策有关。江泽民的国家角色的概念，
区域领袖跟他的外交政策行为也是一样的。可是他的别的国家角色的概
念，关于内部发展是不对的。所以我不能明确我的假设是完全对的或者不
对。
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Chapter Five: Hu Jintao and Chinese Foreign Policy in the New
Millennium

This chapter presents the case of Hu Jintao and the policies that were enacted during
his time as President of China from 2003-2013. First, the chapter surveys relevant
background information on the life of Hu Jintao, then provides evidence of Hu’s national role
conceptions. Next, an analysis of Hu’s foreign policy behavior is issued. The chapter ends
with a short analysis of the independent and dependent variables in relationship to the
hypothesis of the study.

Background Information
Hu Jintao has seemingly taken a more traditional approach to ascending the ranks of
Chinese political leadership. Through the formation of friendships with top officials and
upholding the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) doctrine, Hu has become a true leader and
what Ewing calls, “...one of China’s most powerful politicians….”1 While many of the
personal details of Hu Jintao’s life are unknown, Hu’s political career is well-documented
and displays his exceptional rise to power of the world’s most populous country. From being
the Communist Party Secretary in Guizhou province, to overseeing martial law in the Tibetan
Autonomous Region, Hu Jintao has upheld the traditional ideology of past political leaders of
China and proved to be a trustworthy and diligent member of the CPC.
The birthplace of Hu Jintao is disputed, which shows the personal privacy that
envelopes Hu. However, what is known is that Hu Jintao was born in December 1942,
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during the midst of the Communist Revolution.2 After Hu graduated from high school, he
decided to move to Beijing and attend Tsinghua University, one of the most prestigious
universities in China. At Tsinghua, Hu majored in, “…hydroelectric engineering and
specialized in fluvial multi-purpose power stations.”3 Like his predecessor, Hu did not have
a direct background in politics or government making his rise to power all the more
interesting. However, Hu joined the Communist Party in 1964, during the course of the
Cultural Revolution. His rise to leadership began to unfold after this life changing moment.
After graduating from Tsinghua in 1965, Hu Jintao accepted a position as a researcher
and served as a political counselor. Although there was much chaos in the country and much
disdain placed on educated citizens, having a a job at the university proved a form of
protection for Hu. As a political counselor, Hu Jintao was recognized as a technical expert in
his field as well as a growing political leader.4
In order to quell the chaos that was overtaking the country, many students and
intellectuals were sent to the Chinese countryside. Hu was sent to a hydraulic power plant in
the barren Gansu Province and worked there until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. When Hu
first arrived in Gansu, he was a technician at the plant and also worked as the deputy CPC
secretary in the engineering bureau of the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power.5
This was the first time that Hu Jintao had participated directly in the CPC.
After receiving many promotions and developing strong relationships with powerful
leaders of the Communist Party, Hu left Gansu province and returned to Beijing where he
enrolled at the Central Party School, China’s primer school for cultivating the next generation
of China’s leaders.6 Hu was elected as an alternate member to the Central Committee and
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was appointed the Secretary of the Communist Youth League Central Committee during the
12th National Party Congress. This occurred after a call was made by elder members of the
Central Committee to allow younger political figures to join the Central Committee of the
Communist Party. 7 Following that, in 1984, Hu ascended to the leader of the Chinese
Communist Youth League, making him the leader of fifty million members throughout
China.
Hu excelled as the leader of the Youth League, but when given the chance to become
the Party Secretary of Guizhou Province in 1985, Hu leapt at the opportunity. In this
capacity, Hu developed strong relationships with many of the ethnic minorities throughout
the province and was determined to better the livelihood of China’s poorest province. 8 He
believed that the socioeconomic status of those living in Guizhou needed to be raised and
that the province had more potential for economic development. While in Guizhou, Hu,
“...began formulating his position towards maintaining social stability,” by recognizing that
in order for China and the Communist Party to be successful, social stability was essential.
Finally, in 1988, Hu received his most challenging and important political promotion when
he was asked to become the Party Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. With
growing unrest in the region, Deng Xiaoping supported Hu in his ascension to Party
Secretary. Because of his commitment to the Communist Party ideology and his well-forged
relationship with minority groups, Deng believed Hu was the best choice to oversee a
restoration of order in Tibet.
In Tibet, Hu wished to see the area become more economically developed. However,
due to the unrest, he needed to focus on quelling the separatist movements. In order to do

158

this, Hu declared martial law in Tibet in March 1989. This was one of the most important
decisions that Hu had made and catapulted him to a leading political figure. Due to the
declaration of martial law, the uprisings ceased. The current leaders of China realized the
great potential Hu had and were hopeful that we would lead the next generation of
leadership.9
Hu Jintao was given many important tasks to achieve in Beijing after leaving Tibet in
1990. In addition to participating more in the Party, Hu also assumed leadership roles in the
Communist Party Organization Department, one of the most important departments of the
Party. Through this department, different rising leaders in politics are assigned to different
areas and Hu was the person that would determine the placement of leaders within the Party.
This allowed Hu Jintao to again cultivate many relationships with rising politicians. Then, in
1993, Hu became the president of the Central Party School, which he attended a decade
earlier. As the president of the school, Hu became known as being a very skilled politician
while also upholding the ideology of the Communist Party. 10 Through this position, Hu
became the Vice-President of China in 1998 and the President of China in 2003.
One can see that Hu Jintao excelled in all facets of the Communist Party and became
very well-respected. His focus on maintaining strong relationships with ethnic minorities, as
well as his commitment to the economic development of China made him the perfect choice
to lead China in the new millennium. Though conducting some controversial measures
during his stint as Part Secretary in Tibet, Hu gained much respect by members of the
Communist Party. During Hu’s presidency, China has again experienced many foreign
policy challenges. The global War on Terror and disputes over islands in the South China
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Sea have been important foreign policy challenges that Hu has faced. Through his leadership
and commitment to the communist ideology, Hu has been an important figure in the
development of Chinese politics and will be remembered as one of China’s greatest leaders
during the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions
In order to develop national role conceptions for Hu Jintao, two speeches were
analyzed. Hu’s opening addresses given at the 17th and 18th Communist Party of China
National Party Congress in 2007 and 2012 were investigated in order to gauge Hu’s
perspectives on the China’s role in the international community. These speeches focused on
the importance of China’s rise in the international system and allowed other countries a
chance to see how China has developed over the years following Jiang Zemin’s address in
2002. As the opening speech displays what China has done and what it will do in the future,
these speeches provide insight into the thoughts of China’s highest leadership and allow the
world to better gauge what policies China may pursue in the future.

Hu Jintao’s 17th National Party Congress Opening Address, 2007
In the following section, an analysis of Hu Jintao’s opening address at the 17th
National Party Congress is provided. For both this address and the opening address at the
18th National Party Congress, the indicators of national role conceptions are analyzed in
order to gain a complete perspective on China and its role in the international system. Some
of the explanations are supplemented with the actual words of his address to give specific
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examples of how different words and phrases are being used. By analyzing the data in this
manner, a more comprehensive study of Hu Jintao’s national role conceptions can be
provided.

Socioeconomic Status
Regarding the first indicator of national role conceptions, socioeconomic status, Hu
placed much emphasis on the importance of improving the socioeconomic status of the
Chinese population. In total, seventy-two references were made to advance the
socioeconomic status of China. When looking at the improvements China had made in its
economy in the years prior to 2007 and the enhancement of the lives of Chinese citizens, the
number of references to socioeconomic status is not remarkably high. In this speech, Hu
referenced the importance of education, the need to still improve the incomes of normal
citizens, the need to have a healthy society, and the importance of having a cohesive society.
Hu Jintao mentioned education forty-seven times in his opening address to the 17th
National Party Congress. Throughout the speech, Hu suggested that the further development
of China’s education was necessary in order to ascend to the ranks of a world power. In the
following excerpt, Hu outlined what he deemed as essential to the development of China’s
education system and thus China’s socioeconomic status:11
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优先发展教育，建设人力资源强国。教育是民族振兴的基石，教育公平是社
会公平的重要基础。要全面贯彻党的教育方针，坚持育人 为本、德育为
先，实施素质教育，提高教育现代化水平，培养德智体美全面发展的社会主
义建设者和接班人，办好人民满意的教育。优化教育结构，促进义务教育均
衡发展，加快普及高中阶段教育，大力发展职业教育，提高高等教育质量。
重视学前教育，关心特殊教育。更新教育观念，深化教学内容方式、考试招
生制度、质量 评价制度等改革，减轻中小学生课业负担，提高学生综合素
质。坚持教育公益性质，加大财政对教育投入，规范教育收费，扶持贫困地
区、民族地区教育，健全学生 资助制度，保障经济困难家庭、进城务工人
员子女平等接受义务教育。加强教师队伍建设，重点提高农村教师素质。鼓
励和规范社会力量兴办教育。发展远程教育和 继续教育，建设全民学习、
终身学习的学习型社会。

Hu believed that in order for China to grow to its potential as a great power, the
country should be full of talented citizens that would be able to use what they have gained
through education in order to promote China’s stature on the international stage. He also
stressed the need for an improvement in all facets of education. Hu stated that the
development of compulsory education is essential to having a well-rounded society and that
it is essential to enhance the quality of education given in vocational schools and other forms
of higher education such as universities. Mentioning vocational schools in this address
shows Hu’s commitment to the improvement of education in all of its variations. It also
showed the importance that Hu placed on the socioeconomic status of his citizens.
In addition to education, Hu also stressed the importance of improving the incomes of
his population. Hu mentioned income twenty different times in his 2007 remarks.
Throughout the speech, Hu referenced the need for incomes to raise for all people across the
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People’s Republic of China. Not only are the rural residents specifically mentioned, but
urban residents are referred to as well. The following excerpt displayed Hu’s interest in
improving the distribution of income throughout the county and his wishes to lower the
amount of poverty throughout China:12
深化收入分配制度改革，增加城乡居民收入。合理的收入分配制度是社会公
平的重要体现。要坚持和完善按劳分配为主体、多种分配 方式并存的分配制
度，健全劳动、资本、技术、管理等生产要素按贡献参与分配的制度，初次
分配和再分配都要处理好效率和公平的关系，再分配更加注重公平。逐 步提
高居民收入在国民收入分配中的比重，提高劳动报酬在初次分配中的比重。
着力提高低收入者收入，逐步提高扶贫标准和最低工资标准，建立企业职工
工资正常 增长机制和支付保障机制。创造条件让更多群众拥有财产性收入。
保护合法收入，调节过高收入，取缔非法收入。扩大转移支付，强化税收调
节，打破经营垄断，创 造机会公平，整顿分配秩序，逐步扭转收入分配差距
扩大趋势。

The importance Hu places on income does not come as much of a surprise. As Party
Secretary in Guizhou and Tibet, Hu worked hard in trying to improve the economic status of
the residents of the provinces. Though some of Hu’s policies during his time as Party
Secretary of Guizhou and Tibet were met with criticism by the West, he still achieved much
success in terms of increasing the socioeconomic status of the people in those provinces.
This way of thinking has seemed to be carried through to the entire country since Hu has
become president. As income is an extremely important part of a person’s socioeconomic
status, it is apparent that Hu values socioeconomic status very much and wished to help
enhance the livelihoods of Chinese citizens in every possible way.
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In addition to education and income, Hu also stated, “健康是人全面发展的基础，
关系千家万户幸福.”13 This statement showed that Hu also believes health to be of extreme
importance when it comes to the development of the country. Hu also indicated that it is
necessary for the health level of all Chinese citizens to rise in order for China to become
influential in the international community.
Because of the number of times socioeconomic status gets mentioned, in its various
forms, it seems that Hu believed socioeconomic status to be extremely important. China
must improve the livelihoods of all people if it wishes to stand a chance at being an important
player in world politics. China’s rise in the international system is contingent upon China
achieving an acceptable level of socioeconomic well-being. The data suggest that Hu
seemed steadfast in his ideals, which should manifest themselves in the policies implemented
by his leadership.

Internationalism versus Isolationism
In his opening speech to the 17th National Party Congress, Hu Jintao made a total of
twelve references to being more internationalist in nature rather than isolationist. As with
Jiang Zemin, isolationism was not mentioned in the opening address. Instead, there are some
instances referring to the internationalist nature of China and the importance of recognizing
that the world is interconnected in many different ways.
Hu mentioned sovereignty six times in the 17th NPC opening address. Sovereignty is
mentioned when talking about China’s determination to protect its national security and
promote the well-being of the state. At many points Hu alluded to the fact that China should,
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“...维护国家主权和领土完整...” acknowledging the fact that the world is internationalist in
nature and that states have a duty to protect their citizens from any external threats.14
Recognizing that the world is interconnected suggests that Hu did not believe that China
should hold isolationist ideologies but should rather pursue policies that work to the benefit
of interdependent nature of the international system.
In addition to sovereignty, Hu also mentioned the benefits of interdependence and
said, “... 国与国相互依存日益紧密...” and acknowledged the fact that the world is
increasingly interdependent.15 In the same light, Hu also mentioned the benefits of
globalization five times in his opening address. Globalization is primarily mentioned in
terms of the importance of economic globalization to the sustainability of economic growth.
Hu again perceived the world as very internationalist by these statements and showed that
China also wishes to be a well-respected member of the international system.
The data suggest that Hu Jintao is decidedly more internationalist than isolationist
when thinking about world politics. Especially when it came to the globalization of
economics, Hu seemed to believe globalization is necessary in order for China to become
more powerful in the international system. Because of the more internationalist nature of Hu,
the data imply that Hu’s policies would also follow this point of view.

Interest in Development
As China is hoping to increase its economy and become more influential in the
international community, it goes without saying that development would be central to that
goal. To that end, Hu Jintao made nineteen total references to development in his opening
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address given in 2007. These references are made in regards to China’s economic
development and the importance of peaceful development to China’s rise in the international
system.
Hu made eight references to the importance of China’s economic development in
creating a more powerful China. Hu stated, “实现未来经济发展目标，关键要在加快转变
经济发展方式、完善社会主义市 场经济体制方面取得重大进展,” which displayed Hu’s
affinity for the socialist ideology he upholds. There are also mentions of economic
development that show that while the current economic situation in China is better than it has
been in many years, there is still work to be done in order to make China the economic power
that it wishes to be. Hu also made connections between the need for China’s economic
development in order to sustain the growing population of the country. Having the
population that China does, economic development is essential to the creation of a more
harmonious society.
In addition to economic development, Hu also made references to the need of
developing in a peaceful manner. Hu indicated that China will develop in a peaceful way and
that there is no need for other countries to fear the rise of China. Peaceful development goes
hand in hand with the importance of internal development. If China is to develop in peaceful
ways, then it goes without question that this peaceful development will benefit the internal
development of the country and help China become more influential on the world stage.
Even though Hu referenced having an interest in development seventeen times, which
registers as a medium amount on the scale being used, the importance of these references
should not be undermined. Development is an essential policy for the Chinese government.
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Though Hu did not mention development as many times as indicators of socioeconomic
status, the references to development are just as, if not more, important. Having a welldeveloped country is essential to all aspects of a country’s power in the international system.
Therefore, in terms of this study, Hu will be considered of making development a high
priority in his opening address to the 17th NPC.
In summary, the 17th National Party Congress opening address appeared to show that
Hu Jintao believed improving the socioeconomic status of the Chinese people and improving
the development of the economy were both extremely important. In addition, the data
suggest that Hu is seemingly more internationalist than isolationist when thinking about
world politics.

Hu Jintao’s 18th National Party Congress Opening Address, 2012
Socioeconomic Status
In Hu Jintao’s opening address to the 18th National Party Congress, seventy-three
total references were made indicating that Hu wished to see the development of increased
standards of socioeconomic. As with the address given five years prior, Hu emphasized
education, income and the health of Chinese citizens. It is again not surprising that these
indicators are so prevalent in Hu’s remarks. Hu has been known to hold socioeconomic
issues close to him, so it is correct to assume that Hu would again make many references to
these ideals.
Education was mentioned a total of forty-three times in Hu’s 2012 address.
Education still remained essential to helping China become a major power in the
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international community. Hu made many references to education and the fact that it is
necessary in order to evolve Chinese society into the influential country it wishes to be in the
international system. Hu’s first mention of power came as a call to reform both the rural and
urban education systems. Hu stated, “教育事业迅速发展，城乡免费义务教育全面实现,”
and provided more nuanced discussion of the topic later in his address.16 Hu also considered
education to be a vital interest of the Chinese people because through education, China will
be able to create the means to become an assertive power in world politics. As with his
speech given in 2007, Hu believed that in order for China to fulfill its goals of
comprehensive development, improving the quality of education in the country and
expanding on the number of people who are able to receive a quality education are essential.
Hu also made frequent mentions of still improving the incomes of Chinese citizens.
Twenty-one total references were made which promote Hu’s interest in putting more money
into the pockets of all Chinese citizens. Hu first mentioned income by stating that over the
last years, the incomes of the Chinese population has increased. However, he went on to say
that there is still work to be done in terms of improving the income of the populace. For
example, Hu stated,17
必须坚持走共同富裕道路。共同富裕是中国特色社会主义的根本原则。要坚
持社会主义基本经济制度和分配制度，调整国民收入分配格局，加大再分配
调节力度，着力解决收入分配差距较大问题，使发展成果更多更公平惠及全
体人民，朝共同富裕方向稳步前进.

This excerpt exhibited that Hu believed that there is more work to be done regarding the
enhancement of incomes throughout the country. Not only is he trying to uphold the socialist
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principles that he holds dear, but he displayed his belief that socioeconomic status is very
important for China.
Finally, Hu made nine references to health, the most out of any leader analyzed. Hu
believed that the health of his citizens was very important in developing and improving the
socioeconomic status of the country. In the following passage, Hu asserted his beliefs on the
importance of health in Chinese society:18
提高人民健康水平。健康是促进人的全面发展的必然要求。要坚持为人民健
康服务的方向，坚持预防为主、以农村为重点、中西医并重，按照保基 本、
强基层、建机制要求，重点推进医疗保障、医疗服务、公共卫生、药品供
应、监管体制综合改革，完善国民健康政策，为群众提供安全有效方便价廉
的公共卫生 和基本医疗服务。健全全民医保体系，建立重特大疾病保障和救
助机制，完善突发公共卫生事件应急和重大疾病防控机制。巩固基本药物制
度。健全农村三级医疗卫 生服务网络和城市社区卫生服务体系，深化公立医
院改革，鼓励社会办医。扶持中医药和民族医药事业发展。提高医疗卫生队
伍服务能力，加强医德医风建设。改革 和完善食品药品安全监管体制机制。
开展爱国卫生运动，促进人民身心健康。坚持计划生育的基本国策，提高出
生人口素质，逐步完善政策，促进人口长期均衡发 展。
This excerpt showed that the need for improving the level of health in Chinese society is
paramount to China becoming a power on the world stage. In this passage alone, health was
mentioned five times. The dedication Hu has to the health of the Chinese population is,
therefore, very evident.
Because of the number of times Hu Jintao mentioned these indicators in his 18th NPC
opening speech, the data suggest that he deeply valued the improvement of China’s
socioeconomic status. Again, this does not come as a surprise because of Hu’s background in
trying to improve the livelihoods of people in Guizhou and Tibet. Socioeconomic status had
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always been important for Hu and it is quite evident that he hoped it will improve in China
over the coming years.

Internationalism versus Isolationism
As with the address given in five years earlier, Hu Jintao did not make any references
to being isolationist in the policies that China will pursue. Hu made seven references that
affirm his internationalist mindset when it comes to the international system. A majority of
those references came in the form of mentioning the need to protect China’s national interests
while some again recognize the importance of globalization.
Sovereignty was mentioned five times in Hu’s address to the 18th NPC. Again, the
mentions of sovereignty came in the form of China needing to protect its national interests
and doing whatever it takes to ensure the safekeeping of its borders. Hu stated, “我们坚决维
护国家主权、安全、发展利益，决不会屈服于任何外来压力,” astutely reassuring his
country and the world that China will not capitulate to the demands of other countries.19 Hu
recognized that in this ever more interdependent world, threats could come from anywhere
and he wanted the world to know that China will do anything necessary in order to protect
itself from threats.
Hu also mentioned the importance of globalization twice. As with the 17th NPC
opening address, he proclaimed that economic globalization is a key to the development of
China and the world. He asserted that economic globalization is essential to promoting
China’s ideas of development and economic prosperity. With economic globalization, China
will be able to pursue the policies they need in order to develop their nation.
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The data suggest that with the references to sovereignty and globalization, Hu Jintao
holds a more internationalist view of the world. Knowing that the interconnectedness of the
world is what helps spurs the growth of China, Hu seemed to have embraced the thoughts of
an interdependent and cooperative world. These references again displayed the importance
that Hu places on the interconnected nature of the world and the ways in which China can
benefit from such a world structure.

Interest in Development
Interest in development was another indicator of national role conceptions that
received a lot of attention in Hu’s address in 2012. Hu expressed an interest in development
twenty-eight times throughout the address. These expressions came in terms of economic
development and the idea of peaceful development. With these references to both kinds of
development, Hu provided insight into his thinking and the way in which China should work
to promote these ideas.
Economic development was mentioned fifteen times in the opening address of the
18th National Party Congress. Hu believed that in order for sufficient economic development
to be achieved, China must, “推进经济结构战略性调整.” 20 This statement showed that
economic development begins with a change in the economic structure of China. As China’s
economy is becoming larger, the Chinese government has realized that it is important for the
private sector to have a more influential input on the economic policies China pursues. The
economic development of China is contingent upon both the public and private sectors of
China. Hu showed that it is important for both sides to work together in order to for China to
grow and become more developed.
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In addition to economic development, Hu made references to peaceful development
thirteen times. These references again promoted the need for China to achieve development
peacefully. Hu Jintao stated that the Chinese government must support peaceful
development. Through this kind of development, China will be able to assume the ranks of a
powerful player in the international system. Peaceful development is essential for the overall
development in the People’s Republic of China.
The data suggest that Hu Jintao has a high interest in development. This also
corresponds to the past policies of Hu Jintao where he emphasized the development of
Guizhou and Tibet. Because of these references to development, one should be able to see
many policies that are implemented which support these ideals. For China to be influential in
world politics, it is extremely important for the country to be developed in all ways possible.
Hu realizes this and one would expect policies to be put into action that revolve around
achieving this goal.
In summary, the data suggest that Hu placed a high emphasis on socioeconomic status
and a high level of interest in development. The data also appears to indicate that Hu was
more internationalist in nature when giving this address which corresponds, again, to the
speech given five years prior. These data seem to provide insight into the ideas Hu Jintao
embraces.

Hu Jintao’s National Role Conceptions
Overall, in Hu Jintao’s two addresses to the Communist Party of China National Party
Congress in 2007 and 2012, one hundred forty-five total references were made to improving
the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens. Extremely high numbers were expressed in
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both speeches which was not of much surprise due to Hu’s history of promoting the
enhancement of society. Hu Jintao also did not express any thoughts of being isolationist in
either speech. Rather he made nineteen references to being more internationalist in nature.
Again, these findings were not of much surprise because much of China’s current rise in
power had been due to the interdependence of the international community. Finally, a large
interest in development was mentioned in both speeches. Hu alluded to a need for economic
and peaceful development a total of forty-five times in both speeches. Because of China’s
growing economic power in the international system, it is not of much surprise that Hu
displayed a high interest in development.
Therefore, because of the content of both speeches at the National Party Congresses
of 2007 and 2012, Hu Jintao can be best characterized as holding the regional leader and
internal development national role conceptions. Displaying high levels of interest in the
improvement of the socioeconomic status of Chinese citizens, having a more internationalist
view of the world, and displaying a strong interest in development, the regional leader and
internal development national role conceptions are good characterizations of the ideas and
role that Hu sees China holding in the world. Not only does China hold these roles, but Hu
himself is likely to hold these roles as well. The regional leader and internal development
national role conceptions allow China to again assert its power on other countries in the
world. While China promises to do this peacefully, the regional leader conception allows
China to take more of an influential role in world politics. At the same time, by holding the
internal development national role conception, Hu Jintao is upholding the policies that have
governed China since the Open and Reform policies of Deng Xiaoping. Together, the
regional leader and internal development national role conceptions allow Hu to take on more
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responsibility in the international system while also making sure his country is as developed
as possible.

Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior
Understanding the foreign policy behavior of Hu Jintao provides valuable insight into
what he deems important to China. In line with the research design and methodology
provided in Chapter Two, the three aspects of Chinese foreign policy during the Hu era that
are analyzed are China’s diplomatic relations with great powers, China’s military power, and
China’s economic power. While there are many different ways to analyze a country’s foreign
policy behavior, the areas of Chinese foreign policy that were analyzed provide important
insights into the development of Chinese foreign policy during Hu’s leadership.

Diplomatic Relations with Great Powers
As with Jiang Zemin, the diplomatic relations between China and the United States
and China and Russia are a telling example of China’s general foreign policy behavior. By
having relatively stable relations with the United States and Russia, China was able to assert
itself more strongly in the international system. While China’s relations with both countries
contains many different facets, the diplomatic relations provide the most cohesive
explanation for the overall relationship between China and the United States and Russia.

Sino-US Diplomatic Relations
The People’s Republic of China and the United States experienced many challenges
throughout Hu Jintao’s leadership of China. From debates on the value of China’s currency,
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to creating different avenues for dialogue between the two nations, Hu Jintao and the United
States leadership were forced to cooperate on many issues. China and the United States
seemed to aware of the importance of having stable diplomatic relations and worked to
uphold a cooperative relationship.
Ever since China’s economy was becoming stronger, the United States had remained
skeptical about the value of China’s currency. During Hu’s time as president, China
experienced a massive increase in its trade surplus with the United States. Many people in
the United States believed that this increase in China’s trade surplus was due to China
undervaluing its currency. Some leaders in the United States believed that China’s currency
was nearly 20% undervalued and should be revalued in order to create more trade
competition between the United States and China.21 Both the Bush and Obama
Administrations in the United States had pressured China to revalue its currency in order to
create a fairer trading environment. While China had not completely revalued its currency to
the standards of some in the United States, it has been slowly doing so, thus appeasing to the
demands of the United States.22
One of the strongest signs of Sino-US cooperation was the beginning of the US-China
Senior Dialogue and the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. 23 The Senior Dialogue,
which functions through the US State Department, and the Strategic Economic Dialogue,
working through the US Treasury Department, are designed for top decision-makers in both
China and the United States to come together to discuss key issues that affect not only both
countries, but also the rest of the world.24 The first talks of the Senior Dialogue occurred in
2005 while the Strategic Economic Dialogue began in 2008. These dialogues, while
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officially meeting twice a year, also include many other summits that occur more regularly
throughout the year. These include, the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the USChina Joint Economic Committee, the US-China Joint Commission on Science and
Technology, the US-China Economic Development and Reform Dialogue, and the US-China
Energy Policy Dialogue.25
As both dialogues were initiated by Hu Jintao, one can see that Hu was attempting to
strengthen China’s relations with the United States. These forms of bilateral diplomacy have
become hallmarks of Sino-US diplomatic relations. In addition, China and the US have
cooperated in negotiating with North Korea about their clandestine nuclear weapons
program.26 While China and the United States have faced many challenges and
disagreements regarding recent international events such as the crisis in Syria, the overall
relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China during Hu Jintao’s
leadership has been one of cooperation.27 Starting bilateral dialogues and general
cooperation suggest that China’s diplomatic relations with the United States were good
during Hu Jintao’s leadership.

Sino-Russia Diplomatic Relations
Sino-Russian relations under Hu Jintao can be best characterized as being, “highly
cooperative, moderately competitive.”28 After developing strong relations during the 1990s,
Sino-Russian relations again seemed to flourish in the new millennium. The strong working
partnership developed by Jiang Zemin with Russian President Yeltsin remained when
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leadership in both countries changed.29 Throughout Hu Jintao’s leadership, China and Russia
worked together in order to maintain the security of both nations.
Strategic cooperation became a very important theme in Sino-Russian relations when
Hu Jintao became president.30 China and Russia remained close partners in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization which created more open dialogue between the two countries. In
addition, like with the United States, China and Russia have created different avenues for
more discussion and cooperation through the establishment of regular meetings between top
decision-makers.31 This has allowed China and Russia to understand each others strategic
interests while also allowing both powers to have the means to openly communicate with one
another.
As recently as June 2012, Chinese and Russian leaders met in order to create a path
for sustainable relations in the next decade. At this meeting Hu Jintao and Russian President
Putin signed eleven different cooperative agreements. These agreements ranged a multitude
of areas including, “...energy, nuclear power and technology, tourism, journalism, investment,
banking, industrial park management, and insurance.”32 At the end of the summit, both Hu
and Putin agreed to maintain, “close high-level exchanges,” between the two countries while
also stating the importance of retaining positive relations in many other sectors.33
While China and Russia are both trying to assume more power in Asia, the high level
exchanges between the countries suggest that China’s diplomatic relations with Russia are
very good. Both countries seem to understand the importance of maintaining a close,
positive relationship and are working to sustain their favorable relationship. Hu Jintao and
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the Russian leadership have generated many ways to remain in a close partnership. This has
allowed the diplomatic relations between the two countries to flourish.
The data suggest that China’s overall relations between great powers during the
leadership of Hu Jintao are good. Having good relations with both the United States and
Russia demonstrates that both countries were working together in order to achieve
cooperation and stability in the international community. Establishing good relations
between two of the world’s great powers displays China’s commitment to becoming a more
influential member in world politics. It also exhibits a foreign policy behavior which leans
towards cooperation with other countries.

Military Power
As the President of China, Hu Jintao oversaw a large increase in the modernization of
the Chinese military. 34 After the reductions in troops during the Jiang era, Hu Jintao, the data
suggest that Hu wanted China’s military to modernize in stark ways. He believed that in
order for China to be successful in all its endeavors, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
would need to be a prominent force on the world stage. Because of this, Hu deemed more
reductions of troops necessary while also increasing the budget of China’s defense forces,
modernizing its weapons arsenal, and undertaking more United Nations (UN) missions.
In 2003, after becoming China’s President, Hu believed that China’s military, the
People’s Liberation Army, should again reduce the number of personnel. While Jiang
oversaw the reduction of 500,000 troops from 1997 to 2000, Hu considered another reduction
of 200,000 troops to be necessary in order for China’s military to be as powerful as
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possible.35 This reduction was to take place over a two year period and by 2005, the People’s
Liberation Army had been reduced in size from 2.5 million personnel to 2.3 million troops.36
By doing this, Hu Jintao was essentially allowing for money to be spent on modernization
efforts rather than on taking care of the members of the PLA.
However, while the number of troops in the People’s Liberation Army decreased,
China spent progressively more money on their national defense budget every year. In 2004,
a year after Hu Jintao assumed leadership, China spent over 220 billion yuan on national
defense.37 Two years later, in 2006, that budget had increased by over 63 billion yuan to
nearly 283 billion yuan.38 According to the Chinese National Defense White Paper of 2006,
the increase in spending was mainly needed for improving the salaries of those in the PLA as
well as, “[i]ncreasing investment in weaponry and equipment and infrastructure.”39
Therefore, the White Paper suggests that a large portion of the increase in the national
defense budget in 2006 was needed in order to enhance the modernization efforts of the
military.
In 2009, China’s national defense budget increased to over 495 billion yuan, an
18.5% increase in spending from the previous year.40 This increase of over 200 billion yuan
was used to further modernize China’s military. At this time, the People’s Liberation Army
active members still numbered about 2.3 million. While Hu did believe a small reduction in
troops was necessary, the increase in defense spending shows how important Hu believed the
military was for China’s future.
In addition to putting a large emphasis on the development of the military, Hu also
increased China’s military presence throughout the world. In 2008, nearly 2,000 Chinese
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soldiers were actively participating in United Nations Peacekeeping operations. 41 These
peacekeeping forces took the form of medical personnel, engineers, as well as on the ground
peacekeepers. A majority of these troops were stationed in Africa, which is not surprising
considering China’s new found economic affinity with many countries on the continent.
Participating in many UN peacekeeping missions displays China’s military power to
the rest of the world. Hu Jintao succeeded in modernizing the People’s Liberation Army and
making it a more cohesive force in the international system. Since the number of troops in
the PLA remained relatively constant over Hu’s time as President of China and more money
was spent every year of his leadership, Hu seems to be placing a high emphasis on the need
for Chinese military power to improve. This all culminates with providing Chinese troops to
participate in UN Peacekeeping missions, creating a new direction for Chinese foreign
policy. Increasing military power displays a foreign policy behavior that is attempting to
project China’s military prowess on the world stage. In line with the coding scheme provided
in Chapter Two, the data suggest that China’s military power during the leadership of Hu
Jintao was high.

Economic Power
Following the stark economic growth that characterized Jiang Zemin’s time as
President of China, Hu Jintao was also a firm believer in the importance of economic growth.
From his time as Party Secretary of Guizhou and Tibet, Hu had emphasized economic growth
and development. This emphasis was again evident in the polices that Hu initiated to
enhance China’s economic power. Through increasing China’s economic power, Hu allowed
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China to take more responsibility in the international community and show the rest of the
world China’s economic potential.
After Hu assumed power in 2003, China was still developing at the remarkable rates
that characterized Jiang Zemin’s economic policies. However, as Saich asserts, there was,
“...a clear urban bias to development, as well as a coastal bias...” which Hu needed to remedy
in order to maintain the social stability that is so important for the Chinese government.42 In
2005, the Chinese National Statistics Bureau indicated that the wealthiest 10% of the Chinese
population held 45% of China’s wealth.43 This massive disparity between the rich and poor
created incentive for Hu to create policies that would try to benefit all people in China.
Hu began his quest to improve the livelihood of all Chinese people by first promoting
policies that would allow all citizens to earn more money. In 2005, the World Bank estimates
China’s per capita Gross National Income (GNI) to be over $4000.44 This is a huge increase
from only ten years before when China’s GNI per capita was less than $1500. 45 The same
year (2005), China’s GDP neared $2.3 trillion, the first time China’s GDP had ever surpassed
$2 trillion. This is a testament to the growing economic power of China and the rise of China
in the international system.
During the global recession beginning in 2008, China’s economy still fared relatively
well. Through large amounts of government investment in different industries, China was
able to fend off many effects of the recession that almost crippled some of the world’s
strongest economies.46 Two years after the recession, China finally became the economic
power that it had hoped to become. During the first half of 2010, China surpassed Japan to
become the world’s largest economy.47 China’s GNI increased to over $7500, while the
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country’s GDP increased to nearly $7.4 trillion dollars.48 This stark increase proved that
China was assuming much of the power and recognition that it wanted to hold in the
international system.
Though China’s trade as a percent of GDP decreased from 68% (2005) to 57%
(2010), China’s presence in international trade did not diminish.49 According to a World
Trade Organization report produced in 2012, “China has been committed to developing allaround foreign economic and trade relations,” with other countries throughout the world.50
Hu Jintao and the Chinese government had realized that an essential part of their foreign
policies had come through its trade relations. Perhaps the most significant statistic regarding
China’s international trade is its large trade surplus with the United States. In 2005, China
experienced a trade surplus of over $202 billion dollars with the United States. That surplus
increased substantially to over $273 billion dollars in 2010.51
The changes in China’s GDP, GNI per capita, trade as a percentage of GDP, and
China’s trade surplus with the United States during Hu’s time in power can be seen in the
following table:52
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Figure 6: Changes in Hu Jintao’s Economic Power
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

GDP

$1.64
trillio
n

$1.93
trillio
n

$2.25
trillion

$2.71
trillion

$3.49
trillion

$4.52
trillion

$4.99
trillion

$5.93
trillion

$7.31
trillion

GNI
per
Capita

$3180

$3590

$4090

$4750

$5580

$6230

$6840

$7520

$8390

Trade
as % of
GDP

56.9% 65.3%

68.6%

70.5%

68.0%

62.2%

49.0%

57.3%

58.6%

Trade
Surplus

$124
$126
$202
billion billion billion

$234
billion

$258
billion

$268
billion

$226
billion

$273
billion

$295
billion

Chinese economic power during Hu Jintao’s leadership rose substantially. China
became the second largest economy in the world and continued to grow at astonishingly
quick rates. While China did see some declines in trade as a percent of GDP and still
experienced much inequality, overall, the data suggest that China’s economic power was high
during Hu Jintao’s leadership. China’s foreign relations with the United States, in terms of
international trade, also increased substantially over the ten years Hu was in power. Chinese
foreign policy in terms of economic power, therefore, can be characterized as high because of
the policies implemented by Hu that called for China to still improve its economic standing
in the international community.

Analysis
According to the criteria set forth in this study, Hu Jintao seems to hold the national
role conceptions of regional leader and internal development. The above data suggest that
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not all of the proposed relationships between national role conceptions and foreign policy
behavior were true. Of the possible six relationships between national role conceptions and
foreign policy behavior, four were true. Since this a majority of the relationships, there is an
overall relationship between Hu Jintao’s national role conceptions and his foreign policy
behavior.
Regarding the regional leader national role conception, the data suggest that all of the
relationships between the role conception and foreign policy behavior were true. With the
regional leader national role conception, one would expect to see high levels of military and
economic power and good diplomatic relations with great powers. Hu exhibited all of these
traits. This suggests that Hu was embracing the idea of being a leader in the region and
hoped to gain more influence throughout the region and the world.
The internal development national role conception was not as persuasive as the
former conception. The internal development national role conception would be evident if
the foreign policy behavior exhibited low levels of military power, high levels of economic
power, and indifferent diplomatic relations between great powers. In the case of Hu Jintao,
high levels of military power, high levels of economic power, and good diplomatic relations
with great powers were evident. The data suggest that since only one of the three possible
relationships between national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior was displayed,
the internal development national role conception has a slight relationship with Hu’s foreign
policy behavior.
Overall, four of the possible six relationships between national role conceptions and
foreign policy behavior were correctly predicted. The regional leader national role
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conception perfectly correlated with the foreign policy behavior expected with that national
role conception. However, the data suggest that in the case of the internal development
national role conception, only one relationship was evident. This indicates that the
hypothesis of the study is marginally correct when analyzing Hu Jintao. While the
hypothesis cannot be completely refuted, it also cannot be completely correct due to only the
slight relationship between the internal development national role conception and Hu’s
foreign policy behavior.
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第五章：胡锦涛和中国外交政策

介绍
这一章是关于胡锦涛的分析。首先我会介绍胡锦涛的背景信息。之
后，我会分析我的自变量和确定胡锦涛的国家角色的概念。分析自变量以
后，我会介绍胡锦涛的外交政策的行为。最后，我会分析我的自变量和我
的因变数，然后确定胡锦涛的国家角色的概念是否和他的外交政策有关。

胡锦涛的背景信息
胡锦涛出生于1942年。高中毕业以后，胡锦涛去北京上大学。他上
了清华大学。他的专业是水利水电工程。1964年胡锦涛加入中国共产党。
文化革命以后，胡锦涛在中国共产党里有了很高的地位。比如他是共产党
年轻人的领导，也是中央委员会委员。可是1985年的时候，胡成为甘肃省
的党委书记。在甘肃省的时候，胡要提高甘肃人民的经济水平。而且甘肃
省有很多少数民族，所以胡要发展和少数民族的关系。三年以后，胡成为
西藏的党委书记。在西藏，胡锦涛有很多挑战。可是他还是提高了西藏的
经济水平。在西藏，胡需要表现中国共产党的权力，中国的最高的领导认
为胡锦涛可以担当更多的责任。最后，2003年的时候，胡锦涛成为中国的
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主席。 作为主席的时候，胡有在外交方面有很多的挑战。但是，胡能在
世界上表现出中国的力量。

自变量：国家角色的概念
我看了胡锦涛的两个报告。这两个个报告是在中国共产党全国代表
大会上的报告。这些报告是差不多跟美国的国情咨文报告一样的。那些报
告有很多意思。每个五年，中国的领导作这个报告，并且告诉中国人和世
界，中国的未来的计划。

胡锦涛在中国共产党第十五次和第十六全国代表大会上的报告
2007年10月15日和2012年11月8日，胡锦涛在全国代表大会上作报
告。我会分析这个报告，并且确定他的国家角色的概念。

经济情况
胡锦涛在中国共产党第十七次和第十八次全国代表大会上的报告，
提到了经济情况145次。他说别的字，比如：他说‘社会生活’ 1次，‘健康’
13 次，他说‘教育’ 90次，和说‘收入’ 41次。
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胡锦涛觉得教育是非常重要。他在很多地方也考虑到了教育。比
如，他说：

优先发展教育，建设人力资源强国。教育是民族振兴的基石，教育公平是社
会公平的重要基础。要全面贯彻党的教育方针，坚持育人 为本、德育为先，
实施素质教育，提高教育现代化水平，培养德智体美全面发展的社会主义建
设者和接班人，办好人民满意的教育。优化教育结构，促进义务教育均 衡发
展，加快普及高中阶段教育，大力发展职业教育，提高高等教育质量。重视
学前教育，关心特殊教育。更新教育观念，深化教学内容方式、考试招生制
度、质量 评价制度等改革，减轻中小学生课业负担，提高学生综合素质。坚
持教育公益性质，加大财政对教育投入，规范教育收费，扶持贫困地区、民
族地区教育，健全学生 资助制度，保障经济困难家庭、进城务工人员子女平
等接受义务教育。加强教师队伍建设，重点提高农村教师素质。鼓励和规范
社会力量兴办教育。发展远程教育和 继续教育，建设全民学习、终身学习的
学习型社会。

这一段说明，胡锦涛觉得教育非常重要。他认为中国必须改善中国的教育
系统，并且提高教育质量。如果他们不能提高教育质量，中国不能在世界
上竞争。胡锦涛认为人民的经济情况必须提高。他提到了经济情况很多
次，所以我能分类这个部分：高。

对外开放和自我封闭
在那些报告中，胡锦涛不参考自我封闭。可是他参考了对外开放19
次。胡说到‘主权’11次，‘互相依存’ 1次，和‘全球化’ 7次。说到主权的时
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候，胡说中国应该，“维护国家主权和领土完整”。这个说明胡锦涛保护国
家主权。说到相互依存的时候，胡锦涛说中国跟别的国家必须在经济上相
互依存。如果中国要经济发展，他们必须跟别的国家一起合作。最后，说
全球化的时候，胡锦涛认为经济全球化非常重要，每个国家应该参加经济
全球化。胡锦涛是一个对外开放的领导，不是自我封闭的。

对国内的发展的重视程度
在那些报告中，胡锦涛提到了“国内发展”47次。他认为中国必须发
展经济，并且成为一个非常重要的国家。胡锦涛说到“经济发展”23次
和“和平发展”24次。在这两个报告后，中国的经济有非常快的发展。所以
胡锦涛认为中国必须再发展。胡锦涛说中国必须“推进经济结构战略性调
整”。他的意思是，中国必须有更多经济上的发展，而且中国的经济结构
必须改变。胡锦涛觉得发展非常重要。因为他提到了“国内发展”很多次。
我能分类这个部分：高。

胡锦涛的国家角色的概念
胡锦涛觉得经济情况和国内发展都很有意思，也很重要。他也是一
个对外开放的领导。所以胡锦涛的国家角色的概念是， 区域领袖和国内
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发展。这两个国家角色的概念表现出了胡锦涛的个性。而且，胡的国家角
色的概念可以告诉别的国家，中国的外交政策。

因变数：中国外交政策行为
胡锦涛成为中国的总统的时候，中国在世界上的地位还比较低。可
是他知道中国还应该提高他们的国际地位。为了知道胡锦涛的外交政策，
我看了三个别的部分。那些部分是，中国跟大国的关系，中国的军权，和
中国的经济权。

大国关系
胡锦涛成为中国主席的时候，中国的国际地位在慢慢的提高。美
国，俄罗斯和中国都是世界的大国。如果我们了解中美和中俄关系，我们
就可以了解今天的世界。
胡锦涛成为主席的时候，中美关系没有那么多的问题。最大的问题
是跟中国的货币有关。中国和美国是最好的贸易伙伴。中美关系表现在贸
易上。可是中国跟美国有一个非常大的贸易顺差。很多美国人觉得中国有
贸易顺差，因为他们低估了他们的货币。美国人觉得中国必须升值人民

192

币。中国不要突然让人民币升值。可是中国慢慢的升值人民币。这个表现
了中美合作。
而且中国和美国开始战略对话。胡锦涛和美国布什总统开始了这个
对话。通过这个对话，中国和美国能一起聊天和创造非常好的关系。他们
能讨论他们的经济情况，政治情况，也能一起合作。中国是一个非常大的
国家所以他们必须跟美国有好的关系。
胡锦涛的时候，中俄关系也非常好。他们一起合作，也有一些竞
争。因为中国和俄罗斯都在东亚，他们必须有一个好的关系。胡开始了领
导之间的对话，所以中国的领导人和俄罗斯的能一起谈话。每年胡锦涛和
俄罗斯的普京总统见面。他们一起签署非常重要的协议。而且在国际组织
上，中国和俄罗斯一起合作。
胡的时候，中国和别的国家有非常好的关系。他们都一起合作，也
开始重要的对话。这个表现了胡锦涛的大国外交政策。他觉得中国应该跟
别的大国有非常好的关系。
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军权
胡锦涛成为中国的总统的时候，中国的军队是世界上最大的。中国
有差不多两百五十万的士兵。可是2003年的时候，胡锦涛说，他要减少中
国的士兵。为了减少士兵，中国会发展他们的军队现代化建设。所以2005
年，中国的军队里只有两百三十万士兵。同时中国的军队有很多现代化的
建设。而且中国花很多钱在他们的军队建设上。2004年的时候，中国花了
220亿元在军队上。2009年，中国花了495亿元。这个说明了胡锦涛对军队
看法。中国的军队有很多权力，他们的军队也很强大。

经济权
从邓小平的改革开放到2003年，中国的经济发展得越来越快。胡锦
涛觉得中国必须继续非常快的发展经济。2005年，中国的国内生产总值是
2.3万亿美元。但是在2010年，中国的国内生产总值是差不多7.4万亿美
元。而且中国成为了世界第二大的经济国。这个非常好，可以说明中国的
经济情况。胡锦涛的时候，中国的经济提高的真快。
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分析
从以上的情况，可以看出我的假设是差不多对的。我认为中国领导
的国家角色的概念跟他们的外交政策有关。胡锦涛的国家角色的概念，
区域领袖跟他的外交政策行为也是一样的。可是他的别的国家角色的概
念，关于内部发展是不对的。所以我不能明确我的假设是完全对的或者不
对。
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Chapter Six: Analysis and Conclusion

This chapter presents an analysis and conclusion for the study. First, the chapter
presents a survey of the results of the case studies and general patterns, trends, and
tendencies that were existent throughout the studies. The project resulted in similar
outcomes for the three cases: Each leader appeared to hold the same national role
conceptions and their foreign policy behaviors were very alike which confirms the hypothesis
of the study. The overall conclusions provide nuanced connections based on the scholarly
foundations of the project that can further the study of foreign policy analysis. The chapter
ends with a brief discussion of the limitations of the study and ideas for further research.

Case Study Analysis
Constancy was apparent throughout the three cases regarding the independent and
dependent variables. Because of this, the hypothesis of the study is confirmed. Throughout
the study, important insights are evident that create opportunity to further the study of
Chinese foreign policy. The results of the three case studies suggest that although Chinese
foreign policy is a very dynamic factor, some constants have been evident throughout the
post-Mao era. These constants allow for a more complete understanding of Chinese foreign
policy.
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Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions
The cases of national role conceptions and Chinese foreign policy under Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all resulted in similar findings. Each leader seemed to
hold the same national role conceptions, “regional leader and internal development,” that
display China’s evolving status in the international system. While these national role
conceptions are not surprising given the changing nature of China after the death of Mao
Zedong, they still have some puzzling aspects that can further one’s comprehension of
Chinese foreign policy and China in general.
The national role conceptions for each leader were determined by three distinct
indicators. These indicators included the leader’s perception on socioeconomic status, the
leader’s political views judged by being more internationalist or isolationist, and the leader’s
interest in development. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each showcased similar
results regarding the three indicators. Each leader placed a large emphasis on socioeconomic
status, held more internationalist views on politics, and believed that development was
essential for the growth of Chinese power in the international system.
For example, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao referenced socioeconomic status many times
in each speech that was analyzed. By referencing education, income, health, and the need to
have a harmonious society, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao seemed to believe that improving the
socioeconomic status of all Chinese citizens was extremely important. Through the cases of
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, one can see the tendency for Chinese leaders after the death of
Mao to promote an enhancement of socioeconomic status throughout China. This trend
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corresponds with the fast development and growth that China has been experiencing since
the late 1970s.
In the third case, though, Deng Xiaoping did not directly mention the selected words
and phrases that would indicate a high emphasis on socioeconomic status as many times as
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Deng Xiaoping can be characterized as a man of few words, but
whose words hold much weight and are heavily revered. Therefore, it is not surprising that
he did not make many precise mentions of socioeconomic status. However, what Deng
Xiaoping did provide in the two speeches that were coded showed how deeply he believed
that the socioeconomic status of all Chinese citizens needed to be improved. By mentioning
the importance of quality education and improving the incomes of China’s rural citizens,
Deng Xiaoping displayed his commitment to opening and reforming China in a way that
would improve the livelihood of all Chinese people.
Regarding the second indicator of national role conceptions, internationalism versus
isolationism, the three leaders all seemed to adhere to an internationalist view of the global
political environment. In the six total speeches that were coded and analyzed, isolationism
did not manifest itself in any way based on the coding scheme used. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang
Zemin, and Hu Jintao displayed their understanding of the international system through
promoting the ideas of economic interdependence and economic globalization. In addition,
each leader believed that the sovereignty of all nations in the world should be respected. This
displayed a changed stance of international politics from that of Mao Zedong. Instead of
being more isolationist, as were many of the founders of the People’s Republic of China,
Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao displayed a pattern of more nuanced thought
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regarding the international system. While this trend strayed from the traditional view of
leaders of the People’s Republic of China, it appears to display the changing nature of the
international system and the development that China is experiencing both politically and
economically.
Finally, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each seemed to harbor high
levels of interest in development. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao made many references to China
developing its economy and developing in a peaceful way. Because they were in power after
the beginning of the Open and Reform policies, a trend which places a large emphasis on
development emerges. As China’s economy has been growing at remarkable rates over the
past thirty years, stressing the importance of development has become an even more
important part of being the leader of the People’s Republic of China.
Deng Xiaoping, in many ways, can be seen as the architect of the policies that have
led to more growth throughout China. Though he did not directly mention development as
many times as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as China’s leader through the beginning of the
Open and Reform period, Deng Xiaoping displayed the importance of development in
creating a more prosperous and powerful China. His commitment to developing China was
evident throughout the speeches.
Because of the three leaders' stance on the issues of socioeconomic status,
internationalism and isolationism, and their interest in development, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang
Zemin, and Hu Jintao each held the regional leader and internal development national role
conceptions. These national role conceptions seem to display an evolution of Chinese
politics. In addition, since each leader seemed to hold the same national role conceptions,
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one can see that the three leaders seemed to learn from the past to help develop China in
ways that would promote a rise in power in the international system.
In Chapter Two, it was posited that the Chinese leaders could hold many different
national role conceptions. While many national role conceptions have already been
developed by leading scholars, the scope of this study was not large enough to include every
conception that has been created. Therefore, it was proposed that the three leaders studied in
this project would have the possibility of holding one or more national role conceptions
including, anti-imperialist agent, regional leader, active independent, and internal
development. Though Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao could hold other national
role conceptions, such as those described by Holsti and Hermann, the anti-imperialist agent,
regional leader, active independent, and internal development conceptions seemed to be the
most likely to occur.
The anti-imperialist and active independent national role conceptions were not
present in the speeches analyzed for each leader. The lack of these national role conceptions
appears to display the evolving nature of the Chinese political landscape. From the
formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, China
was virtually cut off from the rest of the world. However, that began to change with the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping and subsequent Chinese leaders. Through the scope of this
study, a trend appeared which seemed to depict how the perspectives of Chinese leaders had
changed which resulted in what can be considered an improvement of China’s international
standing. Since Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all appeared to hold the regional
leader national role conception, it seems that these leaders wished for China to become more
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active in the international system. By being more active and assuming more leadership roles,
China would be able to ascend to the ranks of being a great power in the international
community.
However, just because the anti-imperialist agent and active independent national role
conceptions did not manifest themselves does not mean that they do not appear in other
forms of the Chinese government. Those leaders that fully believe in the traditional Maoist
ideology would be likely to foster the anti-imperialist agent and active independent national
role conceptions. The fact that China’s main political leaders after the death of Mao did not
appear to hold those national role conceptions demonstrates a change in ideology that
occurred throughout China. Though China still operates under a socialist system, the
definitions under which China works have been loosened to include all of the practices that
China pursues today. Therefore, the regional leader and internal development national role
conceptions held by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seem to correctly indicate
the transformation of China after the death of Mao Zedong.

Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Behavior
Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao expressed many similarities in their
respective foreign policy behaviors. Overall, the three leaders displayed good diplomatic
relations with great powers, high military power, and high economic power. By exhibiting
these characteristics, China’s change over the last forty years is again apparent. The
isolationist policies of Mao did not allow for China to assert itself strongly in the
international community. On the contrary, the policies that were in practice from the
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establishment of the People’s Republic of China to the death of Mao Zedong did not allow
for the emergence of a strong China. However, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao
each developed foreign policies that appeared to create a powerful China in the international
community.
As foreign policy behavior represents a myriad of different actors, factors, and
conditions, only three aspects of foreign policy were analyzed. China’s diplomatic relations
with great powers, China’s military power, and China’s economic power were studied in
order to gain an understanding of each leader’s foreign policy behavior. While these
categories do not encompass all aspects of foreign policy, diplomatic relations, military
power, and economic power provide a uniform way of comprehending the foreign policy
behavior of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.
Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each seemed to foster good diplomatic
relations with other great powers during their rule. China’s relations with the United States
and the Soviet Union/Russia developed in ways that promoted a strong partnership between
the states. Starting with the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China and the United States, and
China and the Soviet Union, normalized relations. Strategic partnerships developed between
China and the Soviet Union and between the United States and China. After the fall of the
Soviet Union, Sino-Russian relations developed even further and the strategic cooperation
that began in the 1980s continued to manifest itself. Boasting good relations with the United
States and the Soviet Union/Russia demonstrates that China was trying to avoid the almost
catastrophic policies that characterized the Mao era. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu
Jintao appeared to realize that the only way for China to reach its full potential would be
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through the advancement of positive relations with great powers. A trend developed where
each leader seemed to preside over ground breaking cooperation developments while also
managing tense times in the relationship. However, overall, the Sino-US and Sino-Soviet/
Russian relationships suggest that China was confident in its ability to grow with the
assistance of two of the most important countries in the world.
Military power was also an area where many similarities were evident between the
three leaders. Each leader presided over large cuts to the number of soldiers in the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). Though one may think that cutting the number of soldiers in a
country’s armed forces would be a sign of decline, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu
Jintao all increased the amount of money that was spent on the PLA. By allocating more
money to the military, the leaders were able to create a more modernized army that would be
able to face many challenges throughout the world. Again, a pattern emerged where near the
beginning of each leader’s time in office, the number of soldiers was cut while spending
increased. This suggests that Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao realized that for
China to become more powerful, the People’s Liberation Army would need to modernize.
For these reasons, each leader’s boasted high military power during their rule.
Regarding economic power, the three leaders each saw large rises of China’s
economic might during their time in power. Beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s Open and
Reform policies in the late 1970s, each subsequent leader placed a large emphasis on the
development of China’s economy. After years of policies that did not allow for development,
Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each brought unique ideas to advance China’s
economic growth. This pattern was very evident when analyzing China’s trade with the
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United States as well as China’s Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income.
China’s economy grew substantially larger indicating that policies were being made to help
develop China into an important player in the international community.

Relationship Between Independent and Dependent Variables
As stated in Chapter Two, the hypothesis of this study is that different national role
conceptions lead to different foreign policy behaviors. Each leader appeared to hold the
same national role conceptions which displays constancy between the independent variable.
In addition, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seemed to adhere to similar foreign
policy behaviors which shows constancy in the dependent variable. Since there was
constancy between the independent and dependent variables, the hypothesis of the study is
upheld. Certain trends also developed which can allow for a better understanding of Chinese
foreign policy.
By holding the regional leader and internal development national role conceptions,
one would expect certain foreign policy behavior to be practiced. With the regional leader
national role conception, the leader was hypothesized to have good diplomatic relations with
great powers, high levels of military power, and high levels of economic power. Regarding
the internal development national role conception, one would expect to see indifferent
relations between great powers, low levels of military power, and high levels of economic
power.
In this study, only one national role conception corresponded correctly to all aspects
of foreign policy behavior. For Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, the regional
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leader national role conception correctly predicted the three indicators of foreign policy
behavior. Each leader exhibited good diplomatic relations with great powers, high levels of
military power, and high levels of economic power. With the regional leader national role
conception, one would expect these three indicators to be evident.
Since the regional leader national role conception correctly predicted the foreign
policy behavior of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, the hypothesis of the study is
confirmed. Through the three leaders, constancy was evident between the independent and
dependent variables. The foreign policy behavior of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu
Jintao all corresponded correctly to the regional leader national role conception. Because the
regional leader role conception was evident in their foreign policy behavior, Chinese leaders
tended to place more emphasis on being a leader in East Asia. By being a leader in the area,
China would be able to assume more responsibility and develop into a strong country in the
international system.
Contrasting the regional leader national role conception, the internal development
national role conception did not manifest itself in the same way. The foreign policy behavior
of a leader with the internal development national role conception would be that of
indifferent relations with great powers, low levels of military power, and high levels of
economic power. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each displayed high levels of
economic power but did not show foreign policy behavior that would verify the other
indicators of foreign policy behavior. Again, constancy was evident between the independent
and dependent variables which confirms the hypothesis.
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The data suggest that the regional leader national role conception was more dominant
in the manifestation of foreign policy behavior. However, the internal development national
role conception was not completely nonexistent. In terms of economic power, both the
regional leader and internal development national role conceptions would result in high
levels. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each displayed this kind of power which
shined light onto the validity of the internal development national role conception.1

Conclusions
As previously stated, the hypothesis for this study is that different national role
conceptions lead to different foreign policy behavior. The independent and dependent
variables were consistent throughout the cases of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu
Jintao. It is apparent that national role conceptions play some part in the development of
foreign policy behavior. The exact role that national role conceptions have in the
development of foreign policy behavior may not be large. However, this study shows that
national role conceptions do indeed play a part in the development of foreign policy
behavior.
After Holsti’s work on national role conceptions and the study of foreign policy, many
scholars have advanced the discipline in different ways. Some scholars that use national role
conceptions to study foreign policy behavior believe that the national role conceptions lead to
the difference in foreign policy behavior between different leaders and countries. While
national role conceptions may not be the only factor in the development of foreign policy, it
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is still a very important part of understanding the foreign policy decision-making process in
many countries.
Role theory has many applications to the study of leadership and foreign policy
behavior. Role theory has been able to classify Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao
into two distinct categories that play a part in the development of the policies that occurred
under their leadership. The data suggest that each leader saw himself and China in ways that
would promote the further development of a great power. Since the anti-imperialist agent
and active independent national role conceptions were not evident, the data suggest that
China was going through and is still experiencing a transformation.
As Shih asserted in his work, history and culture play large parts in the development
of a leader’s role. For China, history and culture are essential in understanding why Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seem to hold the national role conceptions they do.
From China’s historical ‘middle kingdom’ ideology to its foundation in Confucian thought,
the roles that the three leaders seem to hold appear to confirm the importance of China’s
history and culture. Without having the history that China has, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin,
and Hu Jintao would not hold the same role conceptions that they do today. In addition,
Chinese culture creates a dichotomy that is hardly present in other countries throughout the
world. By using national role conceptions to try to understand the development of Chinese
foreign policy, the importance of history and culture can be accounted for which allows for
more complete comprehension of foreign policy and the roles Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin,
and Hu Jintao hold in the international system.
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Each leader seemed to hold the same national role conceptions. As Deng Xiaoping,
Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao all developed within the Chinese culture, it is not surprising that
they appeared to hold the same national role conceptions. Shih posited that there are many
psychocultural bases that affect the perceptions decision-makers have of themselves. Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seem to epitomize this notion. Because each leader
grew up within the same cultural context, it is not surprising that Deng Xiaoping, Jiang
Zemin, and Hu Jintao appeared to develop the same national role conceptions. Therefore,
Shih’s assertion that a shared culture and history play a role in the development of
perceptions and role conceptions appears to be confirmed. Though each leader grew up in
different time periods, the culture of China was the same for each leader. This seems to
display the notion that culture and history have a part in the development of the national role
conceptions of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao.
Role expectations, as argued by Thies, appeared to play a role in the development of
national role conceptions for China’s three main leaders after the death of Mao. After Mao’s
death and the beginning of the Open and Reform policies of Deng Xiaoping, subsequent
leaders have been expected to carry out certain policies. For example, it would be impossible
for a rising political star in China to denounce economic development. A precedent has
already been set which would force the future political leaders of China to adhere to the
policies that have allowed China to experience vast economic growth. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang
Zemin, and Hu Jintao, each have displayed this expectation through their national role
conceptions as well as their foreign policy behavior. By holding the regional leader and
internal development national role conceptions and displaying certain types of foreign policy
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behavior, they have upheld the role expectations that have become a prerequisite for
assuming the top positions of Chinese leadership.
In the same light, role demands also manifest themselves in the national role
conceptions and foreign policy behavior of the three leaders analyzed. As a leader, the state
which they govern and the international system demand certain things from the leadership.
In the case of the People’s Republic of China, the results of the study suggest that the
Chinese people were demanding a more prosperous country. After living on basically
nothing during the rule of Mao Zedong, a change occurred which helped foster the
development of Deng Xiaoping’s Open and Reform policies. Since the beginning of the
Open and Reform period, Chinese people of all walks of life have wished to improve their
livelihood. The data suggest that Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao attempted to
help the Chinese citizens reach the goal of a better life. Though China is still not on par with
many other countries throughout the world, steps have been taken to fulfill the demands the
citizens have to better their livelihoods. The role demands that are placed upon Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao display the change in Chinese thought and the
importance of working within the role demands that are essentially a part of their national
role conceptions.
Role theory has great utility in political science because it can be used at the
individual, state, and system level of analysis. However, many scholars, including Holsti and
Hudson, believe that in order to utilize role theory at its full potential, the individual level of
analysis is the most helpful when attempting to explain foreign policy behavior. In addition
to the individual level of analysis, though, the state level of analysis can also be employed to
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further understand the foreign policy behavior of different nations. While mainly using role
theory at the individual level of analysis, this study has confirmed that both the individual
and state levels of analysis are beneficial when applying role theory to foreign policy
analysis. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each displayed characteristics that
provide support for the importance of the individual level of analysis. By analyzing each
leader on an individual level, one can see the potential for role theory to explain a leader’s
foreign policy behavior. The three leaders seemed to believe that leadership and
development were extremely important for the growth of China on the international stage
which was displayed through each leader’s foreign policy behavior. Likewise, through the
use of the state level of analysis, China’s role in East Asia and the international system
became more evident. Using the regional leader national role conception on the state level of
analysis displays China’s willingness to pursue more active roles in the development of its
relations with East Asia and the world.
Both Holsti and Hermann have conducted extensive work on national role
conceptions and foreign policy behavior. Their studies developed different national role
conceptions that can be used to analyze the foreign policy behavior of a leader or country.
This study has confirmed that the regional leader national role conception has utility in
explaining foreign policy behavior. The regional leader national role conception that Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao seemed to hold correctly predicted the foreign policy
behavior that occurred under each leader’s rule. This further supports Holsti’s original
research by confirming the utility and predictability of the regional leader national role
conception regarding foreign policy behavior. The internal development national role
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conception, however, did not completely predict the foreign policy behavior of each leader.
This national role conception only correctly predicted one aspect of each leader’s foreign
policy behavior. Because of this, the internal development national role conception, though
having some utility, is not as persuasive in predicting the foreign policy behavior of a leader.
This study has developed a typology for national role conceptions which has utility
for studying foreign policy behavior throughout the world. Much evidence was noticeable in
support for the regional leader national role conception which could allow for the use of that
typology in many other cases. The regional leader national role conception has been used
before in other scholarly works but not in the same manner and without the same results as
this study. Because of this, the typology of the regional leader national role conception could
be used to further the understanding of leaders’ foreign policy behavior in countries
throughout the world.
In addition, the internal development national role conception could be applied to
leaders in other countries. While the supporting evidence for the internal development role
conception is not as persuasive, the fact that one of the possible relationships between
national role conception and foreign policy behavior appeared shows that there is a practical
application for the use of the internal development role conception.
Because the regional leader national role conception correctly predicted the foreign
policy behavior of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, this national role conception
can be used to predict the foreign policies of leaders throughout the world. If a political
leader seems to hold the regional leader national role conception, a foreign policy behavior
that consists of good diplomatic relations with great powers, high military power, and high
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economic power would be most likely to appear. Since each of the leaders after the death of
Mao Zedong appeared to hold the regional leader national role conception, one would expect
that China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, as well as future leaders, to display the same foreign
policy behavior if the regional leader national role conception was evident. This predictive
ability displays the importance of national role conceptions in the study of foreign policy
behavior.
While Holsti, Wish, Breuning, Shih, and others have used national role conceptions to
further their understandings of foreign policy behavior, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu
Jintao, specifically, are not regularly studied through role theory. Other leaders have been
analyzed using national role conceptions while China seems to be ostracized from that group.
Some Chinese leaders, from the Mao era, have been analyzed by scholars using role theory,
but Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao have seldom appeared together in a study of
national role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. By studying China’s three most recent
leaders, this project has developed in ways that add to the scholarly work using role theory to
study foreign policy. Understanding the more recent leadership of the People’s Republic of
China is just as important as understanding the policies of Mao Zedong.
This study analyzes Chinese foreign policy through a different lens. China’s foreign
policy behavior is an extremely dynamic feature. The stark differences between the foreign
policies of Mao Zedong and Hu Jintao display the evolution China’s growth and
development within the international system. Being able to further one’s understanding of
the subject is essential to comprehending international relations. Foreign policy analysis is
considered to be the backbone of the study of international relations. It is through foreign

212

policy that one is able to see international relations at work. By trying to better one’s
understanding of foreign policy, all aspects of the study of international relations benefit.
From using different levels of analysis to explain certain issues, to understanding ethnic
conflict, foreign policy analysis helps explain those important issues. This study has used
national role conceptions and foreign policy analysis to understand one of the most dynamic
countries in the world, the People’s Republic of China.

Ideas for Further Research
This study faced some limitations in its overview of the foreign policies of Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. However, these limitations do not take away from the
overall results of the study. Questions of the number of national role conceptions used, the
leaders studied, the speeches analyzed, and the operationalization of China’s foreign policy
all pose challenges to this study. These challenges, however, do not reduce the validity of the
study. Rather, they provide ways to enhance further research on national role conceptions
and foreign policy.
Holsti and Hermann develop twenty-one distinct national role conceptions.2 While in
a perfect world, each leader could hold every national role conception, this study could not
afford to potentially analyze twenty-one national role conceptions. Instead, only four
national role conceptions had the potential to be analyzed. However, this study could be
replicated using the different national role conceptions that have been developed by Holsti
and Hermann. This could add another layer to the study of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and
Hu Jintao’s national role conceptions and possibly explain contrasts in foreign policy
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behavior. This study has built upon the ideas of Holsti and Hermann and has further
confirmed the results of their important scholarly work.
In addition, the leaders that were studied could pose certain limitations. China has
only experienced three paramount leaders since the death of Mao Zedong. In that light, these
leaders should be the only leaders studied. However, Chinese foreign policy is not
determined solely by the head politician in the People’s Republic of China. Many other
actors are present in the development of China’s foreign policy. In order to remedy this,
future studies could research the role different bureaucratic organizations play in the
development of Chinese foreign policy. By looking at Chinese foreign policy in this way,
more aspects of China’s foreign policy could be analyzed allowing for more understanding of
China.
In line with the leaders, the selection of speeches analyzed could pose some
methodological difficulties. First, Deng Xiaoping never gave the same type of opening
address to the Communist Party China National Party Congress. His only opening address
was very short and did not have the same policy implications as the remarks given by Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao. Therefore, different speeches were chosen to try to ascertain Deng
Xiaoping’s national role conceptions. Deng Xiaoping gave many influential addresses while
in power making the decision regarding which speeches to use very difficult. However, the
chosen speeches provide a good overview of Deng Xiaoping’s development over time. In
future studies, different speeches could be used to develop Deng Xiaoping’s national role
conceptions. This would allow for broader understandings of Deng Xiaoping and the
policies that he developed.
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In addition, the opening addresses by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao may pose some
issues when being used to develop national role conceptions. The opening address to the
National Party Congress is highly vetted by other top members of the Communist Party of
China. Because of this, the true beliefs of Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao may not totally appear.
However, analyzing the opening address allows for less bias to manifest itself in the remarks
because of the uniformity of all the remarks. In future studies of national role conceptions
and Chinese foreign policy, a more diverse selection of speeches could provide different
insights into Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao’s national role conceptions while
also creating means for additional study of Chinese foreign policy.
It should also be noted that the People’s Liberation Army is the army for the
Communist Party of China. While it also acts as the army for the state, the People’s
Liberation Army’s first goal is to protect the party. This could be the reason why certain
policies were developed by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Whereas most
military forces are bound by the constitution of the state, the People’s Liberation Army is
sworn to uphold the Constitution of the Communist Party of China.
Finally, foreign policy behavior is extremely difficult to conceptualize and
operationalize. There are so many aspects that constitute foreign policy that looking at only
three features may not give a complete representation of the foreign policy that was adhered
to by Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Further research could be done using the
same national role conceptions but changing that aspects of foreign policy that are analyzed.
This would potentially produce results that could help generalize the utility of the national
role conceptions used.
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The results of the study suggest that more work should be done in the area of national
role conceptions and foreign policy behavior. While using role theory to study foreign policy
is still in its infancy, it is important that scholars continue answering difficult questions using
role theory and national role conceptions. The utility of national role conceptions is
seemingly endless. They can been used to understand a leader’s behavior, a state’s behavior,
or even an organization’s behavior in the international system. This study only touches upon
one aspect of role theory and the benefits of using national role conceptions to understand
foreign policy behavior. However, much work needs to be done in order to advance the
efficacy of role theory and international relations.

Summary Conclusion
Looking back on this study, the immortal words of the Dao De Jing still ring true.
Chinese foreign policy is an extremely complex portion of China’s international relations. As
with the Dao De Jing, there is not only one way to analyze Chinese politics. This study
attempts to capture certain aspects of China’s relations to the rest of the world. The national
role conceptions of Chinese leaders are also very intricate which forces scholars to analyze
many facets of China’s history and culture. The Dao De Jing is an important piece of the
Chinese foreign policy and national role conception puzzle. Like the Dao De Jing, Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao have placed an important mark on Chinese society.
Understanding these aspects of the People’s Republic of China, foreign policy, and
international relations create paths for future generations to follow. Through these paths,
they will be able to produce their mark on society and better the world in which we live.
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1

Since the anti-imperialist agent and active independent national role conceptions did not appear, the
hypothesis regarding those conceptions is neither confirmed or denied.
2

See Chapter One page 26 for all national role conceptions.
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第六章：分析和结论

介绍
这一章是关于我的文章的分析和结论。首先我会给出我的研究的结
论。之后，我会说明我研究的局限性和提出进一步研究的想法。

研究的分析
我的文章的结论很有意思。我发现了我的自变量和因变数有一个很
有意思的关系。我发现国家角色的概念和领导的外交政策有关。这个关系
不是那么大，可是非常重要。
我的假设是国家领导的国家角色的概念支配该国外交政策的行为。
这个假设差不多是对的。通过对邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛几位领导人的
分析研究，都表明他们的国家角色的概念和他们的外交政策的行为有关
系。从建立中华人民共和国到现在，中国有很多的变化。比如说，1978年
邓小平开始改革开放政策和中国的经济发展得越来越好。江泽民也有这个
政策，并且他帮助中国的经济发展。而且，胡锦涛也开始了非常重要的政
策。
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在国家系统中，中国的角色有很大的变化。1949年到1978年中国是
自我封闭的国家。可是，现在中国是一个对外开放的国家。这个表现出了
中国和中国领导人的角色的变化。这个角色的变化让中国的外交政策也发
生了变化。我的文章和研究显示了中国在世界上的新水平。中国是一个非
常强和大的国家。中国的领导人，邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛都发挥出了
中国的潜力。因为他们知道中国是世界上的最重要的国家之一，他们必须
有很多的责任。

自变量：国家角色的概念
关于我的自变量，邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛都有一样的结果。他
们都有区域领袖的国家角色的概念和内部发展的国家角色的概念。邓，
江，和胡都觉得中国人的经济情况和中国的经济发展是非常重要的问题。
而且，他们都觉得中国应该跟别的国家有一个非常好的关系。因为他们觉
得中国人的经济情况和中国的经济发展很有意思，而且他们觉得中国应该
成为对外开放的国家，邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛有区域领袖的国家角色
的概念和内部发展的国家角色的概念。
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因变数：外交政策行为
邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛都有差不多一样的外交政策的行为。他
们都跟大国有好的关系。而且，他们的军权和经济权也非常大。1976年以
后，中国的国际形式改变了。中国不是自我封闭的国家。中国跟苏联／俄
罗斯有比较好的关系。另外，中美关系也越来越好。邓小平，江泽民，和
胡锦涛的时候，中国的军事很现代。虽然人民解放军没有那么多人，中国
的军对也很强。中国的经济也有很大的发展。那些外交政策的指针表现出
中国的新的外交政策。

关于国家角色的概念和外交政策行为的关系
中国领导人的国家角色的概念跟外交政策有一个很有意思的关系。
通过对邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛三位领导人的分析，都显示出我的假设
差不多是对的。关于他们的第一个国家角色的概念区域领袖跟他的外交政
策行为也是一样的。 可是关于第二个，他们的国家角色的概念是不对
的。所以我的假设是差不多对的。一个国家角色的概念是对的，和一个是
不对的。这个显示国家角色的概念跟外交政策的行为有一点关系。
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研究的局限性和进一步研究的想法
我的研究有一点局限性。一是，我只能分析四位中国的领导人的国
家角色概念。很多美国的国际学者创造很多国家角色的概念。可是我的研
究不能包括每个国家角色的概念。所以，我只能用这四个分析。在未来，
政治学者能用别的国家角色的概念分析中国领导人的外交政策。
而且，外交政策有很多定义。差不多每个政治学者有别的定义。另
外，外交政策是非常广阔的类别。我只能用三个外交政策的部分分析中国
领导人的外交政策。可是别的政治学者可以用别的外交政策行为分析中国
的领导人。
我的研究的结论告诉人们，我们应该常常学习国家角色的概念和外
交政策。我们的世界有很多的变化。可是，了解别的国家的政策非常必
要。如果我们要成为全球公民，我们必须一起向别的国家学习。中国是一
个非常重要的国家。了解邓小平，江泽民，和胡锦涛的国家角色的概念和
外交政策帮助人们了解我们的世界。这个研究表明，我们都是互为联系
的，每个可以改变我们的世界。
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Appendix
In order to be as consistent as possible during the coding process, only the specific
words and phrases listed below for each indicator of the independent variable were used to
determine the national role conception(s) that a leader may hold.

Socioeconomic Status:
The following words and phrases were used to determine if socioeconomic status is
deemed important by the leader being analyzed.
English

Mandarin
Chinese

Pinyin Translation

Life Expectancy

预计寿命

yuji shouming

Health

健康

jiankang

Healthy Culture

健康文化

jiankang wenhua

Society Life

社会生活

shehui shenghuo

Average Years of Schooling

平均受教育年限

pingjun shou jiaoyu nianxian

Education

教育

jiaoyu

Attend College (Higher Education)

上大学

shang daxue

Gross National Income

国民总收入

guomin zong shouru

Income

收入

shouru

Economic Consumption

经济消费

jingji xiaofei
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Internationalism versus Isolationism
The following words and phrases were used to determine if a leader is more
internationalist or isolationist in nature.
English

Mandarin Chinese

Pinyin Translation

Internationalism

国际主义

guoji zhuyi

Isolationism

孤立

guli

Intervention

干预

ganyu

Military Intervention

军事干预

junshi ganyu

Humanitarian Intervention

人道主义干预

rendao zhuyi ganyu

Peacekeeping

维持和平

weichi heping

Sovereignty

主权

zhuquan

International Organizations
(Good)

国际组织（好）

guoji zuzhi (hao)

International Organizations
(Bad)

国际组织（怀）

guoji zhuyi (huai)

Interdependence (Good)

相互依存（好）

xianghu yicun (hao)

Interdependence (Bad)

相互依存（怀）

xianghu yicun (huai)

Globalization (Good)

全球化（好）

quanqiu hua (hao)

Globalization (Bad)

全球化（怀）

quanqiu hua (huai)
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Interest in Development
The following words and phrases were used to determine how important development
is to a leader.
English

Mandarin Chinese

Pinyin Translation

Economic Development
(Good)

经济发展（好）

jingji fazhan (hao)

Economic Development
(Bad)

经济发展（怀）

jingji fazhan (huai)

Peaceful Development

和平发展／和平与发展

heping fazhan/heping yu
fazhan

Internal Development
(Good)

内部发展（好）

neibu fazhan (hao)

Internal Development (Bad)

内部发展（怀）

neibufazhan (huai)

External Development
(Good)

外部发展（好）

waibu fazhan (hao)

External Development (Bad) 外部发展（怀）

waibu fazhan (huai)

Foreign Aid (Good)

外援（好）

waiyuan (hao)

Foreign Aid (Bad)

外援（怀）

waiyuan (huai)

Foreign Direct Investment
(Good)

外国直接投资（好）

waiguo zhijie touzi (hao)

Foreign Direct Investment
(Bad)

外国直接投资（怀）

waiguo zhijie touzi (huai)

